This article articulates and defends a dissolution of the so-called repugnant conclusion, which focuses on the notion of life worth living figuring both in Parfit's formulation of the repugnant conclusion and in most responses to such a conclusion. The proposed dissolution demonstrates that the notion of life worth living is plagued by multiple ambiguities and that these ambiguities, in turn, hamper meaningful debate about both the issue of whether the repugnant conclusion can be avoided and the issue of whether the (...) repugnant conclusion is actually repugnant. This result does not exclude that some modified versions of the repugnant conclusion may yield valuable insights about the value of populations and the tenability of different axiological/ethical theories. Still, if the proposed dissolution is correct, then the repugnant conclusion rests on an ill-defined notion and we lack the information required to assess the merits of the repugnant conclusion. (shrink)

Surrogacy involves a private agreement whereby a woman who gestates a child attempts to surrender her (putative) moral right to become the parent of that child such that another person (or persons), of the woman’s choice, can acquire it. Since people lack the normative power to privately transfer custody, attempts to do so are illegitimate, and the law should reflect this fact.

Der Beitrag setzt sich kritisch mit dem Prinzip des prokreativen Wohltuns von Julian Savulescu und seinen Implikationen für den Umgang mit der Präimplantationsdiagnostik auseinander. PB fordert angehende Eltern dazu auf, aus mehreren möglichen zukünftigen Kindern dasjenige auszuwählen, dessen Leben voraussichtlich am besten verlaufen wird. Paare mit Kinderwunsch sind danach zumindest unter bestimmten Umständen moralisch verpflichtet, eine PID in Anspruch zu nehmen, um die Weitergabe genetisch bedingter Krankheiten zu verhindern. Die Auswahl von Embryonen im Rahmen einer PID kann jedoch nur dann (...) mit dem Wohlergehen des zukünftigen Kindes begründet werden, wenn man die entsprechende Wohltunspflicht mit Savulescu und Kahane als „unpersönliche“ moralische Pflicht versteht. PB wirft daher die Frage nach der Relevanz unpersönlicher Erwägungen für Entscheidungen über Fortpflanzung und Familiengründung auf. Gegen Savulescu und Kahane argumentiere ich dafür, reproduktive Verantwortung als einen integralen Aspekt elterlicher Verantwortung und damit als personenbezogene Verantwortung zu deuten, und verteidige diese Konzeption reproduktiver Verantwortung gegen Einwände, die sich aus einem von Savulescu und Kahane konstruierten hypothetischen Szenario – dem Röteln-Beispiel – ergeben. (shrink)

Procreation is the ultimate public goods problem. Each new child affects the welfare of many other people, and some (but not all) children produce uncompensated value that future people will enjoy. This essay addresses challenges that arise if we think of procreation and parenting as public goods. These include whether individual choices are likely to lead to a socially desirable outcome, and whether changes in laws, social norms, or access to genetic engineering and embryo selection might improve the aggregate outcome (...) of our reproductive choices. (shrink)

Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be (...) confused with a related but much stronger version of the argument, which says that all human lives are very bad and not worth starting. I criticize the latter stance, but take seriously the former stance and hope it can be answered in future work. (shrink)

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 358-380, June 2021.

Can appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it (...) in the contemporary literature: the identifiability objection; the non-existence objection; the waiving of rights objection, the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and the unfairness objection. (shrink)

The non-identity problem arises when an intervention or behavior changes the identity of those affected. Delaying pregnancy is an example of such a behavior. The problem is whether and in what ways such changes in identity affect moral considerations. While a great deal has been written about the non-identity problem, relatively little has been written about the implications for physicians and how they should understand their duties. We argue that the non-identity problem can make a crucial moral difference in some (...) circumstances, and that it has some interesting implications for when it is or is not right for a physician to refuse to accede to a patient's request. If a physician is asked to provide an intervention (identity preserving) that makes a person worse off, then such harm provides a good reason for the physician to refuse to provide the intervention. However, in cases where different (identity-altering) interventions result in different people having a better or worse life, physicians should normally respect patient choice. (shrink)

This article argues for the elimination of the concept of life worth living from philosophical vocabulary on three complementary grounds. First, the basic components of this concept suffer from multiple ambiguities, which hamper attempts to ground informative evaluative and classificatory judgments about the worth of life. Second, the criteria proposed to track the extension of the concept of life worth living rest on unsupported axiological assumptions and fail to identify precise and plausible referents for this concept. And third, the concept (...) of life worth living is not shown to serve any major evaluative or classificatory purpose besides those served by already available axiological concepts. By eliminating the concept of life worth living, philosophers will free themselves of the task of addressing ill-posed axiological questions and ground reflection about the worth of life on more rigorous conceptual foundations. (shrink)

In a common example of the non-identity problem, a person deliberately conceives a child who she knows will have incurable blindness but a life well worth living. Although Wilma’s decision seems wrong, it is difficult to say why. This paper develops and defends a version of the “indirect strategy” for solving the NIP. This strategy rests on the idea that it is wrong to deliberately make it impossible to fulfill an obligation; consequently, it is wrong for Wilma to create Pebbles (...) because doing so makes it impossible to fulfill her obligation to protect her child from harms like blindness. A challenge for the indirect strategy is the well-known “rights waiver problem”: Since Pebbles’s very existence depends on Wilma’s having made herself unable to fulfill an obligation to Pebbles, Pebbles is likely to waive that obligation. I address this problem by recasting the indirect strategy in terms of a non-grievance evil. I argue that deliberately making it impossible to fulfill a moral obligation manifests a defective attitude toward morality—an attitude which sees moral obligations as things to be dodged whenever they are inconvenient. Next, I argue that acting on this attitude is a wrong-making feature that is independent of any wrong that might be done to Pebbles. I conclude that Wilma’s decision remains wrong even if Pebbles waives any objection to it. (shrink)

Policy-makers have attempted to frame the ethical requirements that are relevant to the creation of human beings via reproductive technologies. Various reports and laws enacted in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Britain have introduced tests for how we should weigh child welfare when using these technologies. A number of bioethicists have argued that child welfare should be interpreted as a “best interests” test. Others have argued that there are ethical reasons why we should abandon this kind of test. I will (...) argue that at least some of the relevant policy can be interpreted as requiring those wishing to exercise their procreative liberty to have a reasonable plan to care and nurture any resulting child, thereby respecting the internal preconditions of that liberty. This interpretation of child welfare requirements answers some of the ethical worries about a child welfare test. (shrink)

When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing official view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if the burdens in an infant's future life outweigh the benefits. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment may be withdrawn from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I (...) present four arguments in favor of the Threshold View, and identify and respond to several counterarguments. I conclude that it is justifiable in some circumstances for parents and doctors to decide to allow an infant to die even though the infant's life would be worth living. The Threshold View provides a justification for treatment decisions that is more consistent, more robust, and potentially more practical than the standard view. (shrink)

Recent scientific advances mean the widespread introduction of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) for chromosomal aneuploidies may be close at hand, raising the question of how NIPD should be introduced as part of antenatal care pathways for pregnant women. In this paper, the authors examine the ethical implications of three hypothetical models for using NIPD for aneuploidy in state-funded healthcare systems and assess which model is ethically preferable. In comparing the models, the authors consider their respective timings; how each model would (...) fit with current screening and diagnostic tests offered to pregnant women; the implications of offering NIPD at different stages of pregnancy; and the potential for each model to support reproductive autonomy and informed decision-making. The authors conclude by favouring a model that would be offered at 11–13 weeks gestation, alongside existing combined screening, provided that this is accompanied by measures to maximise informed decision-making, for example, provision of adequate pretest and post-test counselling. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the prevailing assumption that there is a right to procreate and question whether there exists a coherent notion of such a right. I argue that we should question any and all procreative activities, not just alternative procreative means and contexts. I suggest that clinging to the assumption of a right to procreate prevents serious scrutiny of reproductive behavior and that, instead of continuing to embrace this assumption, attempts should be made to provide a proper foundation (...) for it. I argue that the focus of procreative activities and discourse on reproductive ethics should be on obligations instead of rights, as rights talk tends to obfuscate recognition of obligations toward others, particularly those who bear the most significant burdens of the procreative process. I examine some possible foundations of a right to procreate as well as John Robertson’s thoughtful account of “procreative liberty” but conclude that at the present time there exists no compelling account of a right to procreate. Finally, I conclude that in the absence of a satisfactory account of a right to procreate, we should refrain from grounding practices or polices on the assumption that there is such a right. (shrink)

Der Beitrag setzt sich kritisch mit dem Prinzip des prokreativen Wohltuns von Julian Savulescu und seinen Implikationen für den Umgang mit der Präimplantationsdiagnostik auseinander. PB fordert angehende Eltern dazu auf, aus mehreren möglichen zukünftigen Kindern dasjenige auszuwählen, dessen Leben voraussichtlich am besten verlaufen wird. Paare mit Kinderwunsch sind danach zumindest unter bestimmten Umständen moralisch verpflichtet, eine PID in Anspruch zu nehmen, um die Weitergabe genetisch bedingter Krankheiten zu verhindern. Die Auswahl von Embryonen im Rahmen einer PID kann jedoch nur dann (...) mit dem Wohlergehen des zukünftigen Kindes begründet werden, wenn man die entsprechende Wohltunspflicht mit Savulescu und Kahane als „unpersönliche“ moralische Pflicht versteht. PB wirft daher die Frage nach der Relevanz unpersönlicher Erwägungen für Entscheidungen über Fortpflanzung und Familiengründung auf. Gegen Savulescu und Kahane argumentiere ich dafür, reproduktive Verantwortung als einen integralen Aspekt elterlicher Verantwortung und damit als personenbezogene Verantwortung zu deuten, und verteidige diese Konzeption reproduktiver Verantwortung gegen Einwände, die sich aus einem von Savulescu und Kahane konstruierten hypothetischen Szenario – dem Röteln-Beispiel – ergeben. (shrink)

The advent of prenatal genetic diagnosis has sparked debates among ethicists and philosophers regarding parental responsibility towards potential offspring. Some have attempted to place moral obligations on parents to not bring about children with certain diseases in order to prevent harm to such children. There has been no rigorous evaluation of cystic fibrosis in this context. This paper will demonstrate cystic fibrosis to have unique properties that make it difficult to categorise among other diseases with the goal of promulgating a (...) reproductive rule. Once this is established, it will be demonstrated that procreative rules that appeal to future health are inadequate in the era of advancing genetic knowledge. Utilising a specification of Joel Feinberg's ‘open future’ concept outlined by Matteo Mameli, it will offer an analysis of parental obligation that does not constrain parents of potential children with cystic fibrosis with a moral obligation not to bring them about. (shrink)