Ethics and Law

In this paper we focus on a possible framework for analysing the morality of legal entrapment (which we define based on our previous work): the dirty-hands model. We take as our starting point Christopher Nathan’s criticism of the model (when applied to undercover policing). We have two aims throughout the paper. Our primary aim is to see if the model applies at all to legal entrapment; our secondary aim is to establish whether, if the model applies, Nathan’s criticism hold for (...) it. Regarding the first aim, we present three possible versions of the model, loosely taking our inspiration from Nathan’s remarks and using the work of Janos Kis. We argue that the first two accounts don’t apply well to legal entrapment and the last, perhaps more plausible but still questionably applicable account has no room for morally wrong acts. Regarding the second aim, we argue that Nathan’s criticism of the model is not so forceful once we take account of all the resources available in the dirty-hands model. We end the paper with a brief conclusion and offer some concluding – and critical - remarks regarding a closely related alternative to the dirty-hands model as the right framework of analysis: admirable immorality. (shrink)

We attribute knowledge to institutions on a daily basis, saying things like "the government knew about the threat" or "the university did not act upon the knowledge it had about the harassment". Institutions can also attribute knowledge to themselves, like when Maybank Global Banking claims that it offers its customers "deep expertise and vast knowledge" of the Southeast Asia region, or when the United States Geological Survey states that it understands complex natural science phenomena like the probability of earthquakes occurring (...) along a given fault line. This article aims to discover when we can correctly attribute knowledge to an institution. I find this an interesting question, especially because when something does go wrong, all too often the official line of response from institutions is that they were unaware of the situation: in other words, they did not have enough information at their disposal. I will argue that institutions have fewer excuses for being ignorant than individuals do, and that many admissions of institutional knowledge are too modest. I begin by discussing a real-life example of the latter, before turning my attention to the usually fragmented nature of institutional knowledge. I also discuss the robustness of this knowledge, offering a distinction between two types of institutional knowledge. I then discuss knowledge parameters and why institutions have fewer excuses for not knowing about something than individuals do. I round off the chapter by examining institutional knowledge on climate change. (shrink)

The emerging sexual ethics that characterise the contemporary society, remains new to Africa, a phase of the erosion of African ethos, and a negation of the sacredness and classical norms of sex, which deserves to be addressed by all and sundry. It is a contemporary trend brought to fore by homosexuals, bisexuals and transsexuals, among which are the radical feminists, who indoctrinate many with the practice and continuously push very hard for legalisation and acceptance by all cultures and religions. But (...) interestingly, many cultures and religions still remain opposed to the practice and its evolved ethics since they abuse human sexuality and African ethos. Clearly, adherents and feminists of the ill-practices with the new sex ethics have lost touch with moral sanity and the metaphysical Being, God. Only worthwhile cultural traits need be borrowed into and imbibed by other cultures in contact. The rising ugly development can best be addressed through strong opposing legislations, the sustenance of cultural and moral norms and values (ethics) and attitudinal change. (shrink)

How sexuality should be regulated in a liberal political community is an important, controversial theoretical and empirical question—as shown by the recent criminalization of possession of some adult pornography in the United Kingdom. Supporters of criminalization argue that Mill, often considered a staunch opponent of censorship, would support prohibition due to his feminist commitments. I argue that this account underestimates the strengths of the Millian account of private conduct and free expression, and the consistency of Millian anticensorship with feminist values. (...) A Millian contextual defense of liberty, however, suggests several other policy approaches to addressing the harms of pornography. (shrink)

It is sometimes thought that the normative justification for responding to large-scale violations of human rights via the judicial appararatus of trial and punishment is undermined by the desirability of reconciliation between conflicting parties as part of the process of conflict resolution. I take there to be philosophical, as well as practical and psychological issues involved here: on some conceptions of punishment and reconciliation, the attitudes that they involve conflict with one another on rational grounds. But I shall argue that (...) there is a conception of political reconciliation available which does not involve forgiveness and this forms of reconciliation may be the best we can hope for in many conflicts. Reconciliation is nevertheless likely to require the expression of what Darrell Moellendorf has called 'political regret' and the denunciatory role aspect of punishment makes it particularly well-suited to this role. (shrink)

In questo saggio sono espresse alcune riflessioni concernenti l’orizzonte etico-morale proprio della scuola di materialismo indiana nota con il nome di Cārvāka/Lokāyata. La discussione si sviluppa secondo i seguenti punti: 1. Gli assunti ontologico-psicologici; 2. Gli assunti epistemologici; 3. L’etica e la morale; 4. Conclusioni.

This book offers a detailed account and analysis of the academic scandal regarding the honorary doctorate awarded to Professor Michael Walzer by Belgrade University and the events that followed.

What is the relation between moral reasons and reasons of “political necessity”? Does the authority of morality extend across political decision-making; or are there “reasons of state” which somehow either stand outside the reach of morality or override it, justifying actions that are morally wrong? This chapter argues that attempts to claim a contra-moral justification for political action typically suffer from a fundamental confusion – a confusion about the nature and expression of practical justification. The author aims to bring two (...) new things to the debate. A first aim is to show how light can be shed on this issue by examining a question that philosophers have discussed in isolation from it: the question of the relationship between moral reasons and reasons pertaining to personal well-being. This gives us a better appreciation of the range of available views about the relation of the moral to the political; more importantly, it helps to explain the fundamental challenge to the idea that there could be contra-moral justification of political action. However, it also provides us with guidance for thinking about the ways in which that challenge might be answered. There is, after all, a case to be made for thinking that some political actions can be justified even though they remain morally wrong. And those actions are of great importance to national and international politics today. (shrink)

The phenomenon of “dirty hands” is often held to be endemic to political life. Success in politics—it has been argued—requires a willingness to sacrifice our moral principles in order to pursue worthwhile goals. I argue that the tension between morality and politics goes deeper than this. The very existence of “politics” requires that morality is routinely violated because political community, within which political discourse is possible, is based on denying the moral claims of non-members. Political community requires borders and borders (...) require keeping outsiders out. Yet there is no justification that we can provide to someone outside of our political community as to why they are denied membership. The price of political community is therefore the unjust exclusion of others. In a world characterised by the movement of peoples as a result of large-scale and systematic international injustices, this exclusion often involves acts that violate important obligations of compassion and respect. Thus, “we” are the barbarians my title refers to. In order for political community to exist, we must act like barbarians at the gates. A problem of “dirty hands” therefore lies at the very foundation of political community. (shrink)