Reference [12] introduced a novel formula to formula translation tool that enables syntactic metatheoretical investigations of first-order modallogics, bypassing a need to convert them first into Gentzen style logics in order torely on cut elimination and the subformula property. In fact, the formulator tool,as was already demonstrated in loc. cit., is applicable even to the metatheoreticalstudy of logics such as QGL, where cut elimination is unavailable. This paper applies the formulator approach to show the independence of the axiom schema ☐A (...) → ☐∀ A of the logics M3and ML3 of [17, 18, 11, 13]. This leads to the conclusion that the two logics obtained by removing this axiom are incomplete, both with respect to their natural Kripke structures and to arithmetical interpretations. In particular, the so modified ML3 is, similarly to QGL, an arithmetically incomplete first-order extension of GL, but, unlike QGL, all its theorems have cut free proofs. We also establish here, via formulators, a stronger version of the disjunction property for GL and QGL without going through Gentzen versions of these logics. (shrink)

We introduce a first order extension of GL, called ML 3 , and develop its proof theory via a proxy cut-free sequent calculus GLTS. We prove the highly nontrivial result that cut is a derived rule in GLTS, a result that is unavailable in other known first-order extensions of GL. This leads to proofs of weak reflection and the related conservation result for ML 3 , as well as proofs for Craig’s interpolation theorem for GLTS. Turning to semantics we prove (...) that ML 3 is sound with respect to arithmetical interpretations and that it is also sound and complete with respect to converse well-founded and transitive finite Kripke models. This leads us to expect that a Solovay-like proof of arithmetical completeness of ML 3 is possible. (shrink)

We introduce a Gentzen-style modal predicate logic and prove the cut-elimination theorem for it. This sequent calculus of cut-free proofs is chosen as a proxy to develop the proof-theory of the logics introduced in [14, 15, 4]. We present syntactic proofs for all the metatheoretical results that were proved model-theoretically in loc. cit. and moreover prove that the form of weak reflection proved in these papers is as strong as possible.

The axiomatic presentation of modal systems and the standard formulations of natural deduction and sequent calculus for modal logic are reviewed, together with the difficulties that emerge with these approaches. Generalizations of standard proof systems are then presented. These include, among others, display calculi, hypersequents, and labelled systems, with the latter surveyed from a closer perspective.

In a classical 1976 paper, Solovay proved the arithmetical completeness of the modal logic GL; provability of a formula in GL coincides with provability of its arithmetical interpretations of it in Peano Arithmetic. In that paper, he also provided an axiomatic system GLS and proved arithmetical completeness for GLS; provability of a formula in GLS coincides with truth of its arithmetical interpretations in the standard model of arithmetic. Proof theory for GL has been studied intensively up to the present day. (...) However, it might sound somewhat strange that no proof theory for GLS was ever developed nor even suggested thus far, except for the axiomatic system offered by Solovay. In this paper, we develop a proof theory for GLS based on the sequent calculus method. We provide a sequent calculus for GLS and prove the cut-elimination and some standard consequences of it: the interpolation and definability theorems. As another consequence of cut-elimination, we also prove the equivalence of GL and GLS with respect to a special form of formulas which we call Gödel sentences, using a purely proof-theoretical method. (shrink)

This paper investigates a first-order extension of GL called \. We outline briefly the history that led to \, its key properties and some of its toolbox: the \emph{conservation theorem}, its cut-free Gentzenisation, the ``formulators'' tool. Its semantic completeness is fully stated in the current paper and the proof is retold here. Applying the Solovay technique to those models the present paper establishes its main result, namely, that \ is arithmetically complete. As expanded below, \ is a first-order modal logic (...) that along with its built-in ability to simulate general classical first-order provability―"\" simulating the the informal classical "\"―is also arithmetically complete in the Solovay sense. (shrink)

In 1983, Valentini presented a syntactic proof of cut elimination for a sequent calculus GLSV for the provability logic GL where we have added the subscript V for “Valentini”. The sequents in GLSV were built from sets, as opposed to multisets, thus avoiding an explicit contraction rule. From a syntactic point of view, it is more satisfying and formal to explicitly identify the applications of the contraction rule that are ‘hidden’ in these set based proofs of cut elimination. There is (...) often an underly ing assumption that the move to a proof of cut elimination for sequents built from multisets is easy. Recently, however, it has been claimed that Valentini’s arguments to eliminate cut do not terminate when applied to a multiset formulation of GLSV with an explicit rule of contraction. The claim has led to much confusion and various authors have sought new proofs of cut elimination for GL in a multiset setting. Here we refute this claim by placing Valentini’s arguments in a formal setting and proving cut elimination for sequents built from multisets. The formal setting is particularly important for sequents built from multisets, in order to accurately account for the interplay between the weakening and contraction rules. Furthermore, Valentini’s original proof relies on a novel induction parameter called “width” which is computed ‘globally’. It is diffi cult to verify the correctness of his induction argument based on “width”. In our formulation however, verification of the induction argument is straight forward. Finally, the multiset setting also introduces a new complication in the the case of contractions above cut when the cut formula is boxed. We deal with this using a new transformation based on Valentini’s original arguments. Finally, we show that the algorithm purporting to show the non termi nation of Valentini’s arguments is not a faithful representation of the original arguments, but is instead a transformation already known to be insufficient. (shrink)

A well established technique toward developing the proof theory of a Hilbert-style modal logic is to introduce a Gentzen-style equivalent (a Gentzenisation), then develop the proof theory of the latter, and finally transfer the metatheoretical results to the original logic (e.g., [1, 6, 8, 18, 10, 12]). In the first-order modal case, on one hand we know that the Gentzenisation of the straightforward first-order extension of GL, the logic QGL, admits no cut elimination (if the rule is included as primitive; (...) or, if not included, then the rule is not admissible [1]). On the other hand the (cut-free) Gentzenisations of the first-order modal logics M3 and ML3 of [10, 12] do have cut as an admissible rule. The syntactic cut admissibility proof given in [18] for the Gentzenisation of the propositional provability logic GL is extremely complex, and it was the basis of the proofs of cut admissibility of the Gentzenisations of M3 and ML3, where the presence of quantifiers and quantifier rules added to the complexity and length of the proof. A recent proof of cut admissibility in a cut-free Gentzenisation of GL is given in [5] and is quite short and easy to read. We adapt it here to revisit the proofs for the cases of M3 and ML3, resulting to similarly short and easy to read proofs, only slightly complicated by the presence of quantification and its relevant rules. (shrink)

We give a set of postulates for the minimal normal modal logicK + without negation or any kind of implication. The connectives are simply , , , . The postulates (and theorems) are all deducibility statements . The only postulates that might not be obvious are.

In 1933 Godel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that Godel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves Godel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which (...) resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and λ-calculus. (shrink)

-/- Provability logic is a modal logic that is used to investigate what arithmetical theories can express in a restricted language about their provability predicates. The logic has been inspired by developments in meta-mathematics such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 1931 and Löb’s theorem of 1953. As a modal logic, provability logic has been studied since the early seventies, and has had important applications in the foundations of mathematics. -/- From a philosophical point of view, provability logic is interesting because (...) the concept of provability in a fixed theory of arithmetic has a unique and non-problematic meaning, other than concepts like necessity and knowledge studied in modal and epistemic logic. Furthermore, provability logic provides tools to study the notion of self-reference. (shrink)