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Components of conceptual representation. From feature lists to recursive frames

In Iven van Mechelen, James Hampton, Ryszard S. Michalski & Peter Theuns (eds.), Categories and Concepts: Theoretical Views and Inductive Data Analysis. Academic Press. pp. 97-144 (1993)

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  1. Paul Thagard, Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press1996. Pp. xi + 213. [REVIEW]Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):587-608.
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  • Reuniting perception and conception.Robert L. Goldstone & Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1998 - Cognition 65 (2-3):231-262.
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  • Kuhn's mature philosophy of science and cognitive psychology.Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):347 – 363.
    Drawing on the results of modem psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle (...)
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  • Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and cognitive psychology.Xiang Chen, Hanne Andersen & Peter Barker - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):5 – 28.
    In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and their dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different (...)
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  • Perceptions of perceptual symbols.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):637-660.
    Various defenses of amodal symbol systems are addressed, including amodal symbols in sensory-motor areas, the causal theory of concepts, supramodal concepts, latent semantic analysis, and abstracted amodal symbols. Various aspects of perceptual symbol systems are clarified and developed, including perception, features, simulators, category structure, frames, analogy, introspection, situated action, and development. Particular attention is given to abstract concepts, language, and computational mechanisms.
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  • Continuity through revolutions: A frame-based account of conceptual change during scientific revolutions.Xiang Chen & Peter Barker - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican revolution are (...)
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  • Intrinsic cognitive models.Jonathan A. Waskan - 2003 - Cognitive Science 27 (2):259-283.
    Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction (...)
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  • Mental imagery.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mental imagery (varieties of which are sometimes colloquially refered to as “visualizing,” “seeing in the mind's eye,” “hearing in the head,” “imagining the feel of,” etc.) is quasi-perceptual experience; it resembles perceptual experience, but occurs in the absence of the appropriate external stimuli. It is also generally understood to bear intentionality (i.e., mental images are always images of something or other), and thereby to function as a form of mental representation. Traditionally, visual mental imagery, the most discussed variety, was thought (...)
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  • Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the (...)
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  • How do people use and appraise concepts?James A. Hampton (ed.) - forthcoming - Switzerland: Springer Nature.
    To approach the many challenges involved in the notion of engineering concepts, it is important to have a clear idea of the starting point – the concepts that people use in their everyday lives, in conversations and in expressing beliefs, desires, intentions and so forth. The first Section of this chapter introduces evidence that I have accumulated over the last many years concerning the flexibility, context-dependence, and vagueness of such common concepts. The concept engineer needs to understand the structure of (...)
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  • Determinables in Frames.David Hommen - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):291-310.
    In this paper, I assess the ontological commitments of frame-based methods of knowledge representation. Frames decompose concepts into recursive attribute-value structures. Attributes are the general aspects by which a category or individual is described; their values are more or less specific properties that are assigned to the referential object. The question is: are these properties to be interpreted as universals or as tropes? Some trope theorists allege that an interpretation in terms of universals is incompatible with frames for individuals in (...)
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  • Cognition, Meaning and Action: Lodz-Lund Studies in Cognitive Science.Piotr Łukowski, Aleksander Gemel & Bartosz Żukowski (eds.) - 2015 - Kraków, Polska: Lodz University Press & Jagiellonian University Press.
    The book is addressed to all readers interested in cognitive science, and especially in research combining a logical analysis with psychological, linguistic and neurobiological approaches. The publication is the result of a collaboration between the Department of Cognitive Science at University of Lodz and the Department of Cognitive Science at Lund University. It is intended to provide a comprehensive presentation of the key research issues undertaken in both Departments, including considerations on meaning, natural language and reasoning, linguistic as well as (...)
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  • From Features via Frames to Spaces: Modeling Scientific Conceptual Change Without Incommensurability or Aprioricity.Frank Zenker - 2014 - In T. Gamerschlag, R. Gerland, R. Osswald & W. Petersen (eds.), Frames and Concept Types: Applications in Language and Philosophy. pp. 69-89.
    The frame model, originating in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, has recently been applied to change-phenomena traditionally studied within history and philosophy of science. Its application purpose is to account for episodes of conceptual dynamics in the empirical sciences suggestive of incommensurability as evidenced by “ruptures” in the symbolic forms of historically successive empirical theories with similar classes of applications. This article reviews the frame model and traces its development from the feature list model. Drawing on extant literature, examples of (...)
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  • La cognición incorporada. El contenido y la justificación del enfoque percepto-operacional del conocimiento.Rómulo San Martín García - 2011 - Sophia. Colección de Filosofía de la Educación 10:127-166.
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  • Analyzing Theories in the Frame Model.Stephan Kornmesser & Gerhard Schurz - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1313-1346.
    The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science in order to provide representations of scientific concepts and conceptual taxonomies. The aim of this article is to show that beside the representation of scientific concepts the frame model is an efficient instrument to represent and analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish the frame model as a representation tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science. For this, we will (...)
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  • Embodiment in Religious Knowledge.Lawrence Barsalou, Ava Santos, Aron Barbey & W. Kyle Simmons - 2005 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 (1-2):14-57.
    Increasing evidence suggests that mundane knowledge about objects, people, and events is grounded in the brain's modality-specific systems. The modality-specific representations that become active to represent these entities in actual experience are later used to simulate them in their absence. In particular, simulations of perception, action, and mental states often appear to underlie the representation of knowledge, making it embodied and situated. Findings that support this conclusion are briefly reviewed from cognitive psychology, social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. A similar representational (...)
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  • Frames and concepts in the philosophy of science.Stephan Kornmesser - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (2):225-251.
    In the philosophy of science, the frame model is used in order to represent and analyze scientific concepts and conceptual change. However, the potential of the frame model is far from being fully exploited: Up to now, the frame model is only applied to a rather small set of different kinds of concepts and important advantages of the frame model for reconstructing and analyzing concepts have been neglected. In this article, we will essentially extend the frame model in the following (...)
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  • The modality-switch effect: visually and aurally presented prime sentences activate our senses.Elisa Scerrati, Giulia Baroni, Anna M. Borghi, Renata Galatolo, Luisa Lugli & Roberto Nicoletti - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Representation of concepts as frames.Wiebke Petersen - 2006 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 2:151-170.
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  • Similarity-based categorization and fuzziness of natural categories.James A. Hampton - 1998 - Cognition 65 (2-3):137-165.
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  • Adaptive fuzzy logics for contextual hedge interpretation.Stephan van der Waart van Gulik - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (3):333-356.
    The article presents several adaptive fuzzy hedge logics. These logics are designed to perform a specific kind of hedge detection. Given a premise set Γ that represents a series of communicated statements, the logics can check whether some predicate occurring in Γ may be interpreted as being (implicitly) hedged by technically, strictly speaking or loosely speaking, or simply non-hedged. The logics take into account both the logical constraints of the premise set as well as conceptual information concerning the meaning of (...)
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  • Concept talk cannot be avoided.James A. Hampton - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):212-213.
    Distinct systems for representing concepts as prototypes, exemplars, and theories are closely integrated in the mind, and the notion of concept is required as a framework for exploring this integration. Eliminating the term from our theories will hinder rather than promote scientific progress.
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  • Cognition and decision in biomedical artificial intelligence: From symbolic representation to emergence. [REVIEW]Vincent Rialle - 1995 - AI and Society 9 (2-3):138-160.
    This paper presents work in progress on artificial intelligence in medicine (AIM) within the larger context of cognitive science. It introduces and develops the notion ofemergence both as an inevitable evolution of artificial intelligence towards machine learning programs and as the result of a synergistic co-operation between the physician and the computer. From this perspective, the emergence of knowledge takes placein fine in the expert's mind and is enhanced both by computerised strategies of induction and deduction, and by software abilities (...)
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  • Paul Thagard, Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press1996. Pp. xi + 213. [REVIEW]Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):587-608.
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  • Induction from a Single Instance: Incomplete Frames. [REVIEW]Rafal Urbaniak & Frederik Van De Putte - 2013 - Foundations of Science 18 (4):641-653.
    In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we (...)
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  • Concepts: Stored or created?Marco Mazzone & Elisabetta Lalumera - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):47-68.
    Are concepts stable entities, unchanged from context to context? Or rather are they context-dependent structures, created on the fly? We argue that this does not constitute a genuine dilemma. Our main thesis is that the more a pattern of features is general and shared, the more it qualifies as a concept. Contextualists have not shown that conceptual structures lack a stable, general core, acting as an attractor on idiosyncratic information. What they have done instead is to give a contribution to (...)
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  • The 'platforms' for comparing incommensurable taxonomies: A cognitive-historical analysis. [REVIEW]Xiang Chen - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (1):1-22.
    This paper examines taxonomy comparison from a cognitive perspective. Arguments are developed by drawing on the results of cognitive psychology, which reveal the cognitive mechanisms behind the practice of taxonomy comparison. The taxonomic change in 19th-century ornithology is also used to uncover the historical practice that ornithologists employed in the revision of the classification of birds. On the basis of cognitive and historical analyses, I argue that incommensurable taxonomies can be compared rationally. Using a frame model to represent taxonomy, I (...)
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  • Perceptual symbols and taxonomy comparison.Xiang Chen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S200-S212.
    Many recent cognitive studies reveal that human cognition is inherently perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both the conceptual and the neural levels. This paper introduces Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbols and explores its implications for philosophy of science. If perceptual symbols lie in the heart of conceptual processing, the process of attribute selection during concept representation, which is critical for defining similarity and thus for comparing taxonomies, can no longer be determined solely by background beliefs. The analogous nature of (...)
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