Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in (...) philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked. (shrink)

“Realization” and “emergence” are two concepts that are sometimes used to describe same or similar phenomena in philosophy of mind and the special sciences, where such phenomena involve the synchronic dependence of some higher-level states of affairs on the lower-level ones. According to a popular line of thought, higher-level properties that are invoked in the special sciences are realized by, and/or emergent from, lower-level, broadly physical, properties. So, these two concepts are taken to refer to relations between properties from different (...) levels where the lower-level ones somehow “bring about” the higher-level ones. However, for those who specialise in inter-level relations, there are important differences between these two concepts – especially if emergence is understood as strong emergence. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these differences. (shrink)

What marks emergence as a metaphysically interesting idea is that many macro-level entities and their properties are ontologically and causally autonomous in relation to the micro-level entities and properties they depend on---or so argues Jessica Wilson in Metaphysical Emergence (2021). To do so, she adopts a “metaphysically highly neutral” (p. 32) approach to questions about powers, causation, properties, and laws. That is, while explaining what emergence is and arguing that there is indeed emergence in the natural world, she doesn’t restrict (...) her analyses and arguments to any specific metaphysical accounts of these concepts, and she doesn’t commit to any controversial theses about them. In this article, I assess Wilson’s project against this methodological ideal of metaphysical neutrality. (shrink)

In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are (...) false. Furthermore, making use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and anti-physicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of physicalism and anti-physicalism are superior to their more traditional counterparts. (shrink)

This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. One conclusion is (...) that it is not obvious if qualia epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false—or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, physicalism, and non-physicalist property dualism are further explored. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such (...) alterations are redundant. No reliabilist should fear the demon. (shrink)

I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes (...) are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states. (shrink)

The nomic view of dispositions holds that properties confer dispositions on their bearers with nomological necessity. The argument against nomic dispositions challenges the nomic view: if the nomic view is true, then objects don't have dispositions, but 'mimic' them. This paper presents an explication of disposition conferral which shows that the nomic view is not vulnerable to this objection.

Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as ‘the subset view’ of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said (...) explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers. (shrink)

_The Multiple Realization Book_By PolgerThomas W. and ShapiroLawrence A.Oxford University Press, 2016. xiv + 258 pp. £71.14 cloth, £18.99 paper.

One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to reproduce the non-sensory feelings that are normally associated with visual experiences, especially hedonic and aesthetic responses. This limitation is sometimes reported to cause SSD users frustration. To make matters worse, it is unclear that improvements in acuity, bandwidth, or training will resolve the issue. Yet, if SSDs are to actually reproduce visual experience in its fullness, it seems that the reproduction of non-sensory feelings will be of (...) some importance. We offer a novel solution. Researchers can produce hedonic and aesthetic responses by eliciting these feelings artificially, pairing distal objects that should be pleasurable to pleasurable stimulus outputs from the SSD. We outline two strategies for accomplishing this: first, by means of a prefixed, hardwired, association of pleasant distal objects to pleasant stimulus outputs from the SSD; second, by means of a flexible, feedback-based association which creates associations based on a subject-directed matching of distal objects to patterns of stimuli from the SSD which the subject takes to have the corresponding hedonic properties. We evaluate some problems with both strategies, and we argue that the feedback-based strategy is more promising. Researchers can use this strategy to help the blind, allowing them to take pleasure in the objects they perceive using SSDs. (shrink)

This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the workshop on sensory substitution and augmentation at the British Academy, March 26th through 28th, 2013.

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Does sensory substitution generate perceptual or cognitive states?

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: How does sensory substitution interact with the brain’s architecture?

The aim of this research is to examine the public policy influences on academic investigations that contain a substantial convergence among human resource management–industrial relations and corporate social responsibility–stakeholder approach by means of using bibliometric and content analyses of relevant publications in the Scopus and ScienceDirect databases. Totally, 160 publications were subject to bibliometric, cluster, and summative content analyses. In this context, this study claims that public policy in the EU influences academic investigations and scholars. The investigation draws attention to (...) the importance of active participation of different public institutions and key stakeholders (e.g., trade unions, works councils, academic associations) that prepare a basis for collaboration, solidarity, and communication for strengthening EU social model, social dialogue, collective bargaining, and the protection of social rights. The research findings illuminate the fact that European public policies have significant effects on shaping and encouraging investigations that are considered within the scope of IR–HRM and CSR–SA. One of the most crucial recommendations of this study is that the investigations which are out of this framework can be considered quite idealistic. Therefore, researchers may attempt to publish more scientific investigations in frame of IR–HRM and CSR–SA to enhance the comprehensiveness and depth of these two clusters. (shrink)

Strong emergentism is the position that certain higher-level properties display a kind of metaphysical autonomy from the lower-level properties in which they are grounded. The prospect of collapse is a problem for strong emergentism. According to those who press the collapse problem any purportedly strongly emergent feature inheres in the emergence base and so is not genuinely autonomous from that base. Umut Baysan and Jessica Wilson argue that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem. In this paper, I challenge the (...) claim that power emergentism avoids the collapse problem and argue for explanatory emergentism in its place. (shrink)

