Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physicalism, but it has consequences on the kind of physicalism we should embrace.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
2018, 2019
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KAMDTE-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-03-01
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-11-26

Total views
247 ( #25,510 of 2,448,508 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #22,850 of 2,448,508 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.