5 found
Order:
  1. (1 other version)Monism and Particularism: Methodology in Brentano’s Psychology.Tănăsescu Ion - 2019 - Axiomathes (4):397–412.
    The paper argues that Brentano was the exponent of a methodological monism, which is based on the requirement that science should be grounded on experience, and not on a speculative-idealistic principle, as in the case of German idealism. In Brentano’s psychological writings, this methodological requirement concretized in two different theses: (T1) The method of psychology is identical with the method of natural science; (T2) The method of psychology is inspired by the method of natural science. The thesis of this study (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. (1 other version)The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of Classification of Philosophical Sciences in Brentano’s empirical Psychology.Tănăsescu Ion - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):243-263.
    In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: (i) the intentional inexistence of an object, (ii) the relation to a content, and (iii) the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The two Theories of Intentionality in Brentano and the Program of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.Tănăsescu Ion - 2015 - Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 13 (Brentano’s Concept of Intentiona):211-231.
    The paper defends the following thesis: the intentionality passage from Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) can be interpre- ted from two perspectives: intentionality as the most salient distinguishing feature separating the mental from the physical, and intentionality as a the- ory of the way in which mental acts, with their contents, are related to ex- tra-mental objects. Fundamentally, the theory of intentionality from 1874 is an example of the former. Its role is that of allowing the establishment of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. THE TWO THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY IN BRENTANO AND CHISHOLM's ONTOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THESES.Tănăsescu Ion - 2020 - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 42 (2):341-350.
    R. M. Chisholm interprets Brentano’s theory of intentionality through the lens of two theses: the ontological thesis, according to which the intentionality of the mental designates the fact that there is an immanent object in the act; and the psychological thesis, according to which intentionality consists of the direction of the mental act toward the extra-mental object. In my paper I interpret Chisholm’s and Brentano’s theses on intentionality from two perspectives: intentionality as the most salient distinguishing feature separating the mental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Die Phasentheorie. Franz Brentano und Auguste Comte.Tănăsescu Ion - 2017 - Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 15 (Der frühe Brentano):329-360.
    Die Abhandlung entwickelt und vertritt folgende Thesen: (1) Brentanos Vier-Phasen-Theorie wurde unabhängig von Comtes Drei-Stadien-Gesetz entworfen . (2) Aber Brentano legte großen Wert darauf, die Übereinstim- mung beider Theorien zu unterstreichen . (3) Beide Theorien gehen von verschiedenen Geschichtsauffassungen aus: Comtes Theorie schließt die Geschichte der fundamentalen positiven Wissenschaften ein, die geradli- nig verläuft, stets aufwärts führt und durch keine gesetzmäßig auftretenden Verfallsphasen belastet wird, aber dennoch Stagnationen kennt . Dagegen bezieht sich Brentanos Theorie vorwiegend auf die Geschichte der Philo- (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark