Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. How can we assess whether to trust collectives of scientists?Elinor Clark - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    A great many important decisions we make in life depend on scientific information that we are not in a position to assess. So it seems we must defer to experts. By now there are a variety of criteria on offer by which non-experts can judge the trustworthiness of a scientist responsible for producing or promulgating this information. But science is, for the most part, a collective not an individual enterprise. This paper explores which of the criteria for judging the trustworthiness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Scratching where it doesn't itch: science denialism, expertise, and the probative value of scientific consensus.Claudio Cormick & Valeria Edelsztein - forthcoming - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía.
    In recent years, several strategies have been proposed to tackle social controversies about topics in which science is settled, among which one of the most influential is that of Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that any lay person with access to the Internet and basic education can reliably assess the acceptability of various claims involving expert knowledge. In particular, the author shows that this procedure can be successfully applied to the case of anthropogenic global warming. In this article we will try (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Deference to Experts.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    Especially but not exclusively in the United States, there is a significant gulf between expert opinion and public opinion on a range of important political, social, and scientific issues. Large numbers of lay people hold views contrary to the expert consensus on topics such as climate change, vaccines, and economics. Much political commentary assumes that ordinary people should defer to experts more than they do, and this view is certainly lent force by the literally deadly effects of many denials of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Social Indicators of the Reputation of an Expert.Gloria Origgi - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (5):541-549.
    A notion that comes from the toolbox of social sciences, trust has become a mainstream epistemological concept in the last 15 years. The notion of epistemic trust has been distinguished from the notion of moral and social trust, the former involves kinds of inferences about the others that are rationally justifiable. If I trust a scientist about the efficacy of a vaccine against COVID-19, I must have an epistemic justification. I am therefore rationally justified in trusting her because I have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • In Trust We Trust: Epistemic Vigilance and Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (3):283-298.
    Much of what we know we know through testimony, and knowing on the basis of testimony requires some degree of trust in speakers. Trust is therefore very valuable. But in trusting, we expose ourselves to risks of harm and betrayal. It is therefore important to trust well. In this paper, I discuss two recent cases of the betrayal of trust in (broadly) academic contexts: one involving hoax submissions to journals, the other faking an identity on social media. I consider whether (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Trusting scientific experts in an online world.Kenneth Boyd - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-31.
    A perennial problem in social epistemology is the problem of expert testimony, specifically expert testimony regarding scientific issues: for example, while it is important for me to know information pertaining to anthropogenic climate change, vaccine safety, Covid-19, etc., I may lack the scientific background required to determine whether the information I come across is, in fact, true. Without being able to evaluate the science itself, then, I need to find trustworthy expert testifiers to listen to. A major project in social (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Climate Change, Individual Preferences, and Procrastination.Fausto Corvino - 2021 - In Sarah Kenehan & Corey Katz (eds.), Climate Justice and Feasibility: Normative Theorizing, Feasibility Constraints, and Climate Action. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 193-211.
    When discussing the general inertia in climate change mitigation, it is common to approach the analysis either in terms of epistemic obstacles (climate change is too scientifically complex to be fully understood by all in its dramatic nature and/or to find space in the media) and/or moral obstacles (the causal link between polluting actions and social damage is too loose, both geographically and temporally, to allow individuals to understand the consequences of their emissions). In this chapter I maintain that both (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Skepticism and the Value of Distrust.Maria Baghramian & Silvia Caprioglio Panizza - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Scientific/Intellectual Movements Remedying Epistemic Injustice: The Case of Indigenous Studies.Inkeri Koskinen & Kristina Rolin - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):1052-1063.
    Whereas much of the literature in the social epistemology of scientific knowledge has focused either on scientific communities or research groups, we examine the epistemic significance of scientific/intellectual movements (SIMs). We argue that certain types of SIMs can play an important epistemic role in science: they can remedy epistemic injus- tices in scientific practices. SIMs can counteract epistemic injustices effectively because many forms of epistemic injustice require structural and not merely individual remedies. To illustrate our argument, we discuss the case (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • What Is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?Gürol Irzık & Faik Kurtulmuş - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1145-1166.
    We provide an analysis of the public's having warranted epistemic trust in science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy regarding the connection between autism and measles–mumps–rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • How to balance Balanced Reporting and Reliable Reporting.Mikkel Gerken - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3117-3142.
    The paper draws on philosophy of science to help resolve a tension between two central journalistic ideals: That of resenting diverse viewpoints (Balanced Reporting) and that of presenting the most reliable testimony (Reliable Reporting). While both of these ideals are valuable, they may be in tension. This is particularly so when it comes to scientific testimony and science reporting. Thus, we face a hard question: How should and be balanced in science reporting? The present paper contributes substantive proposals in a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Public Trust in Science: Exploring the Idiosyncrasy-Free Ideal.Marion Boulicault & S. Andrew Schroeder - 2021 - In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Social Trust: Foundational and Philosophical Issues. Routledge.
    What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one proposed answer: the trustworthiness of science is based at least in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, interests, and ideas of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific process would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. We analyze this "idiosyncrasy-free ideal" for science by looking at philosophical debates about inductive risk, focusing on two recent proposals (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):545-562.
    There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the public. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Understanding and Trusting Science.Matthew H. Slater, Joanna K. Huxster & Julia E. Bresticker - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (2):247-261.
    Science communication via testimony requires a certain level of trust. But in the context of ideologically-entangled scientific issues, trust is in short supply—particularly when the issues are politically ‘entangled’. In such cases, cultural values are better predictors than scientific literacy for whether agents trust the publicly-directed claims of the scientific community. In this paper, we argue that a common way of thinking about scientific literacy—as knowledge of particular scientific facts or concepts—ought to give way to a second-order understanding of science (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Denialism as Applied Skepticism: Philosophical and Empirical Considerations.Matthew H. Slater, Joanna K. Huxster, Julia E. Bresticker & Victor LoPiccolo - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):871-890.
