This work offers an analysis of all the legal and moral issues surrounding humanitarian intervention: the deaths of innocent persons and the Doctrine of Double Effect Governmental legitimacy - The Doctrine of Effective Political Control; UN Charter and evaluation of the Nicaragua ruling; The Morality of not intervening; US-led invasion of Iraq; Humanitarian intervention authorised by the UN Security Council - Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia among others highlight NATO's intervention in Kosovo; The Nicaragua Decision; and The precedents (...) of Panama, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The book's features include: a new framework based on the doctrine of double effect; basic principles of international ethics; outline of the moral argument for humanitarian intervention; explores the morality and legality of military action to end tyranny or anarchy; arguments in a much more detailed and complete fashion than in previous editions; in-depth examination of philosophy of international law; the relationship between custom and moral theory; new discussion of the question of right authority; and a full analysis of recent interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. book addresses a broad interdisciplinary audience of international lawyers, philosophers, and political scientists. In this new edition, the author responds to critics while updating the discussion in the light of the momentous events that took place at the beginning of the new millennium. (shrink)

Afryka postkolonialna była, jest i będzie targana konfliktami o naturze separatystycznej. Najsłynniejsze już próby secesji w Afryce to przypadki Katangi (w latach 1960–1963) oraz Biafry (w latach 1967–1970). Wojna w Erytrei (w latach 1961–1991) to jedyny jak dotąd afrykański konflikt separatystyczny, który skończył się ustanowieniem nowego państwa (1993 rok). Charakter separatystyczny mają również dwa krwawe konflikty w Sudanie Południowym (w latach 1961–1972 i 1983–2005). Od 1975 roku aż do dzisiaj Etiopia zmaga się ze zbrojnym separatyzmem w Ogadenie. Irredentystyczna idea budowy (...) Wielkiej Somalii, tj. zjednoczenia w jednym państwie wszystkich Somalów, leżała u podłoża wojny, jaką w Ogadenie stoczyły ze sobą Etiopia i Somalia w latach 1977–1978. W 1981 roku wybuchł konflikt w północnej Somalii, która w 1991 roku ogłosiła niepodległość jako Somaliland. Choć krajowi temu brakuje uznania międzynarodowego, Somaliland posiada wszelkie inne atrybuty państwa, w przeciwieństwie do pozostającej od lat w stanie upadku Republiki Somalii. To tylko niektóre z, często już historycznych, przykładów zbrojnego separatyzmu na kontynencie afrykańskim – te najbardziej krwawe czy długotrwałe. Zbrojny separatyzm obecny jest jednak współcześnie w wielu innych miejscach Afryki. Prawie każde położone na południe od Sahary państwo tego kontynentu posiada potencjalne warunki do rozwoju separatyzmu. Przebieg niemal wszystkich granic w Afryce został arbitralnie ustanowiony przez mocarstwa kolonialne jeszcze w XIX wieku. Większość granic dzieli jakiś lud na nominalnych obywateli różnych organizmów państwowych. Z drugiej strony w granicach jednego państwa zamieszkuje niejednokrotnie wiele ludów o odmiennym pochodzeniu etnicznym oraz różnej kulturze i wierzeniach. Wieloetniczność i różnorodność kulturowa nie są same w sobie przyczynami dążeń separatystycznych, choć zwykle stanowią dla nich bardzo ważne podłoże. (shrink)

Religiously inspired violence is a global phenomenon and connects to transnational narratives, necessitating comparative analysis of socio-historical context and patterns of ideological mobilization. Northeast Africa hosts several radical-extremist and terrorist groups, mostly of Muslim persuasion, tuned in to these global narratives while connecting to local interests. Christian radicalism and violence also occur but are less ideologically consistent and less widespread. I examine key aspects of the current role and ideological self-positioning of Islamist radicalism in state contexts, comparing Somalia, affected (...) by Islamist violence since the late 1990s, and Ethiopia, where Islam’s mobilization followed a different path and where the state so far contained politicization and open radicalism of Muslim groups. A brief contrastive case from Nigeria is also provided. It is observed that Islam, while of course not ‘equalling’ violence, easily provides a militant political theology, frequently instrumentalized in conflicts and situations of (perceived) grievance, and via mimetic rivalry then becomes radically ideological. Securitized response patterns of state authorities toward militancy play a role in furthering violent radicalization. I follow a sociological-anthropological approach but also refer to key aspects of national-legal frameworks regarding state and religion, next to societal and political bases of Muslim militant mobilization for collective aims and self-presentation. (shrink)

This is a conference paper presented at conference “Problem of the Poverty in the Islamic World, Reasons and Solutions” organized by International Islamic University of Malaysia, High Institution, Malaysia, December 2004, and published in the book Vol 2, December, p181-201. In this paper, I have discussed the relationship between Globalization and Poverty that is increasing these days, and I have considered the following questions: • Would the number of the world’s poor increasing or decreasing ? • Would most people get (...) the basic items which are necessary for them to survive, or the people would die of starvation? • Would the number of children who suffer of poor nutrition become fewer, and the child labor would disappear? • Would the Air become more pure and the number of people who die of air pollution would become less? Then, I presented two examples of this phenomenon, which are poverty in Somalia and poverty in Algeria. (shrink)

Seit kurzem wird des öfteren in Deutschland die Ansicht geäußert, Deutschland solle nun seine fremdenfeindliche Vergangenheit im Zweiten Weltkrieg endlich hinter sich lassen und von nun ab als >>normalisiertes<< Land der Zukunft gegenübertreten. Diese Meinung entsteht aus der Voraussetzung, daß Deutschland durch seine Geschichte von Xenophobie und Genozid im Zweiten Weltkrieg als abnormal, als ungewöhnlich gekennzeichnet ist. Aber das ist nicht wahr. Deutschlands blutige Geschichte ist mit derjenigen der Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritanniens, der Niederlande, Rußlands, Chinas, Japans, der Türkei, Vietnams, Kambodschas, (...) Somalias, Ruandas, des Irak, des Kosovo, Bosniens, und anderer Länder vergleichbar. Zu vergleichen bedeutet weder zu relativieren, noch zu entschuldigen, sondern bloß anzuerkennen, daß die Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, die in verschiedenen Ländern stattfinden, einige gemeinsame Eigenschaften haben. (shrink)

The book “The Dialectic of Globalization between Selection and Rejection” consists of five chapters. The first chapter focuses on the literature of globalization, the origins and its definitions. The second chapter covers forms of Globalization, Globalization of information, environment, money, crime, politics, economics, communications as well as any other area of life. The third chapter is the relationship between Globalization and the phenomenon of poverty which is increasing in the contemporary world, and presented two examples of this phenomenon, namely, poverty (...) in Somalia and poverty in Algeria. The fourth chapter explains the phenomenon of euthanasia in the light of Globalization through its definition, its intellectual, economic, and political history, and the ethical question about euthanasia. Finally, the fifth chapter discusses the relationship between Globalization and Development, then Globalization in the Arab world and the positive elements of Globalization. -/- The author published other books in philosophical and intellectual questions. The most important of his books are: (2009) Greek Philosophy ; (2006 ) Mind and Criticism; (2005)Despotism in Modern Arab Government (co-author); (2004) Aristotle’s Criticism of Pre-Socratic Natural Philosophy; (2004) Muslim Arab Civilization(co-author); ( 2004)Global Issues(co-author);( 2003 ) the Development of Philosophical Thought(co-author); (2002)Theory of Ideas: The Construction of Plato and Aristotle’s Criticism. (shrink)

Attacks on migrant and refugee entrepreneurs and their properties by South African rivals and ordinary citizens have become a common phenomenon throughout the country, including the city of Cape Town. Business robberies often result in deaths or serious injuries. The Somali Community Board has noted that over 400 Somali refugees, many of them informal traders, were murdered in South Africa between early 2002 and mid-2010. The police are frequently accused by migrants of fomenting or turning a blind eye to xenophobic (...) attacks on their businesses. Meanwhile, the government refuses to acknowledge the existence of xenophobia or the xenophobic rhetoric in many of these attacks, claiming instead that they are simply the actions of criminal elements. Photographs published in the media of the looting of migrant stores do not tend to feature hardened criminals, but ordinary citizens including children in school uniform. -/- Migrant businesses are portrayed by officials, citizens and the media as having a negative impact on the South African economy and undermining the livelihoods of South Africans. The prevalence of such perceptions helps to explain growing xenophobic sentiment against migrants and refugees. Contrary to these popular perceptions, an emerging literature on migrant entrepreneurship is beginning to demonstrate the positive economic contributions of migrants and refugees to the country. This report examines the nature of informal migrant and refugee entrepreneurship in Cape Town and whether or not the negative stereotypes have any validity. It also seeks to examine what economic contributions migrants and refugees make to the local economy. -/- The report is based on the research conducted by the Growing Informal Cities project, a partnership between SAMP/IMRC, the African Centre for Cities at the University of Cape Town, the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) and Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. A questionnaire was administered to a sample of 518 migrant owners of microenterprises, which had to meet three basic criteria for inclusion: (a) owned by a non-South African; (b) in operation for at least two years; and (c) unregistered with the South African Revenue Services (SARS). Although migrant entrepreneurs are located in most areas of the city, certain areas have particular concentrations of migrant-owned businesses. "e questionnaires were administered in four such areas: Imizamo Yethu, Philippi, Bellville, and Cape Town CBD. Thirty in-depth interviews were also conducted with selected owners of informal micro-enterprises. Two focus group discussions were held in the Cape Town CBD and Philippi respectively. Fifteen key informant interviews were held with various stakeholders in Cape Town to understand the operation and constraints faced by migrants operating in the city’s informal economy. -/- The major findings of the personal profile of the migrant and refugee entrepreneurs were as follows: -/- • The entrepreneurs came from over 20 different countries of which Zimbabwe, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Malawi, Ethiopia and Cameroon were the most prominent. Just over a third were from other countries in the SADC. The prominence of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in the Cape Town informal economy is not surprising, given the events in that country over the past decade and a half and resultant mass migration to South Africa. A total of 57% of the entrepreneurs were from other African countries, especially the DRC, Somalia, Nigeria and Ethiopia. "e majority of migrants from these countries (except Nigeria) came to South Africa as refugees. -/- • A third of the entrepreneurs had refugee permits. Of these, nearly 60% came from only three countries: the DRC, Ethiopia and Somalia. A further 31% held asylum-seeker permits. Of these, 32% were Zimbabwean while another 30% came from DRC, Ethiopia and Somalia. Nearly 12% had permanent residence permits while 8% were holders of work permits. Only 7% of the respondents indicated that they did not have official documentation to stay in South Africa. Thus, the majority of migrant entrepreneurs have forced migrants who are entitled to human rights protection under international and South African refugee law. • Very few of the entrepreneurs entered South Africa before 1994. Only 8% arrived in the immediate post-apartheid years. While another 20% came in the period 2000to 2004, the vast majority (70%) came during the last decade. As many as 44% arrived between 2005 and 2009 and a further 27% thereafter. Migration from Zimbabwe, in particular, escalated between 2005 and 2009 as the country plunged deeper into crisis. • Despite the perception that unemployment at home is a driver of migration to South Africa, only 14% of the entrepreneurs were unemployed immediately before leaving for South Africa. Another 19% were students. Twenty-six percent were working in the informal economy in their home countries. -/- .......INCOMPLETE..... (shrink)