- CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value.Walter Horn - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):191-215.details
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Not Always Worth the Effort: Difficulty and the Value of Achievement.Sukaina Hirji - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):525-548.details
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Scales for Scope: A New Solution to the Scope Problem for Pro-Attitude-Based Well-Being.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):417-438.details
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Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2017 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.details
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Experienced Utility or Decision Utility for QALY Calculation? Both.Paige A. Clayton & Douglas P. MacKay - 2018 - Public Health Ethics 11 (1):82-89.details
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Effort and Achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):27-51.details
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Eliminating ‘ life worth living’.Fumagalli Roberto - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):769-792.details
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Why should Welfare ‘Fit’?Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):685-24.details
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(1 other version)A Topical Bibliography of Scholarship on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.Thornton C. Lockwood - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:1-116.details
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Up and Down with Aggregation.Bradford Hooker - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):126-147.details
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Making good choices: toward a theory of well-being in medicine.Alicia Hall - 2016 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37 (5):383-400.details
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Robots in aged care: a dystopian future.Robert Sparrow - 2016 - AI and Society 31 (4):1-10.details
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Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.details
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Introduction.Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi - 2015 - In Jukka Varelius & Michael Cholbi (eds.), New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Mental Illness, Lack of Autonomy, and Physician-Assisted Death.Jukka Varelius - 2015 - In Michael Cholbi & Jukka Varelius (eds.), New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 59-77.details
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Prioritarianism for Global Health Investments: Identifying the Worst Off.Daniel Sharp & Joseph Millum - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:112-132.details
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Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values.Jason R. Raibley - 2014 - In Alex C. Michalos (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer. pp. 4438-4443.details
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Desire-Fulfillment Theory.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 135-147.details
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Children's Well-Being: A Philosophical Analysis.Anthony Skelton - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 366-377.details
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Happiness is not Well-being.Jason R. Raibley - 2012 - Journal of Happiness Studies 13 (6):1105-1129.details
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How Theories of Well-Being Can Help Us Help.Valerie Tiberius - 2014 - Journal of Practical Ethics 2 (2):1-19.details
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A Normatively Neutral Definition of Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):1-21.details
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Utilitarianism, Welfare, Children.Anthony Skelton - 2014 - In Alexander Bagattini & Colin Macleod (eds.), The Nature of Children's Well-being: Theory and Practice. Springer. pp. 85-103.details
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The Strong-Tie Requirement and Objective-List Theories of Well-Being.William A. Lauinger - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):953-968.details
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Subjectivism without Desire.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.details
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The Hedonist's Dilemma.Dale Dorsey - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196.details
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(1 other version)In search of `the good life' for demented elderly.Maartje Schermer - 2003 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 6 (1):35-44.details
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The Collapse of Virtue Ethics.Brad Hooker - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):22.details
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Constructivist experimental philosophy on well-being and virtue.Matthew Braddock - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):295-323.details
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Authentic happiness.Greg Bognar - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):272-284.details
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(1 other version)Up and down with aggregation.Brad Hooker - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):126-147.details
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Preferences, welfare, and the status-quo bias.Dale Dorsey - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554.details
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Perfectionism in moral and political philosophy.Steven Wall - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Fairness.Brad Hooker - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):329 - 352.details
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(1 other version)Distributive justice and basic capability equality: 'Good enough' is not good enough Richard J. Arneson.Richard Arneson - 2004details
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Desire satisfactionism and hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.details
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Pleasure, Pain, and Pluralism about Well-Being.Eden Lin - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Telic Perfectionism and the Badness of Pain.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Perspectives on Ill-Being. Oxford University Press.details
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Alienation, Resonance, and Experience in Theories of Well-Being.Andrew Alwood - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2225-2240.details
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A Puzzle of Prudence: Reason to Prioritize Current Goals.Dong-Yong Choi - 2021 - Cheolhak-Korean Journal of Philosophy 146:171-190.details
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Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?Peter Königs - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):165-179.details
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Well-Being as Need Satisfaction.Marlowe Fardell - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (3).details
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(2 other versions)Well‐being, part 1: The concept of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
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(2 other versions)Well‐being, part 2: Theories of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
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Can desire-satisfaction alienate our good?Willem van der Deijl - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (4):687-700.details
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Being Sure and Living Well: How Security Affects Human Flourishing.J. A. M. Daemen - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):93-110.details
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Can I Get A Little Less Satisfaction, Please?Michael Plant - manuscriptdetails
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Well-Being as Harmony.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2020 - In David Kaspar (ed.), Explorations in Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 117-140.details
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On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value.Joseph van Weelden - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):137-156.details
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Calculating qalys: Liberalism and the value of health states.Douglas MacKay - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):259-285.details
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