According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their disputed (...) moral beliefs. However, it is implausible to think that commonplace disagreement seriously undermines moral knowledge, and thus it is implausible to think that the standard account of moral intuitionism is true. (shrink)

The criticism of “traditional,” “toxic,” or “patriarchal” masculinity in both academic and popular venues recognizes that there is some sense in which the character traits and tendencies that are associated with masculinity are structurally connected to oppressive, gendered social practices and patriarchal social structures. One important theme of criticism centers on the gender distribution of emotional labor, generally speaking, but this criticism is also particularly meaningful in the context of heterosexual romantic relationships. I begin with the premise that there is (...) a gendered and asymmetrical distribution in how much emotional labor is performed, but I also consider that there might be meaningful and informative distinctions in what kind of emotional labor is characteristically performed by different genders. Specifically, I argue that the social norms around stoicism and restricted emotional expression are masculine-coded forms of emotional labor, and that they are potentially prosocial. Responding to structural and interpersonal asymmetries of emotional labor could well involve supplementing or better cultivating this aspect of male socialization rather than discarding it. (shrink)

If you start taking courses in contemporary cognitive science, you will soon encounter a particular picture of the human mind. This picture says that the mind is a lot like a computer. Specifically, the mind is made up of certain states and certain processes. These states and processes interact, in accordance with certain general rules, to generate specific behaviors. If you want to know how those states and processes got there in the first place, the only answer is that they (...) arose through the interaction of other states and processes, which arose from others... until, ultimately, the chain goes back to factors in our genes and our environment. Hence, one can explain human behavior just by positing a collection of mental states and psychological processes and discussing the ways in which these states and processes interact. This picture of the mind sometimes leaves people feeling deeply uncomfortable. They find themselves thinking something like: 'If the mind actually does work like that, it seems like we could never truly be morally responsible for anything we did. After all, we would never be free to choose any behavior other than the one we actually performed. Our behaviors would just follow inevitably from certain facts about the configuration of the states and processes within us.' Many philosophers think that this sort of discomfort is fundamentally confused or wrongheaded. They think that the confusion here can be cleared up just by saying something like: 'Wait! It doesn't make any sense to say that the interaction of these states and processes is preventing you from controlling your own life. The thing you are forgetting is that the interaction of these states and processes – this whole complex system described by cognitive science – is simply you. So when you learn that these states and processes control your behavior, all you are learning is that you are controlling your behavior. There is no reason at all to see these discoveries as a threat to your freedom or responsibility.'2 Philosophers may regard this argument as a powerful one, perhaps even irrefutable.. (shrink)

Is Buddhism’s attitude towards accepted forms of knowledge sceptical? Are Pyrrhonian scepticism and classical Buddhist scholasticism related in their respective applications and expressions of doubt? In what way and to what degree is Critical Buddhism an offshoot of modern scepticism? Questions such as these as well as related issues are explored in the present collection, which brings together examinations of systematic doubt in the traditions of Buddhism from a variety of perspectives. What results from the perceptive observations and profound analytical (...) insights of the seven essays is a rich and multi-faceted picture of two families of philosophical systems—scepticism and Buddhism—that seem both akin and at odds, both related and distant at the same time. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to improve the practical argument for beliefs in God. Some theists, most famously Kant and William James, called our attention to a particular set of beliefs, the Jamesian-type beliefs, which are justified by virtue of their practical significance, and these theists tried to justify theistic beliefs on the exact same ground. I argue, contra the Jamesian tradition, that theistic beliefs are different from the Jamesian-type beliefs and thus cannot be justified on the same ground. I (...) also argue that the practical argument, as it stands, faces a problem of self-defeat. I then construct a new practical argument that avoids both problems. According to this new argument, theistic beliefs are rational to accept because such beliefs best supply us with motivation strong enough to carry out demanding moral tasks. (shrink)

This article undertakes a comparative study of the conjectural histories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, focusing on the convergences in the moral and political ideals expressed and grounded in these histories. In comparison with Scots like Adam Smith and John Millar, the conjectural histories of Ferguson and Rousseau follow a similar historical trajectory as regards the development and progress of commercial, political and cultural arts. However, their assessment of the moral progress of humanity does not, or in a much (...) more limited way than in Smith and Millar, correlate with this trajectory. Rousseau and Ferguson see a candour and vigour in savage and barbarian societies that is much less easily supported by the complex socio-economic framework of modern, commercial societies. It is argued that the convergences in their conjectural histories arise from a similar fusion of these histories with Stoic and republican perspectives. While Rousseau and Ferguson do not see history as cyclical, they think that the forces that push towards moral decline are strong and can, on the political level, only be countered by firm republican policies. Furthermore, their shared Stoic ideal of the life lived according to nature informs their solutions for modern societies. (shrink)

In this paper, I sketch out a novel theory of well-being according to which well-being is constituted by harmony between mind and world. The notion of harmony I develop has three aspects. First there is correspondence between mind and world in the sense that events in the world match the content of our mental states. Second there is positive orientation towards the world, meaning that we have pro-attitudes towards the world we find ourselves in. Third there is fitting response to (...) the world. Taken together these three aspects make up an ideal of being attuned to, or at home in, the world. Such harmony between mind and world constitutes well-being. Its opposite – being disoriented, ill-at-ease in, or hostile to the world – makes a life go poorly. And, as we shall see, many of the things that intuitively contribute to well-being are instantiating one or more of the three aspects of harmony. (shrink)

I offer a novel reading in this dissertation of René Descartes’s (1596–1650) skepticism in his work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641–1642). I specifically aim to answer the following problem: How is Descartes’s skepticism to be read in accordance with the rest of his philosophy? This problem can be divided into two more general questions in Descartes scholarship: How is skepticism utilized in the Meditations, and what are its intentions and relation to the preceding philosophical tradition? -/- I approach the topic (...) from both a historical and a text-based analysis, combining textual and contextual research. I examine Descartes’s skepticism against two main traditions in the historical analysis: philosophical skepticism and Aristotelian Scholasticism. I argue that skepticism in the Meditations is intended to oppose and upheave both Scholasticism and skepticism. The intended results of the work are not merely epistemological but also metaphysical and even ethical. Furthermore, these ambitions cannot be neatly distinguished but merge into each other. -/- The third historical context against which the skeptical meditations are examined is the literary genre of meditative exercises, particularly from the 1500–1600’s, which, while religiously and spiritually oriented, likewise provided the practitioner with an enlightened understanding of self-knowledge and their cognitive place in the world on the way to closer spiritual proximity to God. I argue by this reading that the skepticism of the Meditations is an attentive, meditational cognitive exercise that is not merely instrumental and methodological but is to have a genuine and serious (psychologically real) effect on our thinking. The skeptical meditation is not simply a theoretical thought experiment but is to be seriously practiced as a transformative process of reorienting one’s cognitive framework to discover truth, certainty, and a way to a happy, tranquil, and virtuous life. -/- I offer a close reading in the textual analysis of the first three meditations of the Meditations. I argue that the meditative skepticism employed in the work does not reject the previous beliefs but suspends judgment on them, withdrawing assent until further evidence can be found. I introduce a new term into Descartes scholarship in this analysis, based on the terminology of ancient skepticism: Cartesian epochē (gr. epochē, suspension, withdrawal). Instead of rejecting previous beliefs or assenting to the probably false, the skeptical procedure of the Meditations is argued to emulate in important ways the suspension of judgment on equally balanced reasons in ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism. Novel interpretations are presented along the way of the will’s freedom, of the First Meditation’s skeptical scenarios, of the cogito, and of the vindication of metaphysical certainty, as well as a clarification of the Cartesian Circle problem. -/- Reinterpreting the relation of Descartes’s skepticism to the preceding historical and literary traditions leads to a new look at the skeptical method itself. Presenting a new interpretation of skepticism in the Meditations leads at the same time to a new look at its relation to the historical context. The two research questions are, then, intrinsically tied together. -/- My focus in the study is on the Meditations, but I also reference and discuss Descartes’s other philosophical works, as well as his correspondence, when necessary. (shrink)

Disney’s Frozen (2013) and Frozen 2 (2019) are among the highest-grossing films of all time (IMDb 2021) and are arguably among the most influential works of fantasy produced in the last decade in any medium. The films, based loosely on Hans Christensen Andersen’s “The Snow Queen” (Andersen 2014) focus on the adventures of the sisters Anna and Elsa as they, together with their companions, seek to safeguard their people both from external threats and (importantly) from Elsa’s inabilities to control her (...) magical abilities to summon ice and snow. While Anna’s choices drive much of the action of both films, Elsa has undoubtedly been the more influential and popular of the two characters, as indicated by measures such as merchandise sales (Ellen Byron and Paul Ziobro 2014), Google search data (Play Like Mum 2020), and even baby name choices (Wolfers 2015). -/- Despite her popularity, Elsa is in many ways a paradoxical sort of hero, as she finds her actions all but predetermined by both external and internal forces. This is particularly the case in the first film, where we meet an Elsa who has been born with a power she cannot control, and which appears more as a force of nature than as anything that “belongs” to Elsa. The film’s action is driven, in large part, precisely by Elsa’s failures to exert control over her emotions and abilities. She begins the film by accidentally injuring Anna. This, in turn, causes Elsa to become fearful and withdrawn and to isolate herself from her sister, even after their parents die on a quest to find a cure for Elsa. Elsa's fear and lack of control lead to an even more dire outcome when she inadvertently calls down winter on Arendelle and abandons her people for the mountains. It is only through Anna's devoted quest to rescue her sister, first by pursuing her to the mountains, and later by throwing herself in front of the villainous Hans’ sword attack on her sister, that Elsa (and Arendelle) are saved. Elsa's most active contribution to this is to appreciate the import of Anna's sacrifice and to discover the power of "love" to overcome her fear. -/- What then, are we to make of Elsa as a character? It is the younger sister Anna who corresponds most closely to Gerda, the unquestioned protagonist of Andersen’s original tale, and her character arc fits neatly with the well-known “Hero’s Journey” model for describing myth (Campbell 2020). It is Anna, for example, who goes on a quest, meets a group of motley companions (the human Kristoff, the reindeer Sven, and the magical snowman Olaf), accepts advice from wise elders (the trolls), undergoes a severe trial, and even gets the "reward" of romantic love at the end. All of this has led some scholars (Niemiec and Bretherton 2015; Heit 2019) to hold up Anna, rather than Elsa, as something like the hero of the story. Existing scholarship on Elsa, by contrast, has focused largely on issues related to her gender and sexuality (Law 2014; Lee 2015; Steinhoff 2017; Streiff and Dundes 2017; Dundes, Streiff, and Streiff 2018; Dundes 2020; Llompart and Brugué 2020). In what follows, I’ll be taking a closer look at Elsa’s unique status as a protagonist, and what her struggles with fate reveal about the nature of free will and ethical responsibility. I’ll argue that Elsa provides a useful model of a “Stoic hero” and that her strengths and weaknesses as a character provide valuable insight into an often-misunderstood school of philosophy. My argument will proceed in several stages. I’ll begin by describing the basic tenets of Stoic philosophy, paying special attention to the role of fate and nature. I’ll then move on to a more detailed treatment of Stoic ethics, as exemplified by Elsa’s own character development. I’ll close by considering the infamous “Lazy Argument” against. (shrink)

A plausible reading of Berkeley’s view of voluntary motion is occasionalism; this, however, leads to a specious conclusion against his argument of human action. Differing from an unqualified occasionalist reading, I consider the alternative reading that Berkeley is a conservationist regarding bodily motion by the human mind at will. That is, finite minds (spirits) immediately cause motions in their body parts, albeit under the divine conservation. My argument then comports with the conservationist reading from three perspectives: (i) theodicy that the (...) human mind is held liable for sinful actions; (ii) an account of the human mind influencing other minds; and (iii) an improper but necessary directing principle of the human mind. This article is a stepping stone to grasping why the conservationist reading is more coherent than the occasionalist one. (shrink)

Ovaj rad se bavi metodološkim aspektima obnovljenih pravno-filozofskih nastojanja da se preispita pojam međunarodnog prava. Posle kratkog osvrta na istoriju pravne filozofije i ključne tačke Hartovog i Kelzenovog pozitivističkog stanovišta, u radu se dalje ispituje na koji način se savremene pravne teorije, kako u pozitivističkoj, tako i u ne-pozitivističkoj tradiciji, bave međunarodnim pravom. Poslednji deo rada predstavlja pokušaj da se skiciraju određene smernice za novi početak u filozofskoj obradi međunarodnog prava. Prvo, istorija rasprava u ovoj oblasti svedoči o tome da (...) su metodološki pravni teoretičari u pravu kada tvrde da nam utvrđivanje odgovarajućeg metoda pomaže u odgovoru na pitanje šta je pravo. Drugo, imajući na umu stalno promenjivu prirodu međunarodnog prava, odgovarajući metodološki pristup zahteva „evolucionarnu epistemologiju“ (D’Amato), koja teško da se može nazvati obeležjem analitičke jurisprudencije. Najzad, takva epistemologija je na kompleksan način povezana sa našim istraživanjem šta međunarodna pravda ili, bar, šta međunarodna „unutrašnja moralnost“ zahteva. (shrink)

