Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...) concept is defined and its introduction motivated. Further, I introduce and explain the distinction between support and confirmation: put in a slogan, ‘confirmation is support by significant evidence’. The second section deals with the Riddle itself. I demonstrate that, given the provisions of the first section, not ‘anything confirms anything’: significant green-evidence confirms only green-hypotheses (and no grue-hypotheses), and significant grue-evidence confirms only grue-hypotheses (and no green-hypotheses), whichever terms we use for expressing these evidences or hypotheses. The third section rounds off my treatment. First I show that Frank Jackson’s use of his counterfactual condition is unsuccessful. Further, I argue that no unwanted consequences result, if one starts from the other, ‘objective’, definition of ‘grue’, as it constitutes no more than a mere fact of logic that cannot do any harm. Finally, I present a grue-case involving both kinds of definition, where the exclusive confirmation of either the green- or the grue-hypothesis is shown. (shrink)

It is a common intuition in scientific practice that positive instances confirm. This confirmation, at least based purely on syntactic considerations, is what Nelson Goodman’s ‘Grue Problem’, and more generally the ‘New Riddle’ of Induction, attempt to defeat. One treatment of the Grue Problem has been made along Bayesian lines, wherein the riddle reduces to a question of probability assignments. In this paper, I consider this so-called Bayesian Grue Problem and evaluate how one might proffer a solution (...) to this problem utilizing what I call a phenomenological approach. I argue that this approach to the problem can be successful on the Bayesian framework. (shrink)

The grue paradox, also called the new riddle of induction, posed a great challenge to the common understanding about induction. This paper shows that there is a close relation between the grue paradox and the problem of conditionals. This paper presents a general form of the grue predicate. Based on the general form, this paper argues that this kind of predicates can not be used for induction and prediction.

Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give a couple of examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was (...) not scaled in 1924. The predicate “greverest” is interdefinable with the predicate “green”: the predicate "green" applies to an object if either the object is greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-greverest" applies to an object if either the object is non-green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is green and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. The predicate "non-green" applies to an object if either the object is non-greverest and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is greverest and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. We know that the famous diamond called Golden Jubilee is not green. If someone (a greverest-speaker) informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest, we would automatically come to know Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a greverest object can only be either 1) green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) non-green (in case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “greverest” that we are faced with case 2, the case in which the object is both non-green and greverest, and Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924. Vice versa, if someone informed us that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not greverest, we would automatically come to know that Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. According to the definitions, a non-greverest object can only be either 1) non-green (in case Mount Everest was scaled in 1924), or 2) green (in the case Mount Everest was not scaled in 1924). Since we know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is not green, if we come to know that the Golden Jubilee diamond is also non-greverest, we would automatically know from the definition of “non-greverest” that we are faced with case 1, the case in which the object is both non-green and non-greverest, and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924. At the moment no one has yet been able to convince the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether the Golden Jubilee diamond is greverest. I am skeptical that anyone will demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether a specific object is greverest; but I would be happy if someone could demonstrate to the scientific community that he can correctly determine whether an object is greverest: that would be a good news for historical studies. The paper continues with a second example. (shrink)

State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the (...) grue predicate. (shrink)

The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole (...) discussion of these issues over the last several decades is a certain view of logic hammered out by Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Quine, and many others. Goodman’s nominalism hinges in essential ways on a certain view of formal logic with an extensional quantification theory at its core. This raises many issues, but the one issue most germane here is the conception of predicates ensconced in this view of logic. (shrink)

Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.

Hempel‘s paradox of the ravens, and his take on it, are meant to be understood as being restricted to situations where we have no additional background information. According to him, in the absence of any such information, observations of FGs confirm the hypothesis that all Fs are G. In this paper I argue against this principle by way of considering two other paradoxes of confirmation, Goodman‘s 'grue‘ paradox and the 'tacking‘ (or 'irrelevant conjunct‘) paradox. What these paradoxes reveal, I (...) argue, is that a presumption of causal realism is required to ground any confirmation; but once we grant causal realism, we have no reason to accept the central principles giving rise to the paradoxes. (shrink)

Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...) arguments that pertain to the choice between these strategies: the Raven Paradox, the Duhem/Quine problem and the Grue Paradox. Finally, I outline an evolutionary criticism of inductive Bayesian approaches based on my assumption of doxastic involuntarism. (shrink)

On page 14 of "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences" (section 4 of chapter 1) by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin is written: “Since ‘blue’ and ‘green’ are interdefinable with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, the question of which pair is basic and which pair derived is entirely a question of which pair we start with”. This paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “grueb”, which is a predicate that applies (...) to an object if the object either is green and examined before time b, or is non-green and not examined before time b. The three predicates “green”, “grueb”, “examined before time b” are interdefinable. According to Goodman, since the predicates “blue” and “green” are interdefinable with the predicates “grue” and “bleen”, “if we can tell which objects are blue and which objects are green, we can tell which ones are grue and which ones are bleen” [pages 12-13 of “Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences”]. But , even though the predicates “green” and “examined before time b” are interdefinable, being able to tell if an object is green does not imply being able to tell if an object is examined before time b. The interdefinability among three elements is a type of interdefinability present, for example, also among the logical connectives. Another example of interdefinability is that one about a decidable predicate PD, which is interdefinable with an undecidable predicate PU: therefore even though we can tell whether an object is PD and whether an object is non-PD, we cannot tell whether an object is PU (since PU is an undecidable predicate) and whether an object is non-PU. Although the predicates PD and PU are interdefinable, the possibility to determine whether an object is PD does not imply the possibility to determine whether an object is PU (since PU is an undecidable predicate). Similarly, although the predicates “green” and “grue” are interdefinable, the possibility to determine whether an object is “green” even in absence of temporal information does not imply the possibility to determine whether an object is “grue” even in absence of temporal information. These and other examples about “grue” and “bleen” point out that even in case two predicates are interdefinable, the possibility to apply a predicate P does not imply the possibility to apply a predicate interdefinable with P. And that the possibility to apply the predicate “green” without having temporal information does not imply the possibility to apply the predicate “grue” without having temporal information. According to Goodman, if it is possible to determine if an object is green without needing temporal information, then it is also possible to determine if an object is grue without needing temporal information. But, knowing that an object is both green and grue implies temporal information: in fact, we know by definition that a grue object can only be: 1) either green (in case the object is examined before time t); 2) or blue (in case the object is not examined before time t). Thus, knowing that an object is both grue and green, we know that we are faced with case 1, the case of a grue object that is green and examined before time t. Then the paper points out why the Goodman-Kripke paradox is a paradox about meaning that cannot have repercussions on induction. Finally the paper points out why Hume’s problem is a problem different from Goodman’s paradox and requires a specific treatment. (shrink)

In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted ‘the metaphysician Carnap ’ amongst his historical ancestors. Here I provide a novel interpretation of the Aufbau that allows us to make sense of Lewis’s claim. Drawing upon Lewis’s correspondence, I argue it was the Carnap of the Aufbau whom Lewis read as a metaphysician, because Carnap’s appeal to the notion of founded relations in the Aufbau echoes Lewis’s own appeal to the metaphysics of natural properties. (...) I further maintain that Lewis was right to read Carnap this way and that the notion of a founded relation has a legitimate claim to be both logical and metaphysical. I also argue that Carnap’s initial response to Goodman’s puzzle about ‘grue’ relies upon a metaphysics of simple properties which also prefigures Lewis’s own response to Goodman invoking natural properties. (shrink)

The intuitive distinction between natural and unnatural properties (e.g., green vs. grue) informs our theorizing not only in fundamental physics, but also in non-fundamental domains. This paper develops a reductive account of this broad notion of naturalness that covers non-fundamental properties: for a property to be natural, I propose, is for it to figure in a law of nature. After motivating the account, I defend it from a potential circularity charge. I argue that a suitably broad notion of lawhood (...) can be defined independently of naturalness, if we help ourselves to the notion of a fundamental physical property. I end by showing how the notions of naturalness and lawhood that my account delivers help illuminate a number of other important philosophical notions, like causation, reference/meaning, and rational induction. (shrink)

I explain the New Riddle of Induction (Goodman 1946, 1955) in very brief words.

This paper consists of an investigation of three debates concerning propositional identity: the tension between structured propositions and higher-order logic, the principle Only Logical Circles, and Kaplan’s Paradox. The literature at large has mistaken the consequences of each of these debates. Structuralists are not committed to the claim that identical properties have different extensions; rather, they are committed to existence monism. Only Logical Circles does not preclude the identification of green in terms of grue; some further (and, as of (...) yet, undisclosed) principle is required for that result. And Kaplan’s Paradox does not count against the possible-worlds conception of propositions; it applies to every account of propositions whatsoever. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that (elementary) topology may be useful for dealing with problems of epistemology and metaphysics. More precisely, I want to show that the introduction of topological structures may elucidate the role of the spatial structures (in a broad sense) that underly logic and cognition. In some detail I’ll deal with “Cassirer’s problem” that may be characterized as an early forrunner of Goodman’s “grue-bleen” problem. On a larger scale, topology turns out to be (...) useful in elaborating the approach of conceptual spaces that in the last twenty years or so has found quite a few applications in cognitive science, psychology, and linguistics. In particular, topology may help distinguish “natural” from “not-so-natural” concepts. This classical problem that up to now has withstood all efforts to solve (or dissolve) it by purely logical methods. Finally, in order to show that a topological perspective may also offer a fresh look on classical metaphysical problems, it is shown that Leibniz’s famous principle of the identity of indiscernibles is closely related to some well-known topological separation axioms. More precisely, the topological perspective gives rise in a natural way to some novel variations of Leibniz’s principle. (shrink)

