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  1. How (not) to think of the ‘dead-donor’ rule.Adam Omelianchuk - 2018 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 39 (1):1-25.
    Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Don’t Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of (...)
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  • Thomistic Principles and Bioethics.Jason T. Eberl - 2006 - New York: Routledge.
    Alongside a revival of interest in Thomism in philosophy, scholars have realised its relevance when addressing certain contemporary issues in bioethics. This book offers a rigorous interpretation of Aquinas's metaphysics and ethical thought, and highlights its significance to questions in bioethics. Jason T. Eberl applies Aquinas’s views on the seminal topics of human nature and morality to key questions in bioethics at the margins of human life – questions which are currently contested in the academia, politics and the media such (...)
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  • Traditional Cardiopulmonary Criterion of Death is the Only Valid Criterion of Human Death.Peter Volek - 2021 - Scientia et Fides 9 (1):283-308.
    In recent time the critique of the whole brain death as the criterion of human death, that was introduced in 1968, has been growing. The paper aims to show in systematically that there are good reasons based on empirical findings combined with Thomistic Christian anthropology to accept the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion as the criterion of human death. This will be shown through a systematic critique of other criteria of death: whole brain death, higher brain death, brain stem death, and controlled (...)
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  • Controversies in defining death: a case for choice.Robert M. Veatch - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):381-401.
    When a new, brain-based definition of death was proposed fifty years ago, no one realized that the issue would remain unresolved for so long. Recently, six new controversies have added to the debate: whether there is a right to refuse apnea testing, which set of criteria should be chosen to measure the death of the brain, how the problem of erroneous testing should be handled, whether any of the current criteria sets accurately measures the death of the brain, whether standard (...)
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  • Abandoning the Dead Donor Rule.Anthony P. Smith - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (10):707-714.
    The Dead Donor Rule is intended to protect the public and patients, but it remains contentious. Here, I argue that we can abandon the Dead Donor Rule. Using Joel Feinberg’s account of harm, I argue that, in most cases, particularly when patients consent to being organ donors, death does not harm permanently unconscious (PUC) patients. In these cases, then, causing the death of PUC patients is not morally wrong. This undermines the strongest argument for the Dead Donor Rule—that doctors ought (...)
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  • Brain Death: A Conclusion in Search of a Justification.D. Alan Shewmon - 2018 - Hastings Center Report 48 (S4):22-25.
    At its inception, “brain death” was proposed not as a coherent concept but as a useful one. The 1968 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death gave no reason that “irreversible coma” should be death itself, but simply asserted that the time had come for it to be declared so. Subsequent writings by chairman Henry Beecher made clear that, to him at least, death was essentially a social construct, and society could define (...)
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  • A narrative review of the empirical evidence on public attitudes on brain death and vital organ transplantation: the need for better data to inform policy.Seema K. Shah, Kenneth Kasper & Franklin G. Miller - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (4):291-296.
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  • How the Body Became Integrated: Cybernetics in the History of the Brain Death Debate.Paul Scherz - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (3):387-406.
    Although the term integration is central to the definition of brain death, there is little agreement on what it means. Through a genealogical analysis, this essay argues that there have been two primary ways of understanding integration in regard to organismal wholeness. One stems from neuroscience, focusing on the role of the brain in responding to external stimuli, which was taken up in phenomenological accounts of life. A second, arising out of cybernetics, focuses on the brain’s role in homeostasis. Recent (...)
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  • Metaphysics and morality at the boundaries of life.Philip Robichaud - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):97 – 105.
    (2006). Metaphysics and Morality at the Boundaries of Life. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 97-105.
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  • Contesting the Equivalency of Continuous Sedation until Death and Physician-assisted Suicide/Euthanasia: A Commentary on LiPuma.Joseph A. Raho & Guido Miccinesi - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (5):529-553.
