How can you steal something that doesn’t exist? This question confronts those of us who take an irrealist view of virtual objects and agree with the Supreme Court of the Netherlands that robbery took place when two boys used non-virtual violence to coerce a third boy into relinquishing his virtual amulet and mask. Here we outline this Puzzle of Virtual Theft, along with the closely related Puzzle of Virtual Value. After demonstrating how these puzzles are deeply problematic for the irrealist, (...) we go on to sketch a solution that not only circumscribes the puzzles but also offers a framework by which legal scholars can make sense within existing legal codes of the new phenomenon of virtual theft. (shrink)

How might we philosophize about the metaverse? It is traditionally held that the four main branches of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic. In this article, I shall demonstrate how virtual walt-fictionalism, a particular version of virtual irrealism, is able to offer a straightforward, internally consistent, and powerful response about the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. I will first characterize the metaverse in terms of a reality-virtuality (RV) continuum and distinguish between virtual realism and virtual irrealism, (...) before elaborating on the explanatory power and potential of virtual walt-fictionalism relative to the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. (shrink)

It is controversial whether virtual reality should be considered fictional or real. Virtual fictionalists claim that objects and events within virtual reality are merely fictional: they are imagined and do not exist. Virtual realists argue that virtual objects and events really exist. This metaphysical debate might appear important for some of the practical questions that arise regarding how to morally evaluate and legally regulate virtual reality. For instance, one advantage claimed of virtual realism is that only by taking virtual objects (...) and events to be real can we explain our strong emotional reactions to certain virtual actions, as well as their potential immorality. This paper argues that emotional reactions towards, and wrongs within, virtual reality are consistent with its being merely fictional. The emotional and ethical judgments we wish to make regarding virtual reality do not provide any grounds for preferring virtual realism. (shrink)

According to David Chalmers, the virtual entities found in Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) environments instantiate virtual properties of a specific kind. It has recently been objected that such a view (i) can’t extend to all types of properties; (ii) leads to a proliferation of property-types; (iii) implausibly ascribes massive errors to VR and AR users; and (iv) faces an analogue of Jackson’s “many-property problem”. My first objective here is to show that advocates of virtual properties can deal (...) with each of these objections. The other goal of this paper is to examine the consequences of Chalmers’ theory in the particular case of AR. If we countenance virtual properties, AR highlights that non-virtual objects can possess both non-virtual and virtual properties. With AR, it also appears that a same non-virtual object can have different and even incompatible properties across augmented environments. Lastly, considering properties in light of AR highlights the risk of an “augmented solipsism”, and calls forth interesting questions about the persistence conditions of non-virtual objects in AR environments. (shrink)

In contemporary computer simulations, particles attract each other and form clusters, cells interact, and agents communicate with one another. This is at least how computer simulations are commonly described. But how can we make sense of such talk? One answer is that the particles, cells, and agents inside simulations are digital artifacts, and thus real objects. In this paper, I cast doubt on this realist position by raising the question: To what objects does a simulation give rise, if it does (...) so at all? I tentatively suggest answers that try to determine what objects arise in computer simulations at both a fundamental and a higher level. However, closer analysis reveals that we run into underdetermination problems. Even for a single run of a simulation program, the acknowledged facts about the simulations often do not suffice to determine the objects and their properties uniquely. I suggest that, from an ontological perspective, it is more attractive to say that computer simulations involve computations, the results of which may then be interpreted in various ways. To make sense of talk about objects in simulations it is more attractive to develop a fictionalist account, or so I argue. (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo es analizar los objetos digitales que pueblan nuestras pantallas y redes: vídeos de YouTube, perfiles de Facebook, imágenes de Flickr, archivos de Dropbox, correos electrónicos, podcasts, blogs, y demás. Estos objetos están codificados en binario (0/1) y, en su forma más elemental, son bits y bytes. Para desentrañar estas entidades intangibles, que son realidades insertas en el tejido de nuestra existencia cotidiana, se examinan los supuestos ontológicos y epistemológicos que las rodean. Desde esta perspectiva, se (...) analizan diferentes marcos conceptuales y definiciones, así como los enfoques filosóficos más representativos. También se explora el papel central de los nuevos paradigmas computacionales, la infraestructura TIC y las tecnologías emergentes. Se introduce un modelo de realismo integrativo que encapsula las tesis recogidas a lo largo del documento. El texto concluye con unas breves reflexiones sobre los hallazgos. (shrink)