This paper argues that the plethora of experiments with decentralized social technologies (DSTs)—clusters of which are sometimes called “the Web 3.0 ecosystem” or “the Fediverse”—have brought us to a constitutional moment. These technologies enable radical innovations in social, economic, and political institutions and practices, with the potential to support transformative approaches to political economy. They demand governance innovation. The paper develops a framework of prudent vigilance for making ethical choices in this space that help to both grasp positive opportunities for (...) transformation and avoid the potentially problematic consequences. Most of our specific examples and concerns come from the blockchain/Web3 universe, as this has received the greatest investment, attention, and adoption to date. However, we aim to offer a framework for governance decision-making in conditions of uncertainty that applies more broadly to other DSTs. Specifically, under the framework of prudent vigilance, we propose a pragmatic, democratic, and pluralist approach to navigating bold experimentation with social practices and political economy enabled by these technologies. Our overarching goal is to provide a framework open to transformative improvement and constrained by guardrails and guiding values supportive of democracy, freedom, and pluralism. We take a relatively strong position, rather than simply laying out ethical issues and potential approaches. We seek to be provocative in order to spur further work and hope this paper will serve as a first bridge between academic philosophy and the DST community, which have hardly interacted to date. (shrink)

When product design teams gather at the whiteboard in big-tech office parks and startup garages around the world, they ask themselves: How will customers use our technology? Is it better than our competitors’? How much money can we make? But one question that’s rarely asked: does our technology advance human flourishing? -/- In a new white paper by Harvard professor Danielle Allen and her colleagues Eli Frankel, Woojin Lim, Divya Siddarth, Josh Simons, and Glen Weyl entitled “The Ethics of Decentralized (...) Social Technologies: Lessons from Web3, the Fediverse, and Beyond,” the authors not only ask this question but offer a powerful framework for answering it. Drawing on the accumulated wisdom of democratic societies, the authors show that the values of democratic governance that have promoted human flourishing can be translated into a rubric for judging new technologies. -/- In this short research brief, we unpack and comment on the four-step logic at the core of their case. Ultimately, their argument demonstrates the power and the challenge – and above all, the urgency – of placing human flourishing at the center of technology governance. (shrink)

This document articulates the foundational principles, legal frameworks, and strategic imperatives underpinning the establishment of Imperium Romanum a sovereign Digital Nation-State. It aims to provide a comprehensive analysis grounded in international relations, legal theory, economics, and historical prece- dents. The focus is on addressing the existential threats posed by blockchain technology, AI, social impact bonds, digital identification systems, and social engineering practices that collectively risk transforming individuals into un- witting digital subjects—a violation of international laws prohibiting unlawful imprisonment and forced (...) labor. By asserting sovereignty over unclaimed territories such as Marie Byrd Land in Antarctica for research purposes, Imperium Romanum seeks to legitimize its physical presence in accordance with international law, including the Antarctic Treaty System. This document employs advanced legal argumentation, referenc- ing precedent cases and established legal theories, to advocate for the voluntary acceptance of citizenship within Imperium Romanum as a means to counteract the unstoppable technological innovations in Web3 and FinTech that threaten individual autonomy and liberty. (shrink)

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a new, rapidly-growing class of organizations governed by smart contracts. Here we describe how researchers can contribute to the emerging science of DAOs and other digitally-constituted organizations. From granular privacy primitives to mechanism designs to model laws, we identify high-impact problems in the DAO ecosystem where existing gaps might be tackled through a new data set or by applying tools and ideas from existing research fields such as political science, computer science, economics, law, and organizational (...) science. Our recommendations encompass exciting research questions as well as promising business opportunities. We call on the wider research community to join the global effort to invent the next generation of organizations. (shrink)

Authors have written of antitrust’s demise in the face of blockchain technology which, supposedly, achieves the goals of the law, through private ordering, without a need for the law. Most importantly of all, public permissionless blockchains offer the vision of disintermediation – the end of the platform economy troubling many scholars today. At the same time, blockchain technology presents challenges to the doctrine and enforcement of antitrust. Finally, blockchain community governance allows for private ordering of antitrust, i.e., enforcement of rules (...) attempting to protect competition, which are at the same time illegal, not coming from the courts or agencies they constitute competition wrongs themselves. -/- I argue that all three claims are overstated and propose a synthesis of the law and code. The legal doctrine can be modified to tackle the novel technological landscape quite easily, with adoption of novel legal fictions. This is necessary since blockchains – both public and even more so private ones – while ingenious, do not remove a need for the law to protect the market from anti-competitive conduct. Indeed, even public ledgers have power structures allowing for abuse, while private blockchains may, in fact, allow for its proliferation. The law, thus, needs to find a regulatory access point to the ledgers. This is not an easy task: however, cooperation of blockchains with the law, and encoding of antitrust rules on the ledgers themselves, offers a possibility of a reconciliation between the law and the code. At the same time, this lends legitimacy to pro-competitive actions of those cyberspace communities and ensures a preservation of the rule of law. This is the blockchain antitrust synthesis. (shrink)