A formalização dos raciocínios a que Aristóteles se consagra nos Primeiros Analíticos é restrita, como sabemos, a proposições da forma categórica. Embora reco- nheça certas especificidades formais nas proposições encerrando predicados relacionais, Aristóteles parece reservar-lhes um estatuto secundário, considerando-as, em alguma medida, redutíveis a proposições categóricas. Neste artigo, pretendo examinar algumas passagens de Categorias 7 que possam lançar alguma luz sobre o estatuto que Aristóte- les confere às atribuições relativas, visando melhor precisar as razões que o teriam conduzido a negligenciar (...) um tratamento formal mais rigoroso das proposições relacionais nos Primeiros Analíticos. (shrink)

Desde los orígenes de su formación en fenomenología, Heidegger emprendió modificaciones metodológicas que tematizan el campo de la vida preteórica y llevan a la hermenéutica del Dasein creando tensiones respecto de Husserl que afectaron tanto la dimensión teórica como la personal. En este trabajo se estudia este viraje señalando sus orígenes tempranos y concentrándose en los aportes del curso Introducción a la investigación fenomenológica, del semestre de invierno de 1923/1924. Este ámbito presenta aspectos relevantes para comprender el modo en que (...) se redefine la noción de fenomenología, la estrategia de impugnación de la posición husserliana por su cartesianismo y los puntos que distancian las perspectivas respecto de la conciencia y la facticidad. El recorrido resultante ofrece elementos para comprender los puntos que llevarían poco más tarde a la fricción entre ambos pensadores que marcó profundamente la filosofía contemporánea. (shrink)

This paper offers a reconstruction of Alessandro Piccolomini's philosophy of mathematics, and reconstructs the role of Themistius and Averroes in the Renaissance debate on Aristotle's theory of proof. It also describes the interpretative context within which Piccolomini was working in order to show that he was not an isolated figure, but rather that he was fully involved in the debate on mathematics and physics of Italian Aristotelians of his time. The ideas of Lodovico Boccadiferro and Sperone Speroni will be analysed. (...) This paper demonstrates that Piccolomini's attack on the certitude of mathematics was a product of discussions between Aristotelians. (shrink)

The present paper aims at examining the characteristics that determine the essential nature of the homogeneous bodies in Aristotle, from an analysis of Meteorology IV.12, which would at the same time establish a certain relationship with other treatises of natural philosophy and also in particular with books VII and VIII of Metaphysics. With this investigation, I will delineate a certain line of argument that goes against a reading perspective considered as traditional, with certain interpretive variants, according to which Aristotle would (...) have adopted the idea of ​​a universal teleology, in the general sense that all natural bodies would be generated for a specific goal, or for a natural purpose. According to a certain view, linked to this perspective, the teleological character of functional type of vital activities, notably expressed by the compositional arrangement of the non-homogeneous parts in the living being's complexion, would be somehow involved in the constitution of the homogeneous bodies considered in themselves and for themselves. In contrast to such a view, I will examine, in a precise way, to what extent the homogeneous bodies would comprise a certain formal factor directly involved in the characterization of their constitutional particularities, taking into account a comparative examination with other kinds of natural compositions, namely, elemental aggregates and living organisms. Thus, through this examination, I will explore the question of whether, in function of this formal factor, such bodies could present some teleological character trait, distinct from the functional type, characteristic of organic-animate constitutions. (shrink)