21. yüzyılın üçüncü on yılının şafağında, insanlığın varlığı son derece tehlikeli hale geldi. Ormanlarımızı kesiyor, tatlı su akiferlerimizi tüketiyor ve hayati önem taşıyan topraklarımızı kaybediyoruz. Okyanuslarımızdaki yaşamı sıyırıp yerine yüz milyonlarca ton plastik atık koyuyoruz. Çevremizi toksik endüstriyel kimyasallarla dolduruyoruz. Kirliliğimiz, kıtalardaki yaşamın dokusunu parçalayan ısı dalgalarına, kuraklıklara ve vahşi yangınlara neden olan iklim değişikliğini tetikliyor. Ve dünyaya yeni nesiller getiriyoruz, onurlu bir varoluşun kaynaklarına erişmeye ihtiyaç duyan milyonlarca insan. Hayata yönelik tehditlerin kapsamı ve genişliği her geçen gün artmaktadır. Bu (...) sürdürülebilir bir kalkınma şekli değildir. -/- Hastalıklarımızın temel nedeni, yanlış bir düşünce tarzından kaynaklanır. Bu tam olarak ne anlama geliyor? bu, ruhsal doğamızı inkar ederken kendimizi esas olarak maddi varlıklar olarak düşündüğümüz anlamına gelir. Maddi varlıklar olarak var olduğumuzu ve başka bir şey olmadığını düşündüğümüz için öncelikle bedenlerimizi zararlardan korumaya ve maddi varlığımızı sürdürmeye önem veririz. Manevi doğamız, eğer hiç düşünülürse, fiziksel varlığımızın ikincil bir yönü olarak ele alınır - ciddiye alınmaması gereken bir şey. Bizim için önemli olan tek şey maddi dünyada ortaya çıkan fenomenlerdir - görülebilen, duyulabilen, dokunulabilen veya ölçülebilen şeyler, ancak duyularımızın bizi aldattığını biliyoruz, duyular beynin bir yapısıdır. . Gerçek bir dünya olarak kabul ettiğimiz şey bir yanılsamadır. Pozitivist ve materyalist düşüncenin tahakkümü mantıksızlığa ve yıkıma yol açar. -/- Peki bu yaklaşım bizi nereye götürdü? Bize bir mutluluk ve tatmin duygusu getirdi mi? Her günü neşeli bir işbirliği ruhu içinde, parlak umutlar ve mutlu beklentilerle dolu kalplerimizle yaşamak yerine, kendimizi diğerlerinden soyutladık ve onları rakip veya düşman olarak gördük. Düşüncelerimiz, sonsuz bir savaş, yoksulluk, açlık ve çevresel yıkım döngüsüne yol açan şüphe, korku ve açgözlülükle dolu. Yakında uyanmadıkça ve ruhsal doğamıza dikkat etmedikçe, Dünya'da insanlık için bir gelecek olmayacak. -/- Kelimeler hayattır. Kelimeler hafiftir. Kelimeler güçtür. Kelimeler enerjidir. Sözler gerçektir. Kelimeler canlandırabilir ve kelimeler de öldürebilir. Kelimeler umut verebilir veya bizi umutsuzluğa sürükleyebilir. İnsanlar barışı inşa etmek için kelimeleri, savaşmak için kelimeleri kullanırlar. Kelimeler kültürler, dinler ve milletler arasında duvarlar oluşturabilir. Ve kelimeler de köprüler kurabilir. Bir bireyin, bir ailenin, bir topluluğun, bir ülkenin ve gezegenimizin varlığı, konuştuğumuz kelimelerin gücüyle iyiye veya kötüye yönlendirilmektedir. Konuştuğumuz kelimeler bu dünyada olan her şeyden sorumludur. Bu nedenle, konuştuğumuz kelimelerden sorumlu olmalıyız. Gelecek nesiller adına, umarım her birimiz sadece parlak, ışık dolu sözler söylemek için elimizden gelen her şeyi yaparız, böylece bir gün torunlarımız ışıkla dolu bir dünyaya doğar. Kaybedecek vakit yok. Bu andan itibaren, umarım hepimiz kullandığımız kelimelere yakından bakar ve onları parlaklık ile doldurmak için sürekli çaba gösteririz. -/- Kimse bizim için hayatımızı değiştiremez. Kimse bizim için dünyayı değiştirmeyecek. Her birimizin, konuştuğumuz her kelimenin serbest bıraktığı olağanüstü, yaratıcı gücü tanımasının ve bilinçli olarak sadece şükran, teşvik ve iyi niyetle dolu kelimeleri konuşmanın zamanı geldi. Bu andan itibaren, kendimiz ve başkaları için sevgi ve bağışlama ile rezonansa giren kelimeleri seçelim. Sadece bir adım ileri gidersek bunu kesinlikle yapabiliriz. Her seferinde bir adım, her seferinde bir kelime, bilincimizdeki trajedi ve izolasyon tohumlarını söküp onları mutluluk ve uzlaşma dalgalarına dönüştürebiliriz. Kendimiz, Toprak Ana ve gelecek nesiller adına, insanlığın Dünya üzerindeki olumlu evrimine katkıda bulunan kelimeleri kullanalım. (shrink)