Traditionally, life has been thought improbable without assuming a special principle, such as vital power. Here, I try to understand organization of living systems in terms of a more rational and materialistic notion. I have introduced the notion of inhomogeneity, which is a novel interpretation of “negentropy”, and equivalent to “bound information”, according to the probabilistic interpretation of entropy. Free energy of metabolites is a labile inhomogeneity, whereas genetic information is a more stable inhomogeneity. Dynamic emergence can result from the (...) conflict between two inhomogeneities, one labile and another stable, just like dialectic synthesis results from the conflict between thesis and antithesis. Life is a special type of dynamic emergence, which is coupled with reproduction mediated by genetic information. Biological membrane formation is taken as an example to formulate self-organization of biological systems through dynamic emergence. This system is ultimately driven by the Sun/Earth temperature difference, and is consistent with an increase in probability in the world. If we consider all entropy production related to life, such as degradation of materials and death of organisms, and ultimately the cooling of the Sun, probability always increases with the progress of living systems. (shrink)

Do universities still need departments in the humanities—philosophy, history, languages, and so forth? Many today, particularly legislators with control over the funding of public universities, feel that the emphasis should be on, and only on, departments in the STEM field. Willem B. Drees, a former dean of humanities, makes a spirited defense of the worth of the humanities and of their continued place in higher education. This essay looks at Drees's arguments in a critical, yet appreciative, fashion. It is a (...) debate we need to have. (shrink)

How is moral thinking, ethics, related to evolutionary theorizing? There are two approaches, epitomized by Charles Darwin who works under the metaphor of the world as a machine, and by Herbert Spencer who works under the metaphor of the world as an organism. Although the author prefers the first approach, the aim of this paper is to give a disinterested account of both approaches.

Peter Hanks and Scott Soames both defend pragmatic solutions to the problem of the unity of the proposition. According to them, what ties together Tim and baldness in the singular proposition expressed by ‘Tim is bald’ is an act of the speaker : the act of predicating baldness of Tim. But Soames construes that act as force neutral and noncommittal while, for Hanks, it is inherently assertive and committal. Hanks answers the Frege–Geach challenge by arguing that, in complex sentences, the (...) force inherent in the content of an embedded sentence is cancelled. Indrek Reiland has recently objected to Hanks’s proposal that it faces a dilemma: either force cancellation dissolves the unity of the proposition secured by the cancelled act of assertion, or Hanks’s proposal reduces to Soames’s. In this paper, I respond to Reiland by offering an analysis of force cancellation which gets rid of the alleged dilemma. The proposal is based on a set of distinctions from speech act theory : between two senses of ’force’, two types of act, and two types of context. The role of simulation in force cancellation is emphasized, and connections drawn to broader issues such as the evolution of complex language. (shrink)

Philosophy of biology is often said to have emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, it has been alleged that the only authors who engaged philosophically with the life sciences were either logical empiricists who sought to impose the explanatory ideals of the physical sciences onto biology, or vitalists who invoked mystical agencies in an attempt to ward off the threat of physicochemical reduction. These schools paid little attention to actual biological science, and as (...) a result philosophy of biology languished in a state of futility for much of the twentieth century. The situation, we are told, only began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a new generation of researchers began to focus on problems internal to biology, leading to the consolidation of the discipline. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted narrative of the history of philosophy of biology. We do so by arguing that the most important tradition within early twentieth-century philosophy of biology was neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but the organicist movement that flourished between the First and Second World Wars. We show that the organicist corpus is thematically and methodologically continuous with the contemporary literature in order to discredit the view that early work in the philosophy of biology was unproductive, and we emphasize the desirability of integrating the historical and contemporary conversations into a single, unified discourse. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy in the United States emerged parallel to the demise of idealism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Josiah Royce had contributed importantly to the predominance of idealist systems and corresponding academic groups. With the rise of pragmatism and new realism, the situation changed dramatically: the idealist movement lost momentum and realism began to dominate the discourse. The present paper argues that the critiques of idealism put forward by the realists during the first two decades of the (...) twentieth century were instrumental to the emergence of analytic philosophy in the United States. As I will explain, Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957) was the key figure in the underinvestigated genesis of this movement. (shrink)

