Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modeling.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    This paper presents and argues for an account of objectual understanding that aims to do justice to the full range of cases of scientific understanding, including cases in which one does not have an explanation of the understood phenomenon. According to the proposed account, one understands a phenomenon just in case one grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of the ways in which it or its features are situated within a network of dependence relations; one’s degree of understanding is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):423-442.
    It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Is Knowledge of Causes Sufficient for Understanding?Xingming Hu - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):291-313.
    ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Understanding, Problem-Solving, and Conscious Reflection.Andrei Mărăşoiu - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):71-81.
    According to Zagzebski, understanding something is justified by the exercise of cognitive skills and intellectual virtues the knower possesses. Zagzebski develops her view by suggesting that “understanding has internalist conditions for success”. Against this view, Grimm raises an objection: what justifies understanding is the reliability of the processes by which we come to understand, and we need not be aware of the outcome of all reliable processes. Understanding is no exception, so, given that understanding something results from reliable processes, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is True Belief Really a Fundamental Epistemic Value?Lance K. Aschliman - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark