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  1. added 2016-12-22
    Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back.Nils Kürbis - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 60 (239):301-316.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism (...)
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  2. added 2016-08-12
    The Nature of Truth.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Robert James M. Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela & Victorino Raymundo Lualhati - 2013 - In Leni Garcia (ed.), Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E Publishing. pp. 38–50.
    This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems (...)
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  3. added 2015-04-27
    Evolution of Quine’s Thinking on the Thesis of Underdetermination and Scott Soames’s Accusation of Paradoxicality.M. Ashraf Adeel - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):56-69.
    Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.
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  4. added 2015-03-17
    What is Wrong with Classical Negation?Nils Kürbis - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):51-86.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  5. added 2014-01-20
    Analytic Philosophy (Alternative Title 'Analytic Atheism?').Charles Pigden - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-319.
    Most analytic philosophers are atheists, but is there a deep connection between analytic philosophy and atheism? The paper argues a) that the founding fathers of analytic philosophy were mostly teenage atheists before they became philosophers; b) that analytic philosophy was invented partly because it was realized that the God-substitute provided by the previously fashionable philosophy - Absolute Idealism – could not cut the spiritual mustard; c) that analytic philosophy developed an unhealthy obsession with meaninglessness which led to a new kind (...)
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  6. added 2012-10-10
    How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption?Nils Kürbis - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  7. added 2012-10-10
    Pluralism and the Logical Basis of Metaphysics.N. Kurbis - 2007 - In Logica Yearbook.
    I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.
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