Results for 'grue'

24 found
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  1. Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  2. On the general form of the Grue Paradox.Chaohui Zhuang - manuscript
    The grue paradox, also called the new riddle of induction, posed a great challenge to the common understanding about induction. This paper shows that there is a close relation between the grue paradox and the problem of conditionals. This paper presents a general form of the grue predicate. Based on the general form, this paper argues that this kind of predicates can not be used for induction and prediction.
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  3. A Phenomenological Approach to the Bayesian Grue Problem.Ibrahim Dagher - 2022 - Aporia 22 (1):1-12.
    It is a common intuition in scientific practice that positive instances confirm. This confirmation, at least based purely on syntactic considerations, is what Nelson Goodman’s ‘Grue Problem’, and more generally the ‘New Riddle’ of Induction, attempt to defeat. One treatment of the Grue Problem has been made along Bayesian lines, wherein the riddle reduces to a question of probability assignments. In this paper, I consider this so-called Bayesian Grue Problem and evaluate how one might proffer a solution (...)
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  4. Nominalism and the Infinite Knowledge It Implies.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give a couple of examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was (...)
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  5. O Problema da Indução.Eduardo Castro & Diogo Fernandes - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the (...)
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  6. Qualities, Universals, Kinds, and the New Riddle of induction.F. Thomas Burke - 2002 - In F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), Dewey's logical theory: new studies and interpretations. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
    The limited aim here is to explain what John Dewey might say about the formulation of the grue example. Nelson Goodman’s problem of distinguishing good and bad inductive inferences is an important one, but the grue example misconstrues this complex problem for certain technical reasons, due to ambiguities that contemporary logical theory has not yet come to terms with. Goodman’s problem is a problem for the theory of induction and thus for logical theory in general. Behind the whole (...)
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  7. Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction.Robert Kowalenko - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
    Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
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  8. A Neglected Response to the Paradoxes of Confirmation.Murali Ramachandran - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):179-85.
    Hempel‘s paradox of the ravens, and his take on it, are meant to be understood as being restricted to situations where we have no additional background information. According to him, in the absence of any such information, observations of FGs confirm the hypothesis that all Fs are G. In this paper I argue against this principle by way of considering two other paradoxes of confirmation, Goodman‘s 'grue‘ paradox and the 'tacking‘ (or 'irrelevant conjunct‘) paradox. What these paradoxes reveal, I (...)
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  9. Confirmation versus Falsificationism.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...)
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  10. (1 other version)Goodman’s Paradox, Hume’s Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    On page 14 of "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences" (section 4 of chapter 1) by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin is written: “Since ‘blue’ and ‘green’ are interdefinable with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, the question of which pair is basic and which pair derived is entirely a question of which pair we start with”. This paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “grueb”, which is a predicate that applies (...)
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  11. Rudolf Carnap and David Lewis on Metaphysics.Fraser MacBride - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (1).
    In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted ‘the metaphysician Carnap ’ amongst his historical ancestors. Here I provide a novel interpretation of the Aufbau that allows us to make sense of Lewis’s claim. Drawing upon Lewis’s correspondence, I argue it was the Carnap of the Aufbau whom Lewis read as a metaphysician, because Carnap’s appeal to the notion of founded relations in the Aufbau echoes Lewis’s own appeal to the metaphysics of natural properties. (...)
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  12. Naturalness by law.Verónica Gómez Sánchez - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):100-127.
    The intuitive distinction between natural and unnatural properties (e.g., green vs. grue) informs our theorizing not only in fundamental physics, but also in non-fundamental domains. This paper develops a reductive account of this broad notion of naturalness that covers non-fundamental properties: for a property to be natural, I propose, is for it to figure in a law of nature. After motivating the account, I defend it from a potential circularity charge. I argue that a suitably broad notion of lawhood (...)
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  13. Goodman's New Riddle of Induction Explained in Words of One Syllable.Sven Neth - manuscript
    I explain the New Riddle of Induction (Goodman 1946, 1955) in very brief words.
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  14. Problems for Propositions.Samuel Elgin - manuscript
    This paper consists of an investigation of three debates concerning propositional identity: the tension between structured propositions and higher-order logic, the principle Only Logical Circles, and Kaplan’s Paradox. The literature at large has mistaken the consequences of each of these debates. Structuralists are not committed to the claim that identical properties have different extensions; rather, they are committed to existence monism. Only Logical Circles does not preclude the identification of green in terms of grue; some further (and, as of (...)
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  15. Topological Aspects of Epistemology and Metaphysics.Thomas Mormann - 2020 - In Silvano Zipoli Caiani & Alberto Peruzzi (eds.), Structures Mères: Semantics, Mathematics, and Cognitive Science. Springer. pp. 135 - 152.
    The aim of this paper is to show that (elementary) topology may be useful for dealing with problems of epistemology and metaphysics. More precisely, I want to show that the introduction of topological structures may elucidate the role of the spatial structures (in a broad sense) that underly logic and cognition. In some detail I’ll deal with “Cassirer’s problem” that may be characterized as an early forrunner of Goodman’s “grue-bleen” problem. On a larger scale, topology turns out to be (...)
