- A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 239-266.details
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Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2018 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 27-59.details
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Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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(2 other versions)In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.details
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Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy?Jason Bridges - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):522-547.details
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(1 other version)The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is What it’s Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation.John Kulvicki - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):205-229.details
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Is pain representational?Murat Aydede - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (2):25-39.details
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How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.details
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Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.details
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What are natural concepts? A design perspective.Igor Douven & Peter Gärdenfors - 2019 - Mind and Language (3):313-334.details
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What is a pain in a body part?Murat Aydede - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):143–158.details
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How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):681-703.details
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(1 other version)A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.details
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Defending the IASP Definition of Pain.Murat Aydede - 2017 - The Monist 100 (4):439–464.details
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Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.details
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On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.details
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Abduction and Modality.Stephen Biggs - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.details
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(1 other version)A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):474-500.details
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(1 other version)Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1159-1178.details
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A Scientific Metaphysics and Ockham’s Razor.Bruce Long - 2019 - Axiomathes (5):1-31.details
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Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.details
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The Phenomenal Quality of Complex Experiences.Peter Fazekas - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):603-620.details
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Stop and smell the what? Two kinds of olfactory representation.Christopher F. Masciari - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.details
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Systems, models and self-awareness: Towards architectural models of consciousness.Ricardo Sanz, Carlos Hernández, Jaime Gómez, Julita Bermejo-Alonso, Manuel Rodríguez, Adolfo Hernando & Guadalupe Sánchez - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):255-279.details
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What it is like.Haoying Liu - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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(1 other version)The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124.details
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