The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state in which they find themselves, and few realize that by remaining they are (...) consenting to the state’s lawful actions. In addition, the various obstacles standing in the way of us leaving the state render our remaining involuntary. Thus, the critics conclude, few if any people can be considered to have consented through their residence. I argue that these objections fail and that the residence theory remains a viable option, at least for those who are not committed incompatibilists. (shrink)

Though historically important, the notion of tacit consent plays little role in contemporary discussions of political legitimacy. The idea, in fact, is often dismissed as obviously implausible. The ambition of this paper is to challenge this assumption and show that tacit consent can become a key ingredient in a theory of legitimacy. Instead of defining tacit consent through residence (where, according to John Locke or Plato's Socrates, staying in the country amounts to tacitly consenting to its system of rule), the (...) paper explores a different strategy, delimiting tacit consent as an absence of active dissent. The basic idea starts from the fact that widespread anti-government protests and demonstrations always carry a potent delegitimating force. Political legitimacy is therefore never permanent and unchangeable, regardless of the nature of the regime, and can be undermined at all times by active dissent from the population. Having established the relationship between dissent and delegitimation of political power, even the inverted, stronger claim is defended: the absence of active dissent (i.e., tacit consent) can, under certain circumstances, serve to legitimize political power. The paper sets up and defends several conditions that need to be met for the right normative mandate to be created by the population tacitly accepting the existing power arrangements. If those are fulfilled (especially when full freedom of expression and information is granted), tacit consent can become a vital element of political legitimacy. (shrink)

Negotiation is mainly treated as a process through which counterparts try to satisfy their conflicting interests. This traditional, subjective approach focuses on the interests-based relation between subjects and the resources which are on the bargaining table; negotiation is viewed as a series of joint decisions regarding the relation of each subject to the negotiated resources. In this paper, we will attempt to outline an intersubjective perspective that focuses on the communication-based relation among subjects, a relation that is founded upon communicative (...) rationality mechanisms which are inherent in social activity. Much in contrast to the concept of interests which describe the relationship of each subject alone to the resources, we will use the concept of ?claim-rights? which are properly formed and validated only vis-à-vis negotiating partners and on the basis of the communication that develops among them. We will offer a step-by-step account of the creation of claim-rights and argue that their validation does not necessarily lie in the parties? interests, but in the communication mechanisms that induce consensus and result in mutually acceptable outcomes. (shrink)

Normative questions concerning political authority and political obligation are widely seen as central questions of political philosophy. Current global transformations require an innovative response from normative political thinking about these two topics. In light of a concrete example of the supranational forms of authority and obligation that have been and are emerging beyond the national state and beyond the traditional domains of international law, I lay out what has become the standard approach to authority and obligation and indicate why this (...) approach is inadequate in contemporary circumstances. I sketch an alternative approach and suggest how the most promising exemplar of this kind, Habermas’ discourse theory of law and politics, can better deal with the example. Having thus made plausible the advantages of the discourse theory of the alternative approach, I end with an ‘internal’ critique of Habermas’ own recent writings on the global political order. (shrink)

The article examines whether realist theory should adopt a philosophical anarchist position concerning political obligation. The conclusions are mixed. Drawing on a distinction between strong and weak theories of political obligation (in the terminology of the paper, strong theories are committed to morality-based theorizing while weak theories depart from it), the article argues that philosophical anarchism and realist theory are natural allies against strong theories of political obligation but they must part company when it comes to weak theories because it (...) is exactly their departure from morality-based theorizing that can make weak theories especially appealing to realists. In addition, two further objections can be raised against philosophical anarchism on realist grounds: first, philosophical anarchists are drawn to undesirably sweeping conclusions about the non-existence of legitimate political authority or the extreme scarcity of genuine political relations by their Kantian or Lockean background assumptions and, second, Simmons seems to have an implicit weak theory of political obligation which could be, ironically, much more appealing to realists than his overall Lockean anarchism or his sweeping criticism of weak theories. All in all, can a realist be an anarchist? Probably, but definitely not on philosophical anarchist grounds. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza el problema de cómo lidiar con situaciones en las que nuestras creencias morales van en contravía de las demandas de un gobierno que cuenta con el decidido apoyo de la mayoría de los miembros de la comunidad política a la cual uno pertenece. Siguiendo las tesis que plantea Jaspers en el Problema de la culpa, se intenta mostrar que si se interpreta el concepto de culpa política propuesto por Jaspers en la línea del filósofo liberal John Locke, (...) se puede arrojar una nueva luz sobre lo que la responsabilidad política significa. Esto también nos permitirá mostrar que las llamadas obligaciones políticas de los ciudadanos se extienden más allá de los requerimientos institucionales, asunto que ha sido el foco de recientes discusiones entre aquellos estudiosos que tratan la cuestión de la legitimidad política desde la perspectiva del contractualismo moderno. Tal extensión consiste básicamente en que los ciudadanos tienen obligaciones políticas relacionadas con la cultura política que constituyen su identidad política. (shrink)

In the past few years, several democratic governments have published their National AI Strategies (NASs). These documents outline how AI technology should be implemented in the public sector and explain the policies that will ensure the ethical use of personal data. In this article, I examine these documents as political texts and reconstruct the political imaginary that underlies them. I argue that these documents intervene in contemporary democratic politics by suggesting that AI can help democracies overcome some of the challenges (...) they are facing. To achieve this, NASs use different kinds of imaginaries—democratic, sociotechnical and data—that help citizens envision how a future AI democracy might look like. As part of this collective effort, a new kind of relationship between citizens and governments is formed. Citizens are seen as autonomous data subjects, but at the same time, they are expected to share their personal data for the common good. As a result, I argue, a new kind of political imaginary is developed in these documents. One that maintains a human-centric approach while championing a vision of collective sovereignty over data. This kind of political imaginary can become useful in understanding the roles of citizens and governments in this technological age. (shrink)

En el Critón de Platón se recurre a un interesante argumento utilitarista para justificar la obligación política de los ciudadanos. El argumento sostiene que la violación de las leyes lleva a la destrucción de cualquier sistema jurídico y acarrea resultados perjudiciales para los miembros de la comunidad. En este trabajo realizaremos un análisis crítico del argumento bajo los postulados de tres corrientes utilitaristas: el utilitarismo de acto, la generalización utilitarista y el utilitarismo de regla. Veremos cómo esta clase de argumentación (...) presenta algunos inconvenientes a la hora de justificar la obediencia al derecho. Una vez realizado este estudio se propondrá otra interpretación complementaria sobre el significado del pasaje, en la que se destacará su costado retórico forense y la idea de la autoridad del derecho. (shrink)

Though much has been written about when paternalistic intervention is justified, and about how it is justified, much less has been written about who may do the intervening. This is a substantial lacuna in our understanding of the nature of justified paternalism. By examining the question of who it is that may most appropriately interfere with the course of our decision-making, we can learn something useful both about paternalism and about the nature of friendship.In this essay I will argue that (...) friendship and paternalistic intervention are linked. Friendship of the close, intimate variety that I will be discussing is in part constituted by the fact that one friend is morally justified in interfering with the other’s decisions. Intimate friendship involves a partial meshing of identities. This meshing of identities manifests itself in part by the liberties that one friend takes in guiding the life of the other. Paternalistic intervention between friends can thus be justified because it expresses the union of the friends, and because it preserves that union. (shrink)

A number of philosophers argue that the moral value of national identity is sufficient to justify at least a prima facie right of a national community to create its own independent, sovereign state. In the literature, this argument is commonly referred to as the identity argument. In this paper, I consider whether the identity argument successfully proves that a national group is entitled to a state of its own. To do so, I first explain three important steps in the argument (...) and then consider whether they lead to the desired conclusion. My examination reveals that the identity argument relies on the Optimal Protection Principle; however, this principle does not apply to the case of a national community. As a result, the identity argument fails to justify even a prima facie right of a national community to establish its own state. (shrink)