Lógica, formação escolar e filosofia entre os jesuítas Resumo: O interesse mais direto deste artigo é a relação entre a Lógica e a formação filosófica na educação jesuíta. Para compor uma imagem da importância e da concreção da Lógica na formação proposta pelos inacianos, nós nos concentraremos na Ratio Studiorum e na obra do jesuíta português Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). A razão do recorte proposto é que as reflexões de Fonseca sobre o tema parecem, por um lado, orientar outros jesuítas, (...) como é o caso de Sebastião do Couto, que é o autor da dialética do Curso Conimbricense; por outro, elas são mais completas, sobretudo pela atenção dada por Fonseca ao método e às disputationes. De posse do conceito de Lógica de Fonseca, concluímos com a indicação de caminhos contemporâneos de revisitação de lógicas do passado. Palavras-chave: lógica; método; educação; jesuítas. Logic, school education and philosophy among the Jesuits Abstract: The most direct interest of this article is the relationship between Logic and philosophical formation in Jesuit education. In order to produce an image of the importance and concretion of Logic in the formation proposed by the Ignatians, we will focus on the Ratio Studiorum and on the work of the Portuguese Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). The reason for the proposed approach is that Fonseca's reflections on the subject seem, on the one hand, to guide other Jesuits, such as Sebastião do Couto, who is the author of the dialectic of Curso Conimbricense; on the other hand, Fonseca’s conception of logic is more complete regarding the other Jesuits, especially due to the attention given by our author to the method and the disputationes. In possession of Fonseca's Logic concept, we conclude with an indication of contemporary paths for revisiting the logics of the past. Key-words: logic; method; education; Jesuits. Logica, educazione scolastica e filosofia tra i gesuiti Abstract: L’interesse più diretto di questo articolo è il rapporto tra Logica e la formazione filosofica nell’educazione dei gesuiti. Per produrre un’immagine dell’importanza e della concretezza della Logica nella formazione proposta dagli inaziani, ci concentreremo nella Ratio Studiorum e nell’opera del gesuita portoghese Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). Il motivo di questa scelta è che le riflessioni di Fonseca sull’argomento sembrano, da un lato, guidare gli altri gesuiti, come Sebastião do Couto, cioè, l’autore della dialettica del Curso Conimbricense; da l’altro, la concezione di logica di Fonseca è più completa riguardo ad’altri gesuiti, soprattutto per l’attenzione data dall’autore al metodo e alle disputationes. Possedendo il concetto di logica di Fonseca, concludiamo con l’indicazione di modi contemporanei di rivisitare le logiche del passato. Parole chiave: logica ; metodo ; educazione ; gesuiti. Data de registro: 16/09/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021. (shrink)

This paper discusses the fallacies of combination and division as they are presented by Aristotle in chapter 4 of his Sophistici Elenchi. Aristotle's examples are concise, their discussion is unclear, and it is difficult to distinguish the cases of combination from those of division. I analyse the Aristotelian examples and the interpretations offered so far. I show that these interpretations suffer from a major defect: they fail to identify a common characteristic whereby the Aristotelian examples can be classified as instances (...) of combination or division. In my reconstruction of the examples, I repair this deficiency: I give a single pattern of explanation for the fallacy of combination and another (similar) pattern for the fallacy of division. Thus, it is possible to free Aristotle from the following charges: (i) he did not clearly distinguish between combination and division, and (ii) he reduced combination and division to a single fallacy. My explanation of the fallacies uses the notion of scope of an expression: in modern terminology, the fallacy of combination can be described as ?fallacy of the wide scope?, the fallacy of division as ?fallacy of the narrow scope? (shrink)

Este trabajo presenta lo que para la mayoría de los intérpretes de Aristóteles, que se ocupan del asunto del método en su obra, constituye el principal problema a resolver. Se trata del problema de determinar la relación existente entre la concepción aristotélica de ciencia demostrativa, consignada en los Analíticos Segundos, y la praxis investigativa de Aristóteles en sus diferentes tratados científicos, una praxis que los intérpretes dan frecuentemente en describir como dialéctica.

The publication offers an interdisciplinary and historical approach to the questions of exploration of the world with an emphasis on paradigm changes during the Renaissance and early modern times, leading to new concepts that we can accept as the beginning of the natural sciences in our current understanding. The main goal is to point out the connections between the paradigms of mathematics, theology and natural sciences, the connection of which is for the main protagonists an essential factor in the formation (...) of conceptions leading to the emergence of natural sciences in the modern sense. (shrink)

El presente libro se enfrenta al problema de cómo es posible concebir la filosofía aristotélica como una forma de vida, y no como una disciplina o profesión. Si en alguno de sus textos se pueden encontrar sus preocupaciones más vitales, sería en sus tratados prácticos, en los que defiende una filosofía de lo humano. Pero, pese a esto, Aristóteles insiste en que la filosofía, en su mayor grado, parece ser la filosofía primera a la que parece referirse con la contemplación (...) propuesta al final de la Ética nicomaquea. ¿Cómo entender esta tensión entre una filosofía humana y una filosofía primera? ¿A qué dio Aristóteles prelación para el buen vivir? Lo que queremos defender es que no hay una dicotomía entre vida activa y vida contemplativa m´ás allá del análisis puramente conceptual. Por el contrario, lo que propone Aristóteles es que es imposible decidir entre la acción y la contemplación sin recurrir a la filosofía misma. El intelecto, en su papel de rector de la vida, requiere contemplación para orientar a la acción, así como el médico requiere de la ciencia natural para orientar su acción. (shrink)

This book faces the problem of how is it possible to conceive Aristotelian philosophy as a way of life, and not as a discipline or profession. If there are any of his texts where this concerns are to be found, it is in his practical treatises, in which he defends a philosophy of human affairs. However, Aristotle insists on the fact that philosophy, in its greatest expression, is the first philosophy, to which the idea of contemplation seems to refer to, (...) at the end of the Nicomachean ethics. How is this tension between human and first philosophy to be understood? Which one was more important in Aristotle’s conception of the good life? What will we be claiming here is that there’s no dichotomy between active and contemplative life beyond the conceptual analysis. On the contrary, the Aristotelian proposal is that choosing between action and contemplation is impossible without appealing to philosophy itself. The intellect, in his role as ruler of life, requires contemplation to lead action, in the same way as a medical practitioner requires natural science in order to guide his deeds. (shrink)

The article examines the relevance of Aristotle’s analysis that concerns the syllogistic figures. On the assumption that Aristotle’s analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis, we show how Aristotle used the three terms, when he formulated the three syllogistic figures. So far it has not been appropriately recognized that the three terms — the major, the middle and the minor one — were viewed by Aristotle syntactically and predicatively in the form of diagrams. Many scholars have misunderstood Aristotle (...) in that in the second and third figure the middle term is outside and that in the second figure the major term is next to the middle one, whereas in the third figure it is further from it. By means of diagrams, we have elucidated how this perfectly accords with Aristotle's planar and graphic arrangement. In the light of these diagrams, one can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative set of terms. Irrespective of the tricky question concerning the abbreviations that Aristotle himself used with reference to these types of predication, the reconstructed figures allow us better to comprehend the reductions of syllogism to the first figure. We assume that the figures of syllogism are analogous to the figures of categorical predication, i.e., they are specific syntactic and semantic models. Aristotle demanded certain logical and methodological competence within analytics, which reflects his great commitment and contribution to the field. (shrink)

A topic common to both Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of theories of the soul is the doctrine of the soul as a harmony of the parts of the body. Plato’s Phaedo as well as Aristotle’s De anima and Eudemus present this theory and argue against the identification of the soul as a harmony. This paper has two focuses, one philosophical and one historical. First, I will focus on the argumentation used by Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus, which is often associated (...) with Aristotle’s early attachment to Plato. On the basis of the argumentation against the harmonia theory, I will try to show that the Eudemus is not a dialogue that depicts Aristotle’s Platonic phase. Instead, by comparing the arguments of the Eudemus with both Plato and Aristotle’s mature thought, I will argue that the argumentation of the Eudemus seems to be an indirect attack on Plato’s view on the Forms and on the nature of the soul, and that it seems to be consistent with Aristotle’s mature work On the Soul. Second, given that Aristotle discusses this topic twice, I will try, also on the basis of conclusions about the Eudemus and on later reception of Aristotle’s arguments, to show why this is the case. (shrink)

