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  1. Emotions and Moods in Husserl’s Phenomenology.Denis Fisette - forthcoming - In Hanne Jacobs (ed.), The Husserlian Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 220-231.
    In this study, I will first introduce Husserl’s analysis in Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins by emphasizing the reasons that motivate these analyses on descriptive psychology and their status in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in the late Freiburg period. I will then focus on the structure of acts, with particular emphasis on three aspects stressed by Husserl in Studien: intentionality, the taxonomy of acts, and Brentano’s principle of the Vorstellungsgrundlage. The last three parts of this study outline the characteristic features of (...)
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  2. Towards a Phenomenological Analysis of Fictional Emotions.Marco Cavallaro - 2019 - Phainomenon. Journal of Phenomenological Philosophy 29:57-81.
    What are fictional emotions and what has phenomenology to say about them? This paper argues that the experience of fictional emotions entails a splitting of the subject between a real and a phantasy ego. The real ego is the ego that imagines something; the phantasy ego is the ego that is necessarily co-posited by any experience of imagining something. Fictional emotions are phantasy emotions of the phantasy ego. The intentional structure of fictional emotions, the nature of their fictional object, as (...)
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  3. The Epistemic Import of Affectivity: A Husserlian Account.Jacob Martin Rump - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):82-104.
    I argue that, on Husserl's account, affectivity, along with the closely related phenomenon of association, follows a form of sui generis lawfulness belonging to the domain of what Husserl calls motivation, which must be distinguished both (1) from the causal structures through which we understand the body third-personally, as a material thing; and also (2) from the rational or inferential structures at the level of deliberative judgment traditionally understood to be the domain of epistemic import. In effect, in addition to (...)
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