In this paper we present tableau methods for two-dimensional modal logics. Although models for such logics are well known, proof systems remain rather unexplored as most of their developments have been purely axiomatic. The logics herein considered contain first-order quantifiers with identity, and all the formulas in the language are doubly-indexed in the proof systems, with the upper indices intuitively representing the actual or reference worlds, and the lower indices representing worlds of evaluation—first and second dimensions, respectively. The tableaux modulate (...) over different notions of validity such as local, general, and diagonal, besides being general enough for several two-dimensional logics proposed in the literature. We also motivate the introduction of a new operator into two-dimensional languages and explore some of the philosophical questions raised by it concerning the relations there are between actuality, necessity, and the a priori, that seem to undermine traditional intuitive interpretations of two-dimensional operators. (shrink)

This article surveys some of the key issues that arise when one tries to use tense logic as a metaphysical theory of the nature of time. Topics discussed include basic tense logic, tense logic and verb tense, the structure of the time series, instants of time, quantified tense logic, and the expressive resources of tense logic.

Fara and Williamson (Mind, 2005) argue that counterpart theory is unable to account for modal claims that use an actuality operator. This paper argues otherwise. Rather than provide a different counterpart translation of the actuality operator itself, the solution presented here starts out with a quantified modal logic in which the actuality operator is redundant, and then translates the sentences of this logic into claims of counterpart theory.

This paper is concerned with a propositional modal logic with operators for necessity, actuality and apriority. The logic is characterized by a class of relational structures defined according to ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics, and can therefore be seen as formalizing the relations between necessity, actuality and apriority according to epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We can ask whether this logic is correct, in the sense that its theorems are all and only the informally valid formulas. This paper gives outlines of two (...) arguments that jointly show that this is the case. The first is intended to show that the logic is informally sound, in the sense that all of its theorems are informally valid. The second is intended to show that it is informally complete, in the sense that all informal validities are among its theorems. In order to give these arguments, a number of independently interesting results concerning the logic are proven. In particular, the soundness and completeness of two proof systems with respect to the semantics is proven (Theorems 2.11 and 2.15), as well as a normal form theorem (Theorem 3.2), an elimination theorem for the actuality operator (Corollary 3.6), and the decidability of the logic (Corollary 3.7). It turns out that the logic invalidates a plausible principle concerning the interaction of apriority and necessity; consequently, a variant semantics is briefly explored on which this principle is valid. The paper concludes by assessing the implications of these results for epistemic two-dimensional semantics. (shrink)

It is widely believed that for all p, or at least for all entertainable p, it is knowable a priori that (p iff actually p). It is even more widely believed that for all such p, it is knowable that (p iff actually p). There is a simple argument against these claims from four antecedently plausible premises.

Two-dimensional (2D) semantics is a formal framework that is used to characterize the meaning of certain linguistic expressions and the entailment relations among sentences containing them. 2D semantics has also been applied to thought contents. In contrast with standard possible worlds semantics, 2D semantics assigns extensions and truth-values to expressions relative to two possible world parameters, rather than just one. So a 2D semantic framework provides finer-grained semantic values than those available within standard possible world semantics, while using the same (...) basic model-theoretic resources. The 2D framework itself is just a formal tool. To develop a semantic theory for someone’s language, a proponent of 2D semantics must do three things: (i) explain what exactly the two possible world parameters represent, (ii) explain the rules for assigning 2D semantic values to a person’s words and sentences, and (iii) explain how 2D semantic values help in understanding the meanings of the person’s words and sentences. (shrink)

The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection1 to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal. Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a “retreat” (2005b, p. 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem.

This paper explains how to obtain quantification over times in a tense logic in which all temporal distinctions are ultimately spelled out in terms of the two simple tense operators “it was the case that” and “it will be the case that.” The account of times defended here is similar to what is known as “linguistic ersatzism” about possible worlds, but there are noteworthy differences between these two cases. For example, while linguistic ersatzism would support actualism, the view of times (...) defended here does not support presentism. (shrink)

There are many parallels between the role of possible worlds in modal logic and that of times in tense logic. But the similarities only go so far, and it is important to note where the two come apart. This paper argues that even though worlds and times play similar roles in the model theories of modal and tense logic, there is no tense analogue of the possible-worlds analysis of modal operators. An important corollary of this result is that presentism cannot (...) be the tense analogue of actualism. (shrink)

According to Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach, the two-dimensional tense operators “now” and “then” are ineliminable in quantified tense logic. This is often adduced as an argument against tense logic, and in favor of an extensional account that makes use of explicit quantification over times. The aim of this paper is to defend tense logic against this attack. It shows that “now” and “then” are eliminable in quantified tense logic, provided we endow it with enough quantificational structure. The operators might (...) not be redundant in some other systems of tense logic, but this merely indicates a lack of quantificational resources and does not show any deep-seated inability of tense logic to express claims about time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the modal analogue of this issue, which concerns the role of the actuality operator in quantified modal logic. (shrink)

Lewis (The Journal of Philosophy, 65(5), 113–126, 1968) attempts to provide an account of modal talk in terms of the resources of counterpart theory, a first-order theory that eschews transworld identity. First, a regimentation of natural language modal claims into sentences of a formal first-order modal language L is assumed. Second, a translation scheme from L-sentences to sentences of the language of the theory is provided. According to Hazen (The Journal of Philosophy, 76(6), 319–338, 1979) and Fara & Williamson (Mind, (...) 114(453), 1–30, 2005), the account cannot handle certain natural language modal claims involving a notion of actuality. The challenge has two parts. First, in order to handle such claims, the initial formal modal language that natural language modal claims are regimented into must extend L with something like an actuality operator. Second, certain ways that Lewis’ translation scheme for L might be extended to accommodate an actuality operator are unacceptable. Meyer (Mind, 122(485), 27–42, 2013) attempts to defend Lewis’ approach. First, Meyer holds that in order to handle such claims, the formal modal language L$$^*$$ ∗ that we initially regiment our natural language claims into need not contain an actuality operator. Instead, we can make do with other resources. Next, Meyer provides an alternative translation scheme from L$$^*$$ ∗ -sentences to sentences of an enriched language of counterpart theory. Unfortunately, Meyer’s approach fails to provide an appropriate counterpart theoretic account of natural language modal claims. In this paper, I demonstrate that failure. (shrink)

We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid.

In this paper, I claim that two ways of defining validity for modal languages (“real-world” and “general” validity), corresponding to distinction between a correct and an incorrect way of defining modal valid- ity, correspond instead to two substantive ways of conceiving modal truth. At the same time, I claim that the major logical manifestation of the real- world/general validity distinction in modal propositional languages with the actuality operator should not be taken seriously, but simply as a by-product of the way (...) in which the semantics of such an operator is usually given. (shrink)

We investigate and compare two major approaches to enhancing the expressive capacities of modal languages, namely the addition of subjunctive markers on the one hand, and the addition of scope-bearing actuality operators, on the other. It turns out that the subjunctive marker approach is not only every bit as versatile as the actuality operator approach, but that it in fact outperforms its rival in the context of cross-world predication.

In Wehmeier (J Philos Log 33:607–630, 2004) we are presented with the subjunctive modal language, a way of dealing with the expressive inadequacy of modal logic by marking atomic predicates as being either in the subjunctive or indicative mood. Wehmeier claims that this language is expressively equivalent to the standard actuality language, and that despite this the marked-unmarked dichotomies are not the same in the two languages. In this paper we will attend to Wehmeier’s argument that this is the case, (...) and show that this conclusion rests on what might be considered an uncharitable stipulation concerning what it is for a formula in the actuality language to be true in a model. (shrink)

We show that the actuality operator A is redundant in any propositional modal logic characterized by a class of Kripke models (respectively, neighborhood models). Specifically, we prove that for every formula ${\phi}$ in the propositional modal language with A, there is a formula ${\psi}$ not containing A such that ${\phi}$ and ${\psi}$ are materially equivalent at the actual world in every Kripke model (respectively, neighborhood model). Inspection of the proofs leads to corresponding proof-theoretic results concerning the eliminability of the actuality (...) operator in the actuality extension of any normal propositional modal logic and of any “classical” modal logic. As an application, we provide an alternative proof of a result of Williamson’s to the effect that the compound operator A□ behaves, in any normal logic between T and S5, like the simple necessity operator □ in S5. (shrink)