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  1. added 2019-05-11
    Good Legal Thought: What Wordsworth Can Teach Langdell About Forms, Frames, Choices, and Aims.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2016 - Vermont Law Review 41 (1):1-22.
    Langdellian “science” and its “formalism” ignore ways form permits and even creates freedom of choice. For example, as Wordsworth notes, though the weaver is restricted by what his form of loom can weave, the weaver may nonetheless choose what and how he weaves. Furthermore, the loom creates weaving possibilities that do not exist without it. Such freedom alongside form is often lost on lawyers, judges, and teachers trained primarily in Langdellian redacted appellate cases where “facts” and other framed matters often (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-02
    The Present and Future of Judgement Aggregation Theory. A Law and Economics Perspective.Philippe Mongin - forthcoming - In Jean-François Laslier, Hervé Moulin, Remzi Sanver & William S. Zwicker (eds.), The Future of Economic Design. New York: Springer.
    This chapter briefly reviews the present state of judgment aggregation theory and tentatively suggests a future direction for that theory. In the review, we start by emphasizing the difference between the doctrinal paradox and the discursive dilemma, two idealized examples which classically serve to motivate the theory, and then proceed to reconstruct it as a brand of logical theory, unlike in some other interpretations, using a single impossibility theorem as a key to its technical development. In the prospective part, having (...)
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  3. added 2017-12-30
    Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective.Sérgio Mascarenhas - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind (13):150-157.
    It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is that truth values can only be predicated of descriptive statements; normative statements are prescriptive, not descriptive; thus truth value predicates cannot be assigned to normative statements. Hence, deonticity lacks logical semantics. This semantic monism has been challenged over the last decades from a series of perspectives that open the way for legal logics with imperative semantics. In the present paper I will go back to Kant (...)
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  4. added 2017-05-22
    Law, Virtue, and Justice (Law and Practical Reason). [REVIEW]Jason Cruze - 20016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (6):743-746.
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  5. added 2015-12-30
    Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica.Andrés Páez (ed.) - 2015 - Ediciones Uniandes.
    Aunque el derecho probatorio y el derecho procesal se han dedicado desde siempre al estudio de los problemas relacionados con las pruebas y el establecimiento de los hechos en los procesos judiciales, el énfasis ha estado siempre en el aspecto formal, doctrinal y procedimental en detrimento de los fundamentos filosóficos y teóricos. Durante los últimos años ha habido un intento sostenido de explorar estos fundamentos combinando no sólo las herramientas tradicionales proporcionadas por la lógica, la gramática y la retórica, sino (...)
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  6. added 2015-09-14
    Elementos doctrinales para el estudio de la argumentación como eje del control judicial.Ivan Vargas-Chaves - 2014 - Prolegómenos 16 (32):235-246.
    En el presente artículo se examinan varias propuestas que abordan la argumentación como un ejercicio válido y necesario de control judicial; ello, a través del estudio de diversos elementos doctrinales, como lo son la representación democrática argumentativa, la interpretación previa y la debida justificación de las decisiones, así como la ponderación y la aplicación de los principios, entre otros. Al margen de lo anterior, nuestra intención no es otra sino la de presentar una descripción del estado del arte de dichas (...)
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  7. added 2015-08-12
    A Critique of Critical Legal Studies' Claim of Legal Indeterminacy.Ian Carlo Dapalla Benitez - 2015 - Lambert Academic Publishing.
    This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that the CLS claims is only grounded in ambiguity and confusion. CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards in legal theory and practice. They maintained that law in the historical and contemporary society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power (...)
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  8. added 2015-08-06
    Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.
    Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of (...)
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  9. added 2014-03-26
    The Logic of “Improper Cross”.Joseph S. Fulda - 2000 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 8 (4):337-341.
    Uses erotetic logic to model the courtroom objection "Improper Cross!". -/- Readers downloading the article should also please download the erratum et corrigendum, which is locally available.
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  10. added 2013-06-02
    The Logic of the Whole Truth.Joseph S. Fulda - 1989 - Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 15 (2):435-446.
    Note: The author holds the copyright, and there was no agreement, express or implied, not to use a facsimile PDF. -/- Using erotetic logic, the paper defines the "the whole truth" in a manner consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. It cannot mean "the whole story," as witnesses in an adversary system are permitted /only/ to answer the questions put to them, nor are they permitted to speculate, add irrelevant material, etc. Nor can it mean not to add an admixture (...)
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  11. added 2011-01-30
    Dialectical and Heuristic Arguments: Presumptions and Burden of Proof.Fabrizio Macagno - 2010 - In C. Tindale & C. Reed (eds.), Dialectics, Dialogue and Argumentation: An Examination of Douglas Walton's Theories of Reasoning and Argument. College Publications. pp. 45-57.
    Presumption is a complex concept in law, affecting the dialogue setting. However, it is not clear how presumptions work in everyday argumentation, in which the concept of “plausible argumentation” seems to encompass all kinds of inferences. By analyzing the legal notion of presumption, it appears that this type of reasoning combines argument schemes with reasoning from ignorance. Presumptive reasoning can be considered a particular form of reasoning, which needs positive or negative evidence to carry a probative weight on the conclusion. (...)
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