The suggestion of Logical Quanta (LQ) is a bidirectional synthesis of the theory of logos of Maximus the Confessor and the philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics. The result of such a synthesis is enrichment to the ontology of classical mechanics that enable us to have a unified view and an explanatory frame of the whole cosmos. It also enables us to overcome the Cartesian duality both on biology and the interaction of body and mind. Finally, one can reconstruct a new (...) understanding of religion. (shrink)

AbstractŁukasiewicz introduced a new methodological approach to the history of logic. It consists of the use of modern formal logic in the research of the history of logic. Although he was not the first to use formal logic in his historical research, Łukasiewicz was the first who used it consistently and formulated it as a requirement for a historian of logic. The aim of this paper is to present Łukasiewicz's contribution and the history of its formulation. In addition, the paper (...) will present its reception. There are two main themes in Łukasiewicz’s work on the history of logic. He discussed Stoic logic and Aristotle’s syllogistic. The second part of the paper focuses on current reception of Łukasiewicz’s contribution and on the question of whether there is a difference between knowledge about his contribution to Stoic logic and to Aristotle’s syllogistic, given that it has been hypothesised that Łukasiewicz’s contribution is currently more known among Aristotelian scholars than among those who focus on Stoic logic. Based on the papers that have appeared in the last five years at Web of Science and Scopus this hypothesis has not been confirmed. (shrink)

In Paradoxa Stoicorum, the Roman philosopher Cicero defends six important Stoic theses. Since these theses seem counterintuitive, and it is not likely that the average person would agree with them, they were generally called "paradoxes". According to the third paradox, (P3), (all) transgressions (wrong actions) are equal and (all) right actions are equal. According to one interpretation of this principle, which I will call (P3′), it means that if it is forbidden that A and it is forbidden that B, then (...) not-A is as good as not-B; and if it is permitted that A and it is permitted that B, then A is as good as B. In this paper, I show how it is possible to prove this thesis in dyadic deontic logic. I also try to defend (P3′) against some philosophical counterarguments. Furthermore, I address the claim that (P3′) is not a correct interpretation of Cicero’s third paradox and the assertion that it does not matter whether (P3′) is true or not. I argue that it does matter whether (P3′) is true or not, but acknowledge that (P3′) is perhaps a slightly different principle than Cicero’s thesis. The upshot is that (P3′) seems to be a plausible principle, and that at least one part of paradox III in Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum appears to be defensible. (shrink)

This chapter provides a brief historical overview of western philosophical views about human well-being from the eighth century BCE to the middle of the twentieth century. Different understandings of the concept of well-being are explained, including our preferred understanding of well-being as the subjective states and objective conditions that make our lives go well for us. While this review is necessarily incomplete, we aim to discuss some of the most salient and influential contributions to our subject. To that end, we (...) discuss some key views from ancient Greece, including the aristocratic values that were considered central to leading a good life, notions of personal and more expansive harmony as they key to well-being, and the idea that the experience of pleasure is all we should really care about. We also explain some of the major religious conceptions of the good life, and their progression through the middle ages and beyond. More recent secular conceptions of wellbeing, including several views on the importance of personal and public happiness. Finally, we discuss views to the effect that happiness is not enough for the good life and that we should strive for loftier goals. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a diverse technology. It is already having significant effects on many jobs and sectors of the economy and over the next ten to twenty years it will drive profound changes in the way New Zealanders live and work. Within the workplace AI will have three dominant effects. This report (funded by the New Zealand Law Foundation) addresses: Chapter 1 Defining the Technology of Interest; Chapter 2 The changing nature and value of work; Chapter 3 AI and (...) the employment relationship; Chapter 4 Consumers, professions and society. The report includes recommendations to the New Zealand Government. (shrink)

Pain is multidimensional, complex; it affects the ontological structures of the human being and exceeds spatio-temporal boundaries. Therefore, it is universally felt with an impact in the past, moving to the present, and projecting to the future. There are efforts to ease or completely eliminate the impact of pain, however, a good understand- ing of its biological and anthropological dimensions is necessary for proper orientation of such undertakings. This article identifies some social, cultural, medical-scientific, and individual factors that account for (...) the changes in modes of experiencing and managing pain. It posits that there is a general unpreparedness on the physical, psychological, and spiritual levels for continued pain in the future. It thus analyses factors that need to be learnt in order to promote favourable alterations in mental attitudes, pain sensitivity, and tolerance to pain. Preparing for a future of pain requires interdisciplinary reflection on the bodily, emotional, and spiritual components that constitute the pain experience so as to re-direct its trajectory. (shrink)

The concept of concrete and abstract entities relates to an ontological specification problem, described by Plato’s Sophist concept of the Gods and Giants and their interpretation of metaphysical reality. Developing an ontology without considering the full metaphysical implications leaves conceptual gaps in the creation of events, change in states and management of thoughts, plans and deceptions. This paper seeks to resolve conceptual gaps in the field of cyberspace representation, enabling both ontological interoperability and the development of more complex artificial intelligence (...) technologies. The beginnings of a new meta-ontology for cyberspace are proposed, based on Stoic metaphysics. A meta-ontology provides high-level construction of meaning, upon which more specific ontologies can be built. Coherence between ontologies is important because cyberspace is a contextually dependent knowledge space within the broader infosphere, with many interdependent concepts. This paper enhances the potential for ontological interoperability and transparency between users, human or machine. (shrink)

Can a democratic Global Society become the alternative to Empire and bring order into present international anarchy? One hundred percent sovereignty in nation states gives “security” to each but creates “anarchy” in relations between states. To bring order into international relations some sovereignty has to be surrendered. Empire, which does bring an order of sorts, is imposed from outside, is undemocratic and aggrandising. Global Society can be conceptualised as its alternative. Sharply contrasting Global Society to Empire tends to pose the (...) former as a panacea, but it is important to know its potential faults. Global Society can be envisioned at the constitutive stage and as continuing to exert influence within the institutions it creates. At the difficult constitutive stage, it will be fragile and of unwieldy size and ought only be called into play at critical junctures. The institutions it creates will be a democratic federal regime of regional blocks of states. To resolve issues, Global Society presumes effective consocial dialogue and participation rather than violent contention. Classical and Hellenistic Greece provide examples where vision and honour battled with the ambitions and greed of Empire and remarkably sometimes won. All the Greek city-states were under some sort of regional federal alliance at different times and drew strength from shared religious sanctuaries and their attached Games. The various interchanges between democratic Federalism and Empire in ancient Greece offers a microcosm of today's interregnum between modern and postmodern international relations. For as democratic political theorists at the start of the twenty first century, we do not seem to be able to do without the legitimizing idea of the People, but we do not know what to do with it. —Margaret Canovan, “The People, the Masses, and the Mobilization of Power: The Paradox of Hannah Arendt's ‘Populism’” Lysistrata: Don't you share a cup at common altars, for common gods, like brothers, at the Olympic games, Thermophylai and Delphi? —Aristophanes, Lysistrata. (shrink)

Readers of Stoic ethics may find ‘benefit’ (ōpheleia) an essential but enigmatic concept. It directly connects to some critical terms of Stoic ethics, such as ‘good’ and ‘virtue,’ but there is no extant discussion of a definition. Beyond the superficial connections, what makes ‘benefit’ beneficial? Why is benefit a good thing? I argue that these essential questions remain unanswerable for a good reason: Stobaeus committed to a specious claim about benefit in his Anthology, which has misguided later commentaries. Either the (...) Stoics themselves made a stronger contrast between sages and inferior people at the cost of coherence, or Stobaeus simply mischaracterized the Stoics’ ideas in his descriptions. This paper aims to clarify Stobaeus’s inaccurate description and reconstruct a coherent and comprehensible interpretation of benefit in the Stoic spirit, with the help of Stoic cosmology. To benefit is to further nature’s agreement. Given the available evidence, I argue that Stoics seem to, or should, be committed to my interpretation. This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 offers a quick background of Stoic ethics. Section 2 discusses two important characteristics of benefit. Section 3 discusses Stobaeus’s description of benefit and inferior people. Section 4 attempts an interpretation of benefit. Finally, Section 5 discusses Inwood and Gerson’s interpretation and argues that it is inadequate. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a growing interest in approaches to military ethics that focus on guarding the moral character of soldiers against the horrors they may be required to commit in war. This approach, which Christopher Toner calls the “shield approach”, offers a variety of mechanisms by which soldiers might shape their characters in ways that reduce their vulnerability to moral corruption; specifically, the likelihood of their committing moral atrocities. Two prominent examples of the shield approach are those (...) of Nancy Sherman and Shannon French. Sherman argues that the inculcation of empathy within soldiers; empathy for the plight and humanity of noncombatants, enemy soldiers, and colleagues, is the best way for soldiers to guard themselves against committing atrocities. French, on the other hand, argues that appealing to a warrior code of honour provides soldiers with an internalised set of beliefs about the type of things that soldiers should and should not do. In this paper I will argue that Sherman’s approach, whilst effective in preventing the killing of noncombatants, will do little to restrain soldier’s passions when the target of those passions is culpable for some wrongdoing . French’s approach, on the other hand, relies on a soldier seeing himself primarily as a warrior . The difficulty here is that the soldier’s conduct is governed by what the rest of his peers see as laudable or blameworthy. A better approach, I believe, is revealed to us by Shakespeare in Coriolanus when the protagonist, Caius Marcius, is persuaded against destroying Rome by the exhortations of his mother, who reminds him of the shame he will bring on himself as a son, a husband, a father, and as a Roman. Coriolanus is swayed by the prospect of shame not by fellow soldiers, but by society generally. In a similar vein, this paper will argue for a variant on the shield approach which appeals to the soldiers’ self-identity outside of the military, as well as his role as a warrior. Coriolanus’ eyes are brought to “sweat compassion” out of love for his mother, and his memories of home. This approach is also appealing in that it can be applied more easily to the growing number of military operators who do not fit the warrior archetype, such as drone operators. Thus, soldiers will do well to remember their moral commitments on the “home front”, as well as the expectations of fellow soldiers. (shrink)

This doctoral thesis analyses the concept of risk and how it functions as an organizing principle of discourse, paying close attention to actual linguistic practice. Article 1 analyses the concepts of risk, safety and security and their relations based on corpus data. Lexical, grammatical and semantic contexts of the nouns risk, safety and security, and the adjectives risky, safe and secure are analysed and compared. Similarities and differences are observed, suggesting partial synonymy between safety and security and semantic opposition to (...) risk. The findings both support and contrast theoretical assumptions about these concepts in the literature. Article 2 analyses the concepts of risk and danger and their relation based on corpus data. Frame semantics is used to explore the assumptions of the sociologist Niklas Luhmann that the risk concept presupposes decision-making, while the concept of danger does not. Findings partly support and partly contradict this assumption. Article 3 analyses how newspapers represent risk and causality. Two theories are used: media framing and the philosopher John Mackie’s account of causality. A central finding of the study is that risks are “framed” with respect to causality in several ways. Furthermore, newspaper reporting on risk and causality vary in complexity. In some articles, risks are presented without causal explanations, while in other articles, risks are presented as results from complex causal conditions. Considering newspaper reporting on an aggregated overall level, complex schemas of causal explanations emerge. Article 4 analyses how phenomena referred to by the term nano are represented as risks in Swedish newspaper reporting. Theoretically, the relational theory of risk and frame semantics are used. Five main groups of nano-risks are identified based on the risk object of the article: nanotechnology; nanotechnology and its artefacts ; nanoparticles, without referring to nanotechnology; non-nanotechnological nanoparticles ; and nanotechnology and nanorobots. Various patterns are explored within each group, concerning, for example, what is considered to be at stake in relation to these risk objects, and under what conditions. It is concluded that Swedish patterns of newspaper reporting on nano-risks follow international trends, influenced by scientific assessment, as well as science fiction. Article 5 analyses the construction and negotiation of risk in the Swedish controversy over the use of antibacterial silver in health care and consumer products. The controversy involves several actors: print and television news media, Government and parliament, governmental agencies, municipalities, non-government organisations, and companies. In the controversy, antibacterial silver is claimed to be a risk object that negatively affects health, the environment, and sewage treatment industry. In contrast, such claims are denied. Antibacterial silver is even associated with the benefit of mitigating risk objects that threaten health and the environment. In other words, both sides of the controversy invoke health and the environment as objects at risk. Three strategies organising risk communication are identified: representation of silver as a risk to health and the environment; denial of such representations; and benefit association, where silver is construed to mitigate risks to health and the environment. (shrink)

Esse volume consiste em traduções de verbetes da Enciclopédia Stanford de Filosofia que dizem respeito à Filosofia das Emoções. Trata-se de um volume de orientação história, que visa desfazer o mito de que emoções foram objetos menores de análise filosófica antes da contemporaneidade, resgatando assim a grande riqueza de teorias e reflexões sobre emoções e afetos na filosofia antiga, medieval, renascentista, moderna e indiana.