Some properties – like charge – are natural, some – like grue are unnatural. The distinction between natural and unnatural properties is normally taken as primitive. However, Barry Loewer’s Package Deal Account (PDA) aims to provide an reductive account of natural properties, integrated with a reductive account of laws of nature. In addition, the account seems to be able to apply to natural properties at the level of fundamental physics, and higher-level, special science, properties. -/- If the account is (...) successful, then, it looks to be incredibly powerful and attractive. The PDA, however, is somewhat underexplored in the literature. So the first aim of the paper is to understand the PDA better -- to map the connections between naturalness and laws on the traditional BSA and to consider how those connections have to adapted in order to develop different versions of the PDA. -/- The second aim is to start to evaluate different versions of the PDA. In particular, perhaps the most promising version of the PDA construes it as an instance of a larger approach to Humeanism — one that has been very visible in the recent literature — that focuses on the role of 'ideal observers' or 'ideal scientists'. While such an approach might be feasible, I claim, it gets its proponents much less than they were originally hoping for. (shrink)

The extensions of Goodman’s ‘grue’ predicate and Kripke’s ‘quus’ are constructed from the extensions of more familiar terms via a reinterpretation that permutes assignments of reference. Since this manoeuvre is at the heart of Putnam’s model-theoretic and permutation arguments against metaphysical realism (‘Putnam’s Paradox’), both Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction and the paradox about meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are instances of Putnam’s. Evidence cannot selectively confirm the green-hypothesis and disconfirm the grue-hypothesis, because the theory of which (...) the green-hypothesis is a part has an unintended model in which the grue-hypothesis is equally confirmed; and there are no meaning-facts that determine reference, because the objects referred to by the referring terms of any language or set of intentional mental states are permutable in a way that is consistent with the truth-values of all other sentences in that language or beliefs in that set. The upshot is that the three paradoxes need to be solved in a unified way. (shrink)

I present a solution to the epistemological or characterisation problem of induction. In part I, Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) is discussed as a good contender for such a solution but with a fundamental explanatory gap (along with other well discussed problems); useful assigned probabilities like priors require substantive degrees of belief about the world. I assert that one does not have such substantive information about the world. Consequently, an explanation is needed for how one can be licensed to act as (...) if one has substantive information about the world when one does not. I sketch the outlines of a solution in part I, showing how it differs from others, with full details to follow in subsequent parts. The solution is pragmatic in sentiment (though differs in specifics to arguments from, for example, William James); the conceptions we use to guide our actions are and should be at least partly determined by preferences. This is cashed out in a reformulation of decision theory motivated by a non-reductive formulation of hypotheses and logic. A distinction emerges between initial assumptions--that can be non-dogmatic--and effective assumptions that can simultaneously be substantive. An explanation is provided for the plausibility arguments used to explain assigned probabilities in BCT. -/- In subsequent parts, logic is constructed from principles independent of language and mind. In particular, propositions are defined to not have form. Probabilities are logical and uniquely determined by assumptions. The problems considered fatal to logical probabilities--Goodman's `grue' problem and the uniqueness of priors problem are dissolved due to the particular formulation of logic used. Other problems such as the zero-prior problem are also solved. -/- A universal theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed. Problems with counterfactual conditionals are solved by developing concepts of abstractions and corresponding pictures that make up hypotheses. Spaces of hypotheses and the version of Bayes' theorem that utilises them emerge from first principles. -/- Theoretical virtues for hypotheses emerge from the theory. Explanatory force is explicated. The significance of effective assumptions is partly determined by combinatoric factors relating to the structure of hypotheses. I conjecture that this is the origin of simplicity. (shrink)