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  16. The Package Deal Account of Naturalness.Harjit Bhogal - 2023 - In Christian Loew, Siegfried Jaag & Michael Townsen Hicks (eds.), Humean Laws for Human Agents. Oxford: Oxford UP.
    Some properties – like charge – are natural, some – like grue are unnatural. The distinction between natural and unnatural properties is normally taken as primitive. However, Barry Loewer’s Package Deal Account (PDA) aims to provide an reductive account of natural properties, integrated with a reductive account of laws of nature. In addition, the account seems to be able to apply to natural properties at the level of fundamental physics, and higher-level, special science, properties. -/- If the account is (...)
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  17. The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):575-594.
    The extensions of Goodman’s ‘grue’ predicate and Kripke’s ‘quus’ are constructed from the extensions of more familiar terms via a reinterpretation that permutes assignments of reference. Since this manoeuvre is at the heart of Putnam’s model-theoretic and permutation arguments against metaphysical realism (‘Putnam’s Paradox’), both Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction and the paradox about meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are instances of Putnam’s. Evidence cannot selectively confirm the green-hypothesis and disconfirm the grue-hypothesis, because the theory of which (...)
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  18.  97
    The Role of Scenarios in Paradoxes.Angelica Mezzadri - 2024 - Synthese 203 (193).
    This paper fills a gap in the existing metaphilosophical research on paradoxes byfocusing on the role of scenarios. Typical philosophical paradoxes contain a scenariodescription whose contribution to paradoxes remains unexplored. I argue that sce-narios are examples or instantiations of the abstract schema of paradoxes. As such,scenarios contribute to paradoxes on two levels. First, they make the argument moreconcrete, thus enhancing the dialectical force of paradoxes and facilitating their under-standing, especially for non-experts. This function is external to the paradox itself, buthas (...)
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  19. On the equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s paradoxes.Kenneth Boyce - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:32-42.
    Historically, Nelson Goodman’s paradox involving the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ has been taken to furnish a serious blow to Carl Hempel’s theory of confirmation in particular and to purely formal theories of confirmation in general. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s paradox is no more serious of a threat to Hempel’s theory of confirmation than is Hempel’s own paradox of the ravens. I proceed by developing a suggestion from R. D. Rosenkrantz into an argument for the conclusion that (...)
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  20. (1 other version)A comprehensive theory of induction and abstraction, part I.Cael L. Hasse -
    I present a solution to the epistemological or characterisation problem of induction. In part I, Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) is discussed as a good contender for such a solution but with a fundamental explanatory gap (along with other well discussed problems); useful assigned probabilities like priors require substantive degrees of belief about the world. I assert that one does not have such substantive information about the world. Consequently, an explanation is needed for how one can be licensed to act as (...)
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  21. L'énigme du "vleu" et l'hyper-nominalisme de Goodman.Alexandre Declos - 2019 - Igitur 10 (1):1-27.
    This paper advocates a new reading of Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. According to Ian Hacking, this famous problem conveys a “pure nominalism”, as it grounds Goodman’s denial regarding the existence of natural kinds. While this interpretation is somewhat convincing, it suffers the major flaw of not corresponding to what Goodman himself understood by “nominalism”. Nominalism, in a goodmanian sense, is indeed primarily a technical demand, which stems from the so-called “calculus of individuals”. I argue that this mereological definition (...)
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  22. Le réalisme: contributions au séminaire d’histoire des sciences 1993-1994.Jean-François Stoffel - 1996 - 2300 Turnhout, Belgique: Brepols Publishers.
    Anne TIHON, Théorie et réalité : l’exemple de l’astronomie an­cienne (pp. 7-23) ; Isabelle DRAELANTS, Les encyclopédies com­me sommes des connaissances, d’Isidore de Séville au XIIIe siè­cle, avec les fondements antiques (pp. 25-50) ; Andrée COLINET, Alchimie antique et médiévale avant 1300 : mystères et réalités (pp. 51-70) ; Baudouin VAN DEN ABEELE, Quelques pas de grue à travers l’histoire naturelle médiévale : un regard diversifié sur le réel (pp. 71-98) ; Régine LEURQUIN, L’astrolabe plan (pp. 99- 117) ; (...)
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  23. A solution to Goodman's paradox.Paul Franceschi - 2001 - Dialogue 40:99-123.
    English translation of a paper intially publisdhed in French in Dialogue under the title 'Une solution pour le paradoxe de Goodman'. In the classical version of Goodman's paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of n-universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given n-universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in (...)
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  24. Goodman, Nelson.Axel Mueller - 2007 - In Noretta Koertge (ed.), New Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Thomson Gale. pp. 148-152.
    Article presenting basic methodological tenets in Goodman's philosophical development with their mutual connections, like the new riddle of indutcion, counterfactual conditionals and his use of reflective equilibrium as a methodological basis.
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