If complexity is a necessary but not sufficient premise for the existence and expression of the living, anticipation is the distinguishing characteristic of what is alive. Anticipation is at work even at levels of existence where we cannot refer to intelligence. The prospect of artificially generating aesthetic artifacts and ethical constructs of relevance to a world in which the natural and the artificial are coexistent cannot be subsumed as yet another product of scientific and technological advancement. Beyond the artificial, the (...) synthetic conjures the understanding of aesthetics and ethics no longer from the perspective of the How? type of question, but rather the Why? Given the current infatuation with synthetic biology (i.e., making life from non-life), there is a practical consequence to such considerations. Synthetic life, as any other form of life, implies the possibility of evolution. Anticipation, which is the underlying factor of evolution, is thus expected. At the level of human existence, anticipation is expressed, for instance (but not exclusively), in aesthetic forms and ethical values. This translates, in turn, into an argument for the role aesthetics and ethics play in the process. Consequently, to qualify as life, the synthesis of the physical and the living will have to efficiently handle ambiguity. Current computational facilities, regardless of their nature or performance, operate exclusively in the semiotic domain of the well defined non-ambiguous. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze’s research during the 1980s focused on the 17th century German thinker G. W. Leibniz. In 1988, Deleuze published Le Pli, which forms part of a series of works on modern philosophy. This book displays Deleuze’s attention to the interpretations of contemporary commentators on modern philosophy, in this case, on Leibniz. In this context, there occurred a brief and important dialogue between Deleuze and Christiane Frémont, the French commentator and translator of Leibniz, with regard to their respective interpretations of (...) the great German philosopher. This article intends to give an account of the main topics present in that conversation. Firstly, we can say they involve 1) the problem of body and the Leibnizian vinculum substantiale, 2) the question of singularities, 3) the principle of economy and incompossibility, and 4) the Deleuzian concept of vice-diction. Our hypothesis in this study is that the readings made by both authors of the German thinker are mutually involved. It is essential, in order to support this hypothesis, to make precise the demarcations of relations between such readings. For this reason, our research will focus on Frémont’s study Singularités, individus et relations dans le système de Leibniz (2003) and on Deleuze’s work Le Pli (1988). We hope to determine the topics that emerge in the relationship, and to specify convergences and divergences of interpretation. (shrink)

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)

The emergence of cinema in the nineteenth century was contemporaneous with the rise of modern sports, both popular spectacles connected with the industrial revolution. Deleuze sees film in his Cinema books as the aesthetic expression of a specifically modern understanding of movement, in contrast to the science and philosophy of antiquity. This article uses Deleuze's analysis of cinema to characterise the aesthetic of modern sports as another ‘industrial art’ with a similarly innovative approach to space, time and movement. It also (...) shows how the aesthetic impact of a sporting match is aligned with the dimensions of Deleuze's ‘affection-image’ in cinema, which frames the world as a ‘face’ divided between absorption and agitation. (shrink)

Bergson’s philosophy marked a turning point in Western understanding of time by differentiating quantitative time—apprehended by intelligence—from qualitative time—duration, embedded in consciousne...

The goal of this paper is to encourage participants in the debate about the locus of cognition (e.g., extended mind vs embedded mind) to turn their attention to noteworthy anthropological and sociological considerations typically (but not uniquely) arising from transhumanist and posthumanist research. Such considerations, we claim, promise to potentially give us a way out of the stalemate in which such a debate has fallen. A secondary goal of this paper is to impress trans and post-humanistically inclined readers to embrace (...) (or at least seriously reflect on) the extended mind thesis as a potential gamechanger to the state of play in their own debates. We start off (Sect. 1) by reviewing two crucial ideas (homo faber and plasticity of the body schema) that are instrumental in setting up the dispute between extended and embedded. We then summarise (Sect. 2), the stalemate between these two competing accounts of cognition, and review some of the dialectics underlying it. In Sect. 3, to get out of the stalemate, we propose to focus on a series of important anthropological and sociological considerations derived from and related to trans and posthumanist research. In doing so, we claim (Sect. 4) that an extended approach to cognition becomes anthropologically preferable and morally as well as socially more desirable than an embedded one. (shrink)

The distinction between primary and secondary properties establishes the absolute priority, both ontological and epistemological, of quantity over quality. In between the two properties, primary and secondary, are the dispositional properties, for example fragility, malleability, rigidity, and so on. But, from an ontological point of view, what are dispositional properties? This contribution takes into consideration two possible answers to this question: the one according to which the dispositional properties are invariant in variation and another according to which they are powers. (...) The second answer is in turn subject to two different interpretations. We can consider dispositions, or powers, as integrally reducible to behavioral events, or physical. However, we can consider powers as ontologically autonomous and not-grounded. This contribution aims to investigate the latter solution, with particular reference to the apparently oxymoronic notion of physical intentionality. This notion will provide a new, dynamic, and evolutionary version of the concept of disposition and at the same time offer a new look at the distinction between primary and secondary properties. (shrink)

Jung’s advance, for Deleuze, must lie in this identification of a « problematic » zone of human intelligence, through which the instinctual form of consciousness can return. A gap is opened up for the return of an « instinct devenu désintéressé, conscient de lui-même, capable de réfléchir sur son objet et de l’élargir indéfiniment ».

Pour Répondre à la question qui constitue le titre de cet essai, il faut d'abord répondre à une autre question, à savoir: qu'est-ce que la philosophie de la nature? De quoi parlons-nous au juste quand nous parlons de philosophie de la nature?

The author refers to his book “Die Selbstgestaltung des Lebendigen, synoptische Theorie des Lebens als ein Beitrag zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft” and comments some basic theses of it, namely the body-soul-relation, the gestalt and the problem of the “soul” of the plant and the significance of these conceptions for the description and the understanding of the realizing itself of the living being. The Author prefers not to call a soul the transcendent order which is propre to a plant, (...) as to all what lives, and which is the consequence of their quality as a gestalt. He designs with J.Reinke the transcending order of the plant with the name “diaphysis”. He names his theory of life autotelism and has some hope that it can reconcile mecanism and vitalism in the idea of identity of the so called parallel processes in different ontological dimensions. The duality of body or organism and soul or “innen” is a result only of human thinking, really they are a whole together and do not work upon another, but what happens in the one of them, happens at the same moment in the other one like in a mirror. The unity of both has been stated so often, that it sounds rather trivial, but in the book cited above it is described and argued exactly in that sense that phenomene and gignomene in one and the same life process are correspondent structures in different ontological dimensions, coordinated to one another, as it were, like two mathematical co-ordinates.The author replies to a critic who has doubts about the possibility of our thinking to approximate to the problems in question. He designs that kind of thinking which is adequate to that purpose.L'auteur se réfère à son livre „Die Selbstgestaltung des Lebendigen, synoptiscne Theorie des Lebens als ein Beitrag zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft” et commente quelques de ses thèses basales, à dire la relation du corps et de l'âme, la gestalt et le problème de l'âme de la plante et l'importance de ces notions pour la description et l'entendement de la réalisation de l'être vivant par lui-même. Il préfère de ne pas nommer un âme l'ordre transcendant qui est propre à la plante comme à tout être vivant et qui est la conséquence de leur qualité comme une gestalt. Il désigne avec J.Reinke l'ordre transcendant de la plante comme „diaphysis”. Il nomme sa théorie autotelisme et il a un peu d'espoir qu'elle peut reconcilier mécanisme et vitalisme par l'idée de l'identité des si-nommés „evénements parallèles” en dimensions ontologiques diverses. La dualité corps ou organisme et âme ou „innen” n'est qu'un résultat de la raison humaine, en réalité ils sont une unité ensemble et n'agissent pas l'un sur l'autre, mais qui arrive dans l'un d'eux, arrive dans l'autre au même instant comme dans un miroir. L'unité des deux est affirmée si souvent, que cela semble presque trivialement, mais dans le livre cité cela est décrit et argumenté exactement dans le sens, que phénomène et gignomène dans le même procès de vie sont structures correspondantes dans diverses dimensions ontologiques, qui sont coordonnées l'une à l'autre, pour ainsi dire, comme deux coordinates mathematiques.L'auteur replique à un critique qui doute qu'il y ait moyen pour notre méthode de penser de s'approcher aux problèmes en question. Il désigne la méthode de penser, qui est adéquate à ce propos. (shrink)

El presente artículo expone cómo, en el pensamiento de García Bacca, la noción de «vida» y la función decisiva que esta desempeña en el mismo, está estrechamente imbricada a una actividad libre y creadora; colocándonos más en la estela de Bergson que en la de Ortega o Dilthey como, hasta el momento, los estudiosos de Gar-cía Bacca han venido situándole.