En su defensa del Principio de no-contradicción, Aristóteles discute con varios interlocutores, desde los presocráticos hasta el sofista Protágoras, este último ampliamente conocido en la Antigüedad por trastocar el concepto de verdad con su doctrina del “homo mensura”, declarando así la imposibilidad del discurso falso. Consideramos que una lectura atenta del Libro Γ que rescate la figura del abderita puede mostrar cómo la crítica del sofista es clave para la constitución del pensamiento aristotélico en torno al problema de la verdad. (...) En la primera sección expondré algunas consideraciones sobre el PNC que son relevantes para entender las motivaciones detrás de las críticas aristotélicas al sofista. A continuación, analizaré dos de los argumentos aristotélicos contra los adversarios que discuten de mala fe: por una parte, la “refutación” de Metaph. Γ. 4 y, por otra parte, el “argumento de las apariencias contrarias” de Metaph. Γ. 5. Mi hipótesis es que algunos elementos teóricos esbozados en Γ. 4 permiten reconstruir una crítica aristotélica seria contra Protágoras en Γ. 5. Finalmente expondré una síntesis del camino recorrido y ofreceré algunas conclusiones. (shrink)

The text of Aristotle'sEthica Eudemia is often in need of emendation, especially because of the particular fault in the manuscripts of misreading one letter for another or misdividing letters to form words. Scholars have already done fine work in correcting many of these errors, but more needs to be done. A second problem with the text does not have to do with matters of spelling or grammar, but rather with those of philosophical sense. For, as scholars have noted, theEEis marked (...) by considerable compression of thought, and this compression leads scholars to propose changes where, on further consideration, it can be shown that not change of words but change of comprehension is needed. (shrink)

A long-established view has deprecated Renaissance humanists as primarily literary figures with little serious interest in philosophy. More recently it has been proposed that the idea of philosophy as a way of life offers a useful framework with which to re-assess their philosophical standing. However, this proposal has faced some criticism. By looking again at the work of three important figures from the period I defend the claim that at least some thinkers during the Renaissance did see philosophy as a (...) way of life, while also acknowledging the force of reservations made by recent critics. (shrink)

The author deals with the lost works of Empedocles, an often neglected subject, in the frame of the discussion concerning the number of the poems and their main features. He reviews the traces of the Passage of Xerxes, of the Medical Discourse, and of the Proem to Apollo among the fragments and witnesses, taking his cue from textual aspects and dealing with the contents, the significance of each of these writings in Empedocles’ culture and thought and their multifarious relationships with (...) his times. As to the Passage, he tries to reconcile the contrasting interpretations so far proposed (historical or religious poem). Concerning B111, the only relic from the Medical Discourse, he explains why its contents are incompatible with the Physical Poem and the Purifications. He analyzes the Proem to Apollo in several perspectives (text, witnesses, contents also from the epistemological point of view, literary genre). He assigns fragments 131–134 and 142 to the Proem, drawing one of his arguments from the comparison with the third Homeric Hymn to Apollo, and also suggesting a relationship with an intellectual cult of the sun. Formal features help to ascribe each fragment to the relevant poem. Close similarities between fragments do not necessarily mean that they come from the same writing: Empedocles is wont to allude to one poem of his while composing another. The author concludes that the striving for a reductio ad unum of the Acragantine’s output, also evident in the attempt by a number of scholars to make only one poem out of the Περὶ φύσεως and the Καθαρμοί, has often led researchers to take for granted that none of the fragments preserved might belong to the lost works. (shrink)

The author distinguishes between scientific and prudential reason (practical wisdom) in Aristotle with reference to the nature of the principles assumed as premises, and to the method of inference. In the history of thought these two models of reason are elieved not only to be proper to science and, respectively, ethics, but also, at times, to be the scientific model proper to ethics (for example, in natural law doctrines) and the prudential model proper to science. Mixed models are also given (...) in the history of thought: scientific‐prudential (for example, in Thomas Aquinas) and prudential‐scientific. Furthermore, some aspects of the relationship between authority and reason are examined. (shrink)

This article offers a Polish translation of Aristotle’s treatise, On Philosophy, of which only certain fragments and testimonies have been preserved. The translation is supplied with an introduction presenting the history of various interpretations and reconstructions of Aristotle’s work.

It is now a widespread opinion among interpreters that Aristotle’s History of Animals is not a mere collection of empirical data but has its own theoretical framework; however, there is still disagreement as to exactly what this framework is. To address the problem, the article analyzes in detail the diairetic schemes of HA I 1, attempting to overturn the common opinion that this chapter is a mere expository introduction to the study of animals’ differences. On the contrary, it will be (...) shown that in this chapter Aristotle not only applies the method of ‘multiple division’ theorized in Parts of Animals I 2–4, but also uses dividing criteria that are informed by his causal theory and his hylomorphist ontology. This analysis will therefore lead to the more controversial conclusion that HA is not an ‘early’ work by Aristotle but a mature treatise with its own specific theoretical aim: the aitiological explanation of the anatomical, eco-physiological and ethological differences among animals. (shrink)

Diogenes Laertius' list of Aristotle's works includes a Homeric Puzzles in six books, as does the list in the biography of Aristotle attributed to Hesychius. This latter also includes a Homeric Problems in ten books, which appears to be the same as an item in the biography attributed to Ptolemy al-Gharib. The later and more derivative Vita Marciana attributes to Aristotle a Homeric Questions. The only other reference to the title of such a work by Aristotle is from the anonymous (...) Antiatticista, a second-century a.d. lexicon : ‘They say Alcaeus the comic poet and Aristotle in Homeric Puzzles said this.’ Finally, Poetics 25 – which begins περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων – is a summary, with examples, of just such a work, and a description of how to undertake such an inquiry. (shrink)

Building on previous scholarly work on the mathematical roots of assertoric syllogistic we submit that for Aristotle, the semantic value of the copula in universal affirmative propositions is the relation of divisibility on positive integers. The adequacy of this interpretation, labeled here ‘arithmetical dictum’, is assessed both theoretically and textually with respect to the existing interpretations, especially the so-called ‘mereological dictum’.

Nauka o středu představuje jeden ze stěžejních pilířů Aristotelovy etiky a je úzce provázána s jeho pojetím etických zdatností. Ty jsou podle Aristotela flexibilní s ohledem na kontext praktické situace. Pojetí statečnosti se však od ostatních etických zdatností liší. Předně je zde problém dvou emocí, které Aristotelés přisuzuje zdatnosti statečnosti. Dále omezuje její oblast výhradně na válečnictví. Toto paradigma válečnictví má pak za následek, že statečnost postrádá flexibilitu etických zdatností a stává se rigidní. Tyto klíčové prvky ohrožují plausibilitu a koherenci (...) Aristotelovy nauky o středu. Chyba ovšem není v nauce o středu jako takové, ale chyby se dopouští sám Aristotelés nesprávnou aplikací nauky o středu na statečnost. (shrink)

Pseudo-Aristotle’s Physiognomonica is one of the main authoritative texts in the field of ancient and medieval physiognomy. After its thirteenth century translation into Latin by Bartholomew of Messina, the treatise was widely diffused across Europe. Nevertheless, its medieval reception and use remains largely unexplored. The present paper aims to fill this gap and offers a new inventory of all the medieval commentaries written on pseudo-Aristotle’s Physiognomonica. The newly discovered material allows us to demonstrate that this physiognomic text was more widely (...) read and commented upon than was previously accepted, which inevitably changes the picture of medieval physiognomy in general. (shrink)