    Patients who are imminently dying sometimes experience symptoms refractory to traditional palliative interventions, and in rare cases, continuous sedation is offered. Samuel H. LiPuma, in a recent article in this Journal, argues that continuous sedation until death is equivalent to physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia based on a higher brain neocortical definition of death. We contest his position that continuous sedation involves killing and offer four objections to the equivalency thesis. First, sedation practices are proportional in a way that physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia is not. (...)
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  • The Whole-Brain Concept of Death Remains Optimum Public Policy.James L. Bernat - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):35-43.
    “Brain death,” the determination of human death by showing the irreversible loss of all clinical functions of the brain, has become a worldwide practice. A biophilosophical account of brain death requires four sequential tasks: agreeing on the paradigm of death, a set of preconditions that frame the discussion; determining the definition of death by making explicit the consensual concept of death; determining the criterion of death that proves the definition has been fulfilled by being both necessary and sufficient for death; (...)
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  • Rethinking “Disease”: a fresh diagnosis and a new philosophical treatment.Russell Powell & Eric Scarffe - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (9):579-588.
    Despite several decades of debate, the concept of disease remains hotly contested. The debate is typically cast as one between naturalism and normativism, with a hybrid view that combines elements of each staked out in between. In light of a number of widely discussed problems with existing accounts, some theorists argue that the concept of disease is beyond repair and thus recommend eliminating it in a wide range of practical medical contexts. Any attempt to reframe the ‘disease’ discussion should answer (...)
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  • Reevaluating the Dead Donor Rule.Mike Collins - 2010 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (2):1-26.
    The dead donor rule justifies current practice in organ procurement for transplantation and states that organ donors must be dead prior to donation. The majority of organ donors are diagnosed as having suffered brain death and hence are declared dead by neurological criteria. However, a significant amount of unrest in both the philosophical and the medical literature has surfaced since this practice began forty years ago. I argue that, first, declaring death by neurological criteria is both unreliable and unjustified but (...)
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  • Diagnosing death 50 years after the Harvard brain death report.Francis J. O’Keeffe & George L. Mendz - 2021 - The New Bioethics 27 (1):46-64.
    More than 50 years after the publication of the Harvard Committee Report that sought to define death according to whole-brain function criteria, this document continues to generate a diversity of o...
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  • The Metaphysical Irreversibility of Death.Catherine Nolan - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (6):725-741.
    The popularization of the term “clinical death” for the absence of vital signs suggests the possibility of a radical change in our understanding of death. While death used to be considered something that we do not have the power to reverse, contemporary optimism suggests that we may be able to restore life to a dead organism. In this article, I examine how the term “death” is used today to clarify what kind of irreversibility we ought to assign to it. I (...)
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  • Brain Death, Souls, and Integrated Functioning: Reply to Verheijde and Potts.Stephen Napier - 2013 - Christian Bioethics 19 (1):25-39.
    Recently, Verheijde and Potts (2011) have called into question the whole-brain death (WBD) criterion and, in particular, have taken issue with my admittedly limited defense of WBD. I would like to thank Verheijde and Potts for their comments and for identifying key points in the debate that need further clarification and defense. This article is an attempt to provide such clarification and to focus on Verheijde and Potts’s key argument against me and other proponents of WBD. The structure of this (...)
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  • Taking Science Seriously in the Debate on Death and Organ Transplantation.Michael Nair-Collins - 2015 - Hastings Center Report 45 (6):38-48.
    The concept of death and its relationship to organ transplantation continue to be sources of debate and confusion among academics, clinicians, and the public. Recently, an international group of scholars and clinicians, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, met in the first phase of an effort to develop international guidelines for determination of death. The goal of this first phase was to focus on the biology of death and the dying process while bracketing legal, ethical, cultural, and religious perspectives. (...)
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  • Death, Brain Death, and the Limits of Science: Why the Whole-Brain Concept of Death Is a Flawed Public Policy.Mike Nair-Collins - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (3):667-683.
    Legally defining “death” in terms of brain death unacceptably obscures a value judgment that not all reasonable people would accept. This is disingenuous, and it results in serious moral flaws in the medical practices surrounding organ donation. Public policy that relies on the whole-brain concept of death is therefore morally flawed and in need of revision.
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  • Clinical and ethical perspectives on brain death.Michael Nair-Collins - 2015 - Medicolegal and Bioethics 5:69-80.
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  • The Demise of Brain Death.Lukas J. Meier - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):487-508.
    Fifty years have passed since brain death was first proposed as a criterion of death. Its advocates believe that with the destruction of the brain, integrated functioning ceases irreversibly, somatic unity dissolves, and the organism turns into a corpse. In this article, I put forward two objections against this assertion. First, I draw parallels between brain death and other pathological conditions and argue that whenever one regards the absence or the artificial replacement of a certain function in these pathological conditions (...)
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  • An Alternative to Brain Death.Jeff McMahan - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):44-48.
    Most contributors to the debate about brain death, including Dr. James Bernat, share certain assumptions. They believe that the concept of death is univocal, that death is a biological phenomenon, that it is necessarily irreversible, that it is paradigmatically something that happens to organisms, that we are human organisms, and therefore that our deaths will be deaths of organisms. These claims are supposed to have moral significance. It is, for example, only when a person dies that it is permissible to (...)
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  • A New Defense of Brain Death as the Death of the Human Organism.Andrew McGee, Dale Gardiner & Melanie Jansen - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (5):434-452.
    This paper provides a new rationale for equating brain death with the death of the human organism, in light of well-known criticisms made by Alan D Shewmon, Franklin Miller and Robert Truog and a number of other writers. We claim that these criticisms can be answered, but only if we accept that we have slightly redefined the concept of death when equating brain death with death simpliciter. Accordingly, much of the paper defends the legitimacy of redefining death against objections, before (...)
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  • The theoretical and practical importance of the dead donor rule.James J. McCartney - 2003 - American Journal of Bioethics 3 (1):15 – 16.
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  • Are DCD Donors Dead?Don Marquis - 2010 - Hastings Center Report 40 (3):24-31.
    Donation after cardiac death protocols are widely accepted, so arguments for them have apparently been persuasive. But this does not mean they are sound.
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  • A Matter of Respect: A Defense of the Dead Donor Rule and of a "Whole-Brain" Criterion for Determination of Death.G. Khushf - 2010 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (3):330-364.
    Many accounts of the historical development of neurological criteria for determination of death insufficiently distinguish between two strands of interpretation advanced by advocates of a "whole-brain" criterion. One strand focuses on the brain as the organ of integration. Another provides a far more complex and nuanced account, both of death and of a policy on the determination of death. Current criticisms of the whole-brain criterion are effective in refuting the first interpretation, but not the second, which is advanced in the (...)
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  • Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong.Todd Karhu - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):378–394.
    Many people believe that the wrongness of killing a person does not depend on factors like her age, condition, or how much she has to lose by dying – a view Jeff McMahan calls the ‘Equal Wrongness Thesis’. This article argues that we should reject the Equal Wrongness Thesis on the basis of the moral equivalence between killing a person and knocking her unconscious.
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  • The Case for Reasonable Accommodation of Conscientious Objections to Declarations of Brain Death.L. Syd M. Johnson - 2016 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 13 (1):105-115.
    Since its inception in 1968, the concept of whole-brain death has been contentious, and four decades on, controversy concerning the validity and coherence of whole-brain death continues unabated. Although whole-brain death is legally recognized and medically entrenched in the United States and elsewhere, there is reasonable disagreement among physicians, philosophers, and the public concerning whether brain death is really equivalent to death as it has been traditionally understood. A handful of states have acknowledged this plurality of viewpoints and enacted “conscience (...)
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  • DCDD Donors Are Not Dead.Ari Joffe - 2018 - Hastings Center Report 48 (S4):29-32.
    According to international scientific medical consensus, death is a biological, unidirectional, ontological state of an organism, the event that separates the process of dying from the process of disintegration. Death is not merely a social contrivance or a normative concept; it is a scientific reality. Using this paradigm, the international consensus is that, regardless of context, death is operationally defined as “the permanent loss of the capacity for consciousness and all brainstem function. This may result from permanent cessation of circulation (...)
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  • Donation after cardiocirculatory death: a call for a moratorium pending full public disclosure and fully informed consent.Ari R. Joffe, Joe Carcillo, Natalie Anton, Allan deCaen, Yong Y. Han, Michael J. Bell, Frank A. Maffei, John Sullivan, James Thomas & Gonzalo Garcia-Guerra - 2011 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 6:17.
    Many believe that the ethical problems of donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) have been "worked out" and that it is unclear why DCD should be resisted. In this paper we will argue that DCD donors may not yet be dead, and therefore that organ donation during DCD may violate the dead donor rule. We first present a description of the process of DCD and the standard ethical rationale for the practice. We then present our concerns with DCD, including the following: (...)
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  • Medical ethics, logic traps, and game theory: an illustrative tale of brain death.J. E. Riggs - 2004 - Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (4):359-361.
    Decision making and choices are frequent themes in medical ethics. Game theory is based upon modelled decision making. Game theory, and associated logic traps, may have relevance to the clinical practice of medicine and medical ethics. The “prisoner’s dilemma” is one logic trap from game theory in which “rational” decision making on the part of participating individuals can lead to “suboptimal” situations. An example of such a situation involving brain death is presented and discussed from the perspective of the prisoner’s (...)
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  • In defense of the reverence of all life: Heideggerean dissolution of the ethical challenges of organ donation after circulatory determination of death. [REVIEW]D. J. Isch - 2007 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (4):441-459.
    During the past 50 years since the first successful organ transplant, waiting lists of potential organ recipients have expanded exponentially as supply and demand have been on a collision course. The recovery of organs from patients with circulatory determination of death is one of several effective alternative approaches recommended to reduce the supply-and-demand gap. However, renewed debate ensues regarding the ethical management of the overarching risks, pressures, challenges and conflicts of interest inherent in organ retrieval after circulatory determination of death. (...)
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  • Four Queries Concerning the Metaphysics of Early Human Embryogenesis.A. A. Howsepian - 2008 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (2):140-157.
    In this essay, I attempt to provide answers to the following four queries concerning the metaphysics of early human embryogenesis. (1) Following its first cellular fission, is it coherent to claim that one and only one of two “blastomeric” twins of a human zygote is identical with that zygote? (2) Following the fusion of two human pre-embryos, is it coherent to claim that one and only one pre-fusion pre-embryo is identical with that postfusion pre-embryo? (3) Does a live human being (...)
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  • Death, treatment decisions and the permanent vegetative state: evidence from families and experts.Stephen Holland, Celia Kitzinger & Jenny Kitzinger - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (3):413-423.
    Some brain injured patients are left in a permanent vegetative state, i.e., they have irreversibly lost their capacity for consciousness but retained some autonomic physiological functions, such as breathing unaided. Having discussed the controversial nature of the permanent vegetative state as a diagnostic category, we turn to the question of the patients’ ontological status. Are the permanently vegetative alive, dead, or in some other state? We present empirical data from interviews with relatives of patients, and with experts, to support the (...)
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  • Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death.David B. Hershenov - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):403-418.
    Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion (...)
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  • The death of a person.David B. Hershenov - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):107 – 120.
    Drawing upon Lynne Baker's idea of the person derivatively possessing the properties of a constituting organism, I argue that even if persons aren't identical to living organisms, they can each literally die a biological death. Thus we can accept that we're not essentially organisms and can still die without having to admit that there are two concepts and criteria of death as Jeff McMahan and Robert Veatch do. Furthermore, we can accept James Bernat's definition of "death" without having to insist, (...)
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  • Thinking Animals or Thinking Brains?David Hershenov - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):11-24.