    The scientific community, we hold, often provides society with knowledge—that the HIV virus causes AIDS, that anthropogenic climate change is underway, that the MMR vaccine is safe. Some deny that we have this knowledge, however, and work to undermine it in others. It has been common to refer to such agents as “denialists”. At first glance, then, denialism appears to be a form of skepticism. But while we know that various denialist strategies for suppressing belief are generally effective, little is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Knowledge from Scientific Expert Testimony without Epistemic Trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2018 - Synthese:1-31.
    In this paper we address the question of how it can be possible for a non-expert to acquire justified true belief from expert testimony. We discuss reductionism and epistemic trust as theoretical approaches to answer this question and present a novel solution that avoids major problems of both theoretical options: Performative Expert Testimony (PET). PET draws on a functional account of expertise insofar as it takes the expert’s visibility as a good informant capable to satisfy informational needs as equally important (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Epistemic trust and the ethics of science communication: against transparency, openness, sincerity and honesty.Stephen John - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (2):75-87.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Du Bois’ democratic defence of the value free ideal.Liam Kofi Bright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2227-2245.
    Philosophers of science debate the proper role of non-epistemic value judgements in scientific reasoning. Many modern authors oppose the value free ideal, claiming that we should not even try to get scientists to eliminate all such non-epistemic value judgements from their reasoning. W. E. B. Du Bois, on the other hand, has a defence of the value free ideal in science that is rooted in a conception of the proper place of science in a democracy. In particular, Du Bois argues (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • The Roles of Institutional Trust and Distrust in Grounding Rational Deference to Scientific Expertise.Frédéric Bouchard - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (5):582-608.
    Given the complexity of most phenomena, we have to delegate much epistemic work to other knowers and we must find reasons for relying on these specific knowers and not others. In our societies, these other knowers are often called experts and we rely on their epistemic authority more and more. For many complex phenomena such as climate change, genetically modified crops, and immunization, the experts that are called upon are scientific experts. For that reason, finding good reasons and justification for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Throwing the Baby Out with the Water: From Reasonably Scrutinizing Authorities to Rampant Scepticism About Expertise.Markus Seidel - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (2):192-218.
    In this paper, I argue that many arguments from expert opinion are strong arguments. Therefore, in many cases it is rational to rely on experts since in many cases the fact that an expert says that p makes it highly likely that p is true. I will defend this claim by providing 5 arguments that illuminate and elaborate on 5 crucial claims about expertise. In this way, I aim to undermine recent attempts to establish a rampant scepticism about arguments from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Epistemic Trust in Scientific Experts: A Moral Dimension.George Kwasi Barimah - 2024 - Science and Engineering Ethics 30 (3):1-21.
    In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Climate denialism bullshit is harmful.Joshua Luczak - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-20.
    This paper suggests that some climate denialism is bullshit. Those who spread it do not display a proper concern for the truth. This paper also shows that this bullshit is harmful in some significant ways. It undermines the epistemic demands imposed on us by what we care about, by the social roles we occupy, and by morality. It is also harmful because it corrodes epistemic trust.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy.Udit Bhatia - 2020 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 23 (6):706-731.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Concerning the politicization of climate science: epistemic dependency, trust in expert testimony, and determining What We Ought to Believe.Caitlin Heppner - unknown
    Belief in climate change does not divide into a simple dichotomy of believers and nonbelievers. An unclear view of skepticism arises when the differences between empirical and normative claims are revealed. Developing responsible beliefs on matters of which we possess no expertise requires reliable expert testimony. However, trust and objectivity are integral factors for belief in expert consensus. A reduction in public opinion regarding the reliability of climate science, due to politicization, enables the dismissal anthropogenic climate change. Understanding politicization from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • When the experts are uncertain: Scientific knowledge and the ethics of democratic judgment.Melissa Lane - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):97-118.
    Can ordinary citizens in a democracy evaluate the claims of scientific experts? While a definitive answer must be case by case, some scholars have offered sharply opposed general answers: a skeptical versus an optimistic. The article addresses this basic conflict, arguing that a satisfactory answer requires a first-order engagement in judging the claims of experts which both skeptics and optimists rule out in taking the issue to be one of second-order assessments only. Having argued that such first-order judgments are necessary, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • (1 other version)Knowledge from scientific expert testimony without epistemic trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3611-3641.
    In this paper we address the question of how it can be possible for a non-expert to acquire justified true belief from expert testimony. We discuss reductionism and epistemic trust as theoretical approaches to answer this question and present a novel solution that avoids major problems of both theoretical options: Performative Expert Testimony. PET draws on a functional account of expertise insofar as it takes the expert’s visibility as a good informant capable to satisfy informational needs as equally important as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Science Advice in an Environment of Trust: Trusted, but Not Trustworthy?Torbjørn Gundersen & Cathrine Holst - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (5):629-640.
    This paper examines the conditions of trustworthy science advice mechanisms, in which scientists have a mandated role to inform public policymaking. Based on the literature on epistemic trust and public trust in science, we argue that possession of relevant expertise, justified moral and political considerations, as well as proper institutional design are conditions for trustworthy science advice. In order to assess these conditions further, we explore the case of temporary advisory committees in Norway. These committees exemplify a de facto trusted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Review of Three Books on Science: Trust, Corporate Influence, and Militarization. [REVIEW]Sheldon Krimsky - 2022 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 47 (1):217-230.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark