Citations of:
Add citations
You must login to add citations.


Classical accounts of intertheoretic reduction involve two pieces: first, the new terms of the higherlevel theory must be definable from the terms of the lowerlevel theory, and second, the claims of the higherlevel theory must be deducible from the lowerlevel theory along with these definitions. The status of each of these pieces becomes controversial when the alleged reduction involves an infinite limit, as in statistical mechanics. Can one define features of or deduce the behavior of an infinite idealized system from (...) 

Classical accounts of intertheoretic reduction involve two pieces: first, the new terms of the higherlevel theory must be definable from the terms of the lowerlevel theory, and second, the claims of the higherlevel theory must be deducible from the lowerlevel theory along with these definitions. The status of each of these pieces becomes controversial when the alleged reduction involves an infinite limit, as in statistical mechanics. Can one define features of or deduce the behavior of an infinite idealized system from (...) 



The celu of the philosophical literature on the hole argument is the 1987 paper by Earman \& Norton ["What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story" Br. J. Phil. Sci.]. This paper has a wellknown backstory, concerning work by Stachel and Norton on Einstein's thinking in the years 191315. Less wellknown is a connection between the hole argument and Earman's work on Leibniz in the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn can be traced to an argument first presented in 1975 by (...) 

This article proposes to explicate theoretical equivalence by supplementing formal equivalence criteria with preservation conditions concerning interpretation. I argue that both the internal structure of models and choices of morphisms are aspects of formalisms that are relevant when it comes to their interpretation. Hence, a formal criterion suitable for being supplemented with preservation conditions concerning interpretation should take these two aspects into account. The two currently most important criteria—generalized definitional equivalence and categorical equivalence—are not optimal in this respect. I put (...) 

I review the philosophical literature on the question of when two physical theories are equivalent. This includes a discussion of empirical equivalence, which is often taken to be necessary, and sometimes taken to be sufficient, for theoretical equivalence; and "interpretational" equivalence, which is the idea that two theories are equivalent just in case they have the same interpretation. It also includes a discussion of several formal notions of equivalence that have been considered in the recent philosophical literature, including definitional equivalence (...) 

