In this work we consider the problem of the approximate hedging of a contingent claim in the minimum mean square deviation criterion. A theorem on martingale representation in case of discrete time and an application of the result for semi-continuous market model are also given.

In this work, we consider the problem of the approximate hedging of a contingent claim in the minimum mean square deviation criterion. A theorem on martingaỉe representation in the case of discrete time and an application of obtained result for semi-continous market model are given.

This paper will attempt to offer a defence of to the Multiverse (MV) hypotheses, in the context of the theistic Fine Tuning Argument (FTA). It will be argued that theistic proponents of the FTA who argue that the MV hypothesis commits the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy (IGF) are, themselves, guilty of moving the goalposts when it comes to assessing the validity of the MV hypothesis. The Cosmic Slot Machine analogy will be used to demonstrate how the This Universe Objection (TUO), first (...) outlined by White (2000) and further clarified by Draper et al (2007), fails to adequately account for the anthropic principle (or selection effect). (shrink)

The concept of non-arbitrage plays an essential role in finance theory. Under certain regularity conditions, the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing states that, in non-arbitrage markets, prices of financial instruments are martingale processes. In this theoretical framework, the analysis of the statistical distributions of financial assets can assist in understanding how participants behave in the markets, and may or may not engender arbitrage conditions. Assuming an underlying Variance Gamma statistical model, this study aims to test, using the FBST - (...) Full Bayesian Significance Test, if there is a relevant price difference between essentially the same financial asset traded at two distinct locations. Specifically, we investigate and compare the behavior of call options on the BOVESPA Index traded at (a) the Equities Segment and (b) the Derivatives Segment of BM&FBovespa. Our results seem to point out significant statistical differences. To what extent this evidence is actually the expression of perennial arbitrage opportunities is still an open question. (shrink)

Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity (...) is necessary and sufficient for the rationality of predictable polarization. The main theoretical result is that there can be a series of such updates, each of which is individually expected to make you more accurate, but which together will predictably polarize you. Polarization results from asymmetric increases in accuracy. This mechanism is not only theoretically possible, but empirically plausible. I argue that cognitive search—searching a cognitively accessible space for a particular item—often yields asymmetrically ambiguous evidence, I present an experiment supporting its polarizing effects, and I use simulations to show how it can explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect. (shrink)

A standard way to challenge convergence-based accounts of inductive success is to claim that they are too weak to constrain inductive inferences in the short run. We respond to such a challenge by answering some questions raised by Juhl (1994). When it comes to predicting limiting relative frequencies in the framework of Reichenbach, we show that speed-optimal convergence—a long-run success condition—induces dynamic coherence in the short run.

There is an important sense in which one can be sure without being certain, i.e., without assigning unit probability. I will offer an explication of this sense of sureness, connecting it with the level of credence that a rational agent would need to have to be confident that she won’t ever lose her confidence. A simple formal result then gives us an explicit formula connecting the threshold α for credence needed for confidence with the threshold needed for being sure: one (...) needs 1−(1−α) to be sure. I then suggest that stepping between α and 1−(1−α) gives a procedure that generates an interesting hierarchy of credential thresholds. (shrink)