The mean has mostly been considered in the history of Aristotelian Ethics’ commentaries as the main idea of his ethical thought so that it transformed from an ethical concept to his ethical theory. Thus, the validity of the Aristotelian ethical attitude is evaluated by the mean as the central thesis. However, it becomes apparent by pursuing the procedure of the Aristotelian investigation in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics that the mean is first presented as a possibility for the necessity (...) of the best choice’s understanding in every given practical situation. The final signification and the substantial content of the mean is that the best choice must be chosen by every individual agent at any particular action considering all the multiple, variable and conditioned factors. Because the mean is an individual intuitive grasping, it needs a right rule; relying on which, as a universal criterion, we determine any particular mean in every special circumstance. The right rule itself consists of the right reason. Having surveyed various kinds of knowledge, Aristotle arrives at practical reason, which is an agent’s dispositional power generally and in comprehending and actualizing the best particular option particularly. The mean, therefore, depends on the right rule which itself relies on the correct reason or practical understanding. (shrink)

Human beings, according to Aristotle, are not the only political animals. Bees, wasps, ants and cranes are the other political species mentioned by Aristotle in the History of Animals. Politics, I, 2 confirms this point and makes the additional statement that human beings, if not the only political animals, are nevertheless more political than the other political animals. There has been a traditional scholarly agreement that the capacity for rational speech is the reason why human beings are more political. This (...) traditional view seems to have some support from the same chapter of Politics, where Aristotle addresses, right after having stated that human beings are more political, the role of language in human beings’ political life. This paper contests this traditional view about language and claims that it is the more political character of human beings which explains the political role of language and not vice versa. -/- . (shrink)

This dissertation explores Aristotle’s use of teleology as a principle of explanation, especially as it is used in the natural treatises. Its main purposes are, first, to determine the function, structure, and explanatory power of teleological explanations in four of Aristotle’s natural treatises, that is, in Physica (book II), De Anima, De Partibus Animalium (including the practice in books II-IV), and De Caelo (book II). Its second purpose is to confront these findings about Aristotle’s practice in the natural treatises with (...) the theoretical picture of the structure of teleological explanations gained from Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration. For this purpose a new interpretation of Analytica Posteriora II.11 is presented. This study thereby contributes to recent scholarship on the relation between Aristotle’s philosophy of science and his philosophy of nature, while at the same time adding to our knowledge of Aristotle’s notion of teleology in terms of its explanatory merits and limits. (shrink)

Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda. It accompanies the translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda into Portuguese in the same volume of the journal.

The Role of Negation in the Description of the World According to Aristote’s Metaphysics. The notions of ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ have entered philosophical language, forming the basis of ontology and meontology, as the counterparts of the Greek expressions to on and to me on (nominalised forms, affirmative and negative, of the participle of the verb einai). Originally, however, these expressions did not have any objectifying meaning, but played the role of meta-language names, representing the copula einai in all its forms, (...) most generally in its affirmative and negative forms. The copula itself, which in later philosophy took on the existential meaning, had functioned only as a semantically empty connective of predicates. Over time the participle on has been used as a universal name of all predicates. The above-mentioned expressions became central in Greek philosophical terminology thanks to the debates, initiated by Parmenides, on the role of negation in the description of the world. Parmenides himself proposed a complete excision of negative sentences as describing by elimination, and created a positive-monistic system which abandoned multiplicity, divisibility, and variability. Later philosophers defended negation, fighting back against the paradoxes formulated by the Eleatics and later by the Sophists. Plato observed that without negation it is impossible to describe the multiplicity of things. He also distinguished a relative negation which does not eliminate anything but makes it possible to confront some things with others. According to the atomists, the divisibility of physical things forces us to accept that they consist of a positive element in the form of an impenetrable body, and of another element lacking any characteristics, i.e. the void. Finally, Aristotle, when analysing the process of change, justified the consistency of the statement that something comes out of “not being” and “being”, under the assumption that the former is understood as being actual, and the latter as being potential. In all these conceptions there is nothing non-existent, there are only proposals of how to identify the aspects of reality whose explanation justifies the use of negation. The affirmative and negative forms of the above expressions have also provoked reflection on the problem of truth and falsity. It has been observed that they are used in everyday language not only to state an agreement or disagreement with the actual facts of the matter, but also to affirm or deny something. (shrink)