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  1. added 2020-09-07
    The Best Available Parent.Anca Gheaus - forthcoming - Ethics.
    There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children’s and prospective parents’ interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children’s interests for the sake of advancing adults’ interest in childrearing. Therefore, the allocation of the moral right to parent should track the child’s, and not the potential parent’s, interest. This revisionary thesis is moderated by two additional qualifications. First, parents lack the moral right to exclude (...)
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  2. added 2019-07-25
    Sigmund Freud in Agamben's Philosophy.Virgil W. Brower - 2017 - In Adam Kotsko & Carlo Salzani (ed.), Agamben's Philosophical Lineage. Edinburgh, UK: pp. 242-251.
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  3. added 2019-04-19
    Well-Being, Gamete Donation, & Genetic Knowledge: The Significant Interest View.Daniel Groll - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    Every year, thousands of children are conceived with gametes from anonymous donors. By some estimates, there are more than 1 million donor-conceived children (donor-conceived people) living in the United States alone. In all likelihood, these donor-conceived people will never know the identity of their donor. Is this a problem? More specifically, do prospective parents who plan to conceive a child via gamete donation have a weighty reason to use a known or “identity-release” donor? -/- I argue that the answer is (...)
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  4. added 2017-09-11
    Parental Genetic Shaping and Parental Environmental Shaping.Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):20-31.
    Analytic philosophers tend to agree that intentional parental genetic shaping and intentional parental environmental shaping for the same feature are, normatively, on a par. I challenge this view by advancing a novel argument, grounded in the value of fair relationships between parents and children: Parental genetic shaping is morally objectionable because it unjustifiably exacerbates the asymmetry between parent and child with respect to the voluntariness of their entrance into the parent–child relationship. Parental genetic shaping is, for this reason, different from (...)
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