View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories
Siblings:History/traditions: Singular Terms

3 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2020-01-11
    Levels of Ontology and Natural Language: The Case of the Ontology of Parts and Wholes.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - In James Miller (ed.), The Language of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    It is common in contemporary metaphysics to distinguish two levels of ontology: the ontology of ordinary objects and the ontology of fundamental reality. This papers argues that natural language reflects not only the ontology of ordinary objects, but also a language-driven ontology, which is involved in the mass-count distinction and part-structure-sensitive semantic selection, as well as perhaps the light ontology of pleonastic entities. The paper recasts my older theory of situated part structures without situations, making use of a primitive notion (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2015-04-10
    Descriptions Which Have Grown Capital Letters.Brian Rabern - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):292-319.
    Almost entirely ignored in the linguistic theorising on names and descriptions is a hybrid form of expression which, like definite descriptions, begin with 'the' but which, like proper names, are capitalised and seem to lack descriptive content. These are expressions such as the following, 'the Holy Roman Empire', 'the Mississippi River', or 'the Space Needle'. Such capitalised descriptions are ubiquitous in natural language, but to which linguistic categories do they belong? Are they simply proper names? Or are they definite descriptions (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. added 2011-03-07
    What Is a Singular Term?Richard Heck - manuscript
    This paper discusses the question whether it is possible to explain the notion of a singular term without invoking the notion of an object or other ontological notions. The framework here is that of Michael Dummett's discussion in Frege: Philosophy of Language. I offer an emended version of Dummett's conditions, accepting but modifying some suggestions made by Bob Hale, and defend the emended conditions against some objections due to Crispin Wright. This paper dates from about 1989. It originally formed part (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations