- Unavoidable actions.Justin A. Capes - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):57-73.details
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Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..details
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Addiction and Agency.Justin Clarke-Doane & Kathryn Tabb - 2022 - In Matt King & Joshua May (eds.), Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions. Oxford University Press.details
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From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Experiential Pluralism and Mental Kinds.Maja Spener - 2021 - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5. Springer. pp. 3-20.details
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No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
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Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.details
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Fähigkeiten und das Problem des Determinismus.Romy Jaster & Ansgar Beckermann - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 3 (72):317-342.details
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Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Disputatio (45):219-243.details
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The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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The Relevance of Folk Intuitions to Philosophical Debates.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Dissertation, Florida State Universitydetails
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Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 126–50.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Global control and freedom.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.details
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To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Dispositional accounts of abilities.Barbara Vetter & Romy Jaster - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (8):e12432.details
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Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots.Heering David - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):293-316.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5.Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.) - 2019 - Springer.details
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What is human freedom?Lynne Rudder Baker - unknowndetails
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The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism.Rick Repetti - 2010 - Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.details
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Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and ability to do otherwise: A reply to Fischer.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.details
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The ability to do otherwise and the new dispositionalism.Romy Jaster - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):1149-1166.details
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