    Animalism offers a more attractive account of the human person than the Embodied Mind Account. If people are not animals, but small proper parts of animals, then there is a threat of spatially coincident thinkers. This will likely have to be avoided at the cost of the sparsest of ontologies, one in which there are no larger entities that can become reduced to the size of the brain or cerebrum-size thinker. This will be a rather implausible ontology as such thinkers (...)
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  • Olson's embryo problem.David B. Hershenov - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):502-511.
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  • Is Death Irreversible?Nada Gligorov - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (5):492-503.
    There are currently two legally established criteria for death: the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration and the irreversible cessation of neurologic function. Recently, there have been technological developments that could undermine the irreversibility requirement. In this paper, I focus both on whether death should be identified as an irreversible state and on the proper scope of irreversibility in the biological definition of death. In this paper, I tackle the distinction between the commonsense definition of death and the biological definition (...)
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  • Death and Irreversibility.Nada Gligorov - 2020 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 29 (3):334-336.
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  • Consent for organ retrieval cannot be presumed.Mike Collins - 2009 - HEC Forum 21 (1):71-106.
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  • Diagnosing death: the “fuzzy area” between life and decomposition.María A. Carrasco & Luca Valera - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (1):1-24.
    This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg’s claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the (...)
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  • Are Brain Dead Individuals Dead? Grounds for Reasonable Doubt.E. Christian Brugger - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (3):329-350.
    According to the biological definition of death, a human body that has not lost the capacity to holistically organize itself is the body of a living human individual. Reasonable doubt against the conclusion that it has lost the capacity exists when the body appears to express it and no evidence to the contrary is sufficient to rule out reasonable doubt against the conclusion that the apparent expression is a true expression. This essay argues that the evidence and arguments against the (...)
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  • Whither Brain Death?James L. Bernat - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (8):3-8.
    The publicity surrounding the recent McMath and Muñoz cases has rekindled public interest in brain death: the familiar term for human death determination by showing the irreversible cessation of clinical brain functions. The concept of brain death was developed decades ago to permit withdrawal of therapy in hopeless cases and to permit organ donation. It has become widely established medical practice, and laws permit it in all U.S. jurisdictions. Brain death has a biophilosophical justification as a standard for determining human (...)
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  • Brain Death: What We Are and When We Die.Lukas J. Meier - 2020 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    When does a human being cease to exist? For millennia, the answer to this question had remained largely unchanged: death had been diagnosed when heartbeat and breathing were permanently absent. Only comparatively recently, in the 1950s, rapid developments in intensive-care medicine called into question this widely accepted criterion. What had previously been deemed a permanent cessation of vital functions suddenly became reversible. -/- A new criterion of death was needed. It was suggested that the destruction of the brain could indicate (...)
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  • The Definition of Death.David DeGrazia - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Is Brain Death Death?Lukas J. Meier - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    For hundreds of years, death had been defined by cardiopulmonary criteria. When heart and respiratory functions were permanently absent, doctors declared their patients dead. Three developments in intensive care medicine called into question these widely-accepted criteria, however: the advent of positive pressure ventilation and the promotion of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, both in the early 1950s, and the first successful heart transplantation in 1967. What had previously been diagnosed as the permanent absence of vital functions, suddenly became reversible. Not only could doctors (...)
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  • Psychopathy: Morally Incapacitated Persons.Heidi Maibom - 2017 - In Thomas Schramme & Steven Edwards (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine. Springer. pp. 1109-1129.
    After describing the disorder of psychopathy, I examine the theories and the evidence concerning the psychopaths’ deficient moral capacities. I first examine whether or not psychopaths can pass tests of moral knowledge. Most of the evidence suggests that they can. If there is a lack of moral understanding, then it has to be due to an incapacity that affects not their declarative knowledge of moral norms, but their deeper understanding of them. I then examine two suggestions: it is their deficient (...)
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  • The declaration of Sydney on human death.Calixto Machado, J. Korein, Y. Ferrer, L. Portela, M. de la C. García, M. Chinchilla, Y. Machado & J. M. Manero - 2007 - Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (12):699-703.
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