This paper fills a gap in the existing metaphilosophical research on paradoxes byfocusing on the role of scenarios. Typical philosophical paradoxes contain a scenariodescription whose contribution to paradoxes remains unexplored. I argue that sce-narios are examples or instantiations of the abstract schema of paradoxes. As such,scenarios contribute to paradoxes on two levels. First, they make the argument moreconcrete, thus enhancing the dialectical force of paradoxes and facilitating their under-standing, especially for non-experts. This function is external to the paradox itself, buthas (...) important practical implications for the use of paradoxes and their effect on philo-sophical debates, and it contributes to explaining why philosophical paradoxes areusually introduced by a scenario. Second, and more crucially, scenarios are essentialto the epistemic dimension of paradoxes. By definition, paradoxes have two neces-sary components: the argumentative structure and the plausibility/implausibility ofthe premises/conclusion. By providing examples of the abstract schema, scenarioscontribute to making the premises plausible. In particular, scenarios are the source ofplausibility and justification for those premises that contain an empirically groundedassertion of existence. Examples of such paradoxes are the Sorites paradox, the Lot-tery paradox, and the Grue paradox. Contrary to the dialectical role, the epistemicfunction of scenarios is indispensable, as it connects paradoxes to the real world andunderscores their significance in specific debates. (shrink)

Historically, Nelson Goodman’s paradox involving the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ has been taken to furnish a serious blow to Carl Hempel’s theory of confirmation in particular and to purely formal theories of confirmation in general. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s paradox is no more serious of a threat to Hempel’s theory of confirmation than is Hempel’s own paradox of the ravens. I proceed by developing a suggestion from R. D. Rosenkrantz into an argument for the conclusion that (...) these paradoxes are, in fact, equivalent. My argument, if successful, is of both historical and philosophical interest. Goodman himself maintained that Hempel’s theory of confirmation was capable of handling the paradox of the ravens. And Hempel eventually conceded that Goodman’s paradox showed that there could be no adequate, purely syntactical theory of confirmation. The conclusion of my argument entails, by contrast, that Hempel’s theory of confirmation is incapable of handling Goodman’s paradox if and only if it is incapable of handling the paradox of the ravens. It also entails that for any adequate solution to one of these paradoxes, there is a corresponding and equally adequate solution to the other. (shrink)

Anne TIHON, Théorie et réalité : l’exemple de l’astronomie an­cienne (pp. 7-23) ; Isabelle DRAELANTS, Les encyclopédies com­me sommes des connaissances, d’Isidore de Séville au XIIIe siè­cle, avec les fondements antiques (pp. 25-50) ; Andrée COLINET, Alchimie antique et médiévale avant 1300 : mystères et réalités (pp. 51-70) ; Baudouin VAN DEN ABEELE, Quelques pas de grue à travers l’histoire naturelle médiévale : un regard diversifié sur le réel (pp. 71-98) ; Régine LEURQUIN, L’astrolabe plan (pp. 99- 117) ; (...) Patricia RADELET-DE GRAVE, Copernic, Stevin, Galilée et la réalité des orbites célestes (pp. 119-151) ; Brigitte VAN TIGGELEN, Étiqueter ou définir : le réalisme dans la nomen­cla­ture chimique aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (pp. 153-183) ; Michel GHINS, L’existence de l’espace et du temps selon Leon­hard Euler (pp. 185-193) ; Chantal TILMANS-CABIAUX, Le rap­port de l’idée théorique à l’expérimentation chez Hahnemann : le système homéo­pathique naissant et le réalisme (pp. 195-214) ; Jean MAWHIN, La Terre tourne-t-elle ? À propos de la philosophie scientifique de Poincaré (pp. 215-252) ; Michel WILLEM, Paul Lévy et les fondements du calcul des probabilités (pp. 253-263). (shrink)

This paper advocates a new reading of Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. According to Ian Hacking, this famous problem conveys a “pure nominalism”, as it grounds Goodman’s denial regarding the existence of natural kinds. While this interpretation is somewhat convincing, it suffers the major flaw of not corresponding to what Goodman himself understood by “nominalism”. Nominalism, in a goodmanian sense, is indeed primarily a technical demand, which stems from the so-called “calculus of individuals”. I argue that this mereological definition (...) of nominalism allows to understand the new riddle of induction afresh. As a result, Goodman’s riddle is “hyper-nominalist”, i.e., nominalist in a distinct and stronger sense than what Hacking suggested. (shrink)

English translation of a paper intially publisdhed in French in Dialogue under the title 'Une solution pour le paradoxe de Goodman'. In the classical version of Goodman's paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of n-universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given n-universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in (...) an n-universe the variables of which are colour and time; (ii) in an n-universe the variables of which are colour, time and space. Finally, I show that each of these versions admits a specific resolution. (shrink)

Article presenting basic methodological tenets in Goodman's philosophical development with their mutual connections, like the new riddle of indutcion, counterfactual conditionals and his use of reflective equilibrium as a methodological basis.