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  1. added 2020-06-26
    Parents of Adults with Diminished Self-Governance.Jennifer Desante, David Degrazia & Marion Danis - 2016 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (1):93-107.
    Most theories of parenthood assume, at least implicitly, that a child will grow up to be an independent, autonomous adult. However, some children with cognitive limitations or psychiatric illness are unable to do so. For this reason, these accounts do not accommodate the circumstances and responsibilities of parents of such adult children. Our article attempts to correct this deficiency. In particular, we describe some of the common characteristics and experiences of this population of parents and children, examine the unique aspects (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-29
    Mandating Vaccination.Anthony Skelton & Lisa Forsberg - 2020 - In Meredith Celene Schwartz (ed.), The Ethics of Pandemics. pp. 131-134.
    A short piece exploring some arguments for mandating vaccination for Covid-19.
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  3. added 2020-05-20
    Child-Rearing With Minimal Domination: A Republican Account.Anca Gheaus - forthcoming - Political Studies.
    Parenting involves an extraordinary degree of power over children. Republicans are concerned about domination, which, on one view, is the holding of power that fails to track the interests of those over whom it is exercised. On this account, parenting as we know it is dominating due to the low standards necessary for acquiring and retaining parental rights and the extent of parental power. Domination cannot be fully eliminated from child-rearing without unacceptable loss of value. Most likely, republicanism requires that (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-10
    Defending the Distinction Between Pregnancy and Parenthood.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 1:1-3.
    In this paper, I respond to criticisms toward my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent-child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative support, they do not pose a problem for my account. I conclude the raised (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-24
    The Well-Being of Children, the Limits of Paternalism, and the State: Can Disparate Interests Be Reconciled?Michael S. Merry - 2007 - Ethics and Education 2 (1):39-59.
    For many, it is far from clear where the prerogatives of parents to educate as they deem appropriate end and the interests of their children, immediate or future, begin. In this article I consider the educational interests of children and argue that children have an interest in their own well-being. Following this, I will examine the interests of parents and consider where the limits of paternalism lie. Finally, I will consider the state's interest in the education of children and discuss (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-27
    Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766-1834).Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2013 - In James E. Crimmins (ed.), The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 324-326.
    A discussion of Malthusian mythology yielding the classification as a 'theological utilitarian' followed by a revision of 18th Anglican moral theology re-described in terms of consequentialist voluntarism and an interpretation of Malthus's view on morality, population and political economics.
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  7. added 2019-10-22
    More Co-Parents, Fewer Children: Multiparenting and Sustainable Population.Anca Gheaus - 2019 - Essays in Philosophy 20 (1):3-23.
    Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation – for instance, to one child per person or one child per couple – in order to reduce our aggregate carbon footprint. I provide additional support to the claim that population size is a matter of justice, by explaining that we have a duty of justice towards the current generation of children to pass on to them a sustainable population. But instead of, or, more likely, alongside with, having fewer children in in (...)
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  8. added 2019-08-26
    Fetuses, Newborns, and Parental Responsibility.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (3):188-193.
    I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analyzing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-21
    Wronging Future Children.K. Lindsey Chambers - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    The dominant framework for addressing procreative ethics has revolved around the notion of harm, largely due to Derek Parfit’s famous non-identity problem. Focusing exclusively on the question of harm treats what procreators owe their offspring as akin to what they would owe strangers (if they owe them anything at all). Procreators, however, usually expect (and are expected) to parent the persons they create, so we cannot understand what procreators owe their offspring without also appealing to their role as prospective parents. (...)
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  10. added 2019-04-19
    Well-Being, Gamete Donation, & Genetic Knowledge: The Significant Interest View.Daniel Groll - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    Every year, thousands of children are conceived with gametes from anonymous donors. By some estimates, there are more than 1 million donor-conceived children (donor-conceived people) living in the United States alone. In all likelihood, these donor-conceived people will never know the identity of their donor. Is this a problem? More specifically, do prospective parents who plan to conceive a child via gamete donation have a weighty reason to use a known or “identity-release” donor? -/- I argue that the answer is (...)
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  11. added 2018-07-24
    Well-Being, Disability, and Choosing Children.Matthew J. Barker & Robert A. Wilson - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):305-328.
    The view that it is better for life to be created free of disability is pervasive in both common sense and philosophy. We cast doubt on this view by focusing on an influential line of thinking that manifests it. That thinking begins with a widely-discussed principle, Procreative Beneficence, and draws conclusions about parental choice and disability. After reconstructing two versions of this argument, we critique the first by exploring the relationship between different understandings of well-being and disability, and the second (...)
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  12. added 2017-09-11
    Parental Genetic Shaping and Parental Environmental Shaping.Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):20-31.
    Analytic philosophers tend to agree that intentional parental genetic shaping and intentional parental environmental shaping for the same feature are, normatively, on a par. I challenge this view by advancing a novel argument, grounded in the value of fair relationships between parents and children: Parental genetic shaping is morally objectionable because it unjustifiably exacerbates the asymmetry between parent and child with respect to the voluntariness of their entrance into the parent–child relationship. Parental genetic shaping is, for this reason, different from (...)
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  13. added 2017-09-02
    How Do We Acquire Parental Responsibilities?Joseph Millum - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):71-93.
    It is commonly believed that parents have special duties toward their children—weightier duties than they owe other children. How these duties are acquired, however, is not well understood. This is problematic when claims about parental responsibilities are challenged; for example, when people deny that they are morally responsible for their biological offspring. In this paper I present a theory of the origins of parental responsibilities that can resolve such cases of disputed moral parenthood.
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  14. added 2017-04-27
    Love and Justice: A Paradox?Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):739-759.
    Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-08
    Children's Vulnerability and Legitimate Authority Over Children.Anca Gheaus - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:60-75.
    Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their caregivers entails that they have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of legitimate authority over them. Second, children's vulnerability to the loss of some special goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. My interest is (...)
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