This paper deals with Parmenides of Elea’s way of inquiry about reality and the opposition emerging from it. In more detail, it analyses how Parmenides’ concepts of logos and doxa present some analogies with Bergson’s thoughts about duration and Time and how these theories influenced the understanding of visual media, especially the cinematographic camera. This survey will allow us to demonstrate that some scientific theories about space that accompanied the development of the cinematographic camera progressively allowed for the birth of (...) a new understanding of this device. In the last section of this study, we will then focus on the way through which the film camera - understood as an intelligent device - passes from the sphere of doxa to the sphere of logos. (shrink)

The concept of teleonomy has been attracting renewed attention recently. This is based on the idea that teleonomy provides a useful conceptual replacement for teleology, and even that it constitutes an indispensable resource for thinking biologically about purposes. However, both these claims are open to question. We review the history of teleological thinking from Greek antiquity to the modern period to illuminate the tensions and ambiguities that emerged when forms of teleological reasoning interacted with major developments in biological thought. This (...) sets the stage for an examination of Pittendrigh’s (Adaptation, natural selection, and behavior. In: Roe A, Simpson GG (eds) Behavior and evolution. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp 390–416, 1958) introduction of “teleonomy” and its early uptake in the work of prominent biologists. We then explore why teleonomy subsequently foundered and consider whether the term may yet have significance for discussions of goal-directedness in evolutionary biology and philosophy of science. This involves clarifying the relationship between teleonomy and teleological explanation, as well as asking how the concept of teleonomy impinges on research at the frontiers of evolutionary theory. (shrink)

Aunque el propio Bergson llegó a afirmar que no siempre había manejado una misma noción de tiempo en cada una de sus obras, en este artículo pretendo reconstruir la filosofía bergsoniana del tiempo y tratar de demostrar que hay una concepción unitaria de la _durée_, solo que desde diversas perspectivas. Un examen atento de algunos pasajes clave de sus obras nos muestra que en Bergson hay una progresiva profundización en la noción de tiempo, que comienza por la duración en la (...) conciencia y culmina en el tiempo del universo. De este modo, Bergson no psicologiza el tiempo, sino que más bien “temporaliza” el mundo y la conciencia. (shrink)

Darwin’s classic ‘Origin of Species’ (Darwin 1859) described forces of selection acting upon individuals, but there remains a great deal of controversy about what exactly the status and definition of a biological individual is. Recently some authors have argued that the individual is dispensable – that an inability to pin it down is not problematic because little rests on it anyway. The aim of this paper is to show that there is a real problem of biological individuality, and an urgent (...) need to arbitrate over the current plethora of solutions to it. (shrink)

This article is an analysis of a collection of articles published by Gilles Deleuze in 1953 under the direction of Georges Canguilhem. This collection, which has been little read and commented upon, sheds light on the intellectual trajectory of its author by underlining the theoretical hesitations that were his. I show that Deleuze then outlined an ambitious “psycho-sociological” project that he never fully realized. To do this, I reconstitute the psychological and ethological subtext of the book by following his sources; (...) I thus bring to light real theoretical positions often unnoticed in his work (in particular with respect to Henri Bergson, Jakob von Uexküll, and gestaltpsychology). I then argue that the difficulties linked to the theory of perception lead Deleuze to turn away from this project in order to devote himself to more specifically ontological problems. However, I suggest that these difficulties persist throughout Deleuze's works, where notions such as “sign” and “semiotics” both cover and avoid specifically perceptual problems. (shrink)

Creare est unire? An outline of Teilhard de Chardin's metaphysics of union As underlying leitmotiv throughout all his work, Teilhard de Chardin develops the relationship between spirit and matter. Matter and spirit are related as follows: centricity depends on the complexity. Nothing in the universe exists but spirit in different states or degrees of organization or plurality for Teilhard. If it is defined as a thing without a trace of consciousness, matter does not exist. The Spirit comes innovatively by successive (...) synthesis, by what he calls law of central-complexity. From the central-complexity, we present here how Teilhard identifies three areas in the universe: the pre-living, the living and thinking ; and yet, we expose how he bases its philosophy of creation in a non-materialistic monism and a kind of panpsychism, to avoid a radical dualism between spirit and matter, which enables him to explain in what sense the spirit emerges from the union of matter. Hence based on its spirituality, Teilhard wants to integrate Science and Faith for a Christian worldview. (shrink)

Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, allegedly denying motion, have been conceived to reinforce the Parmenidean vision of an immutable world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that these famous logical paradoxes should be seen instead as paradoxes of immobility. From this new point of view, motion is therefore no longer logically problematic, while immobility is. This is convenient since it is easy to conceive that immobility can actually conceal motion, and thus the proposition “immobility is mere illusion of the (...) senses” is much more credible than the reverse thesis supported by Parmenides. Moreover, this proposition is also supported by modern depiction of material bodies: the existence of a ceaseless random motion of atoms—the ‘thermal agitation’—in the scope of contemporary atomic theory, can offer a rational explanation of this ‘illusion of immobility’. Our new approach to Zeno’s paradoxes therefore leads to presenting the novel concept of ‘impermobility’, which we think is a more adequate description of physical reality. (shrink)

Borrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of life from Merleau‐Ponty's Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily action, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also thereby revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty develops a nonserial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility (...) of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures its passage. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's reference to "a past which has never been present" at the end of "Le sentir" challenges the typical framework of the Phenomenology of Perception, with its primacy of perception and bodily field of presence. In light of this "original past," I propose a re-reading of the prepersonal as ground of perception that precedes the dichotomies of subject-object and activity-passivity. Merleau-Ponty searches in the Phenomenology for language to describe this ground, borrowing from multiple registers (notably Bergson, but also Husserl). This (...) "sensory life" is a coexistence of sensing and sensible—bodily and worldly—rhythms. Perception is, then, not a natural given, but a temporal process of synchronization between rhythms. By drawing on Bergson, this can be described as a process in which virtual life is actualized into perceiving subject and object perceived. Significantly, this process involves non-coincidence or delay whereby sensory life is always already past for perception. (shrink)

The article focuses on the history of the conflict between analytic and continental tradition, which dominated the philosophy of the 20th century. Although both traditions originated from the same intellectual environment and were heavily influenced by Neo-Kantianism, their mutual lack of understanding progressed over time and, on several occasions, the situation grew into open hostility. The article describes the ten most serious conflicts: Russell vs. Bergson, Schlick vs. Husserl, Carnap vs. Heidegger, Ryle vs. Heidegger, Popper's critique of pseudoscience, conference in (...) Royaumont, Searle vs. Derrida, the revelation of Heidegger's Nazi past, Derrida's Honorary Doctorate from Cambridge, and Sokal's scam. At the beginning of the 21st century it turns out that the conflict between analytic and continental philosophy has been exhausted. What is more substantial is the dispute over the philosophical methodology, which is reflected in the division into naturalistic and anti-naturalistic thinkers. (shrink)

A posição filosófica chamada de externismo semântico caracteriza-se pela tese segundo a qual a individuação do conteúdo de estados mentais deve recorrer a fatores que não podem ser localizados na região geralmente circunscrita pela noção mesma de mente. Tal tese implica, em todo caso, que a suposta interioridade da vida psicológica não se basta para tornar inteligível as condições de possibilidade que o pensamento conceitual requer. Assim, se fatores externos aos indivíduos são vistos como desempenhando uma contribuição decisiva na própria (...) determinação de seu conteúdo mental, isto é algo que torna necessário compreender em que sentido mente e mundo podem ser tomados como intrinsecamente relacionados. A aposta teórica do presente trabalho é a de que apenas uma concepção da individuação liberada dos grilhões substancialistas permite fornecer um solo ontológico fértil para uma teoria externista do conceito. Daí que a noção de triangulação, que Donald Davidson forjou para dar conta de alguns fatores cruciais na gênese da conceitualidade, seja lida a partir de filosofias que ressaltam o caráter decisivo da vida como referencialidade fundamental do conceito. Logo, é na ordem vital que se busca dissolver os impasses ligados à origem da normatividade e à dualidade entre interno e externo, oposição a partir da qual a subjetividade desde muito tempo tem sido pensada. (shrink)

The article focuses on the constitution of the concept of image in Bergson’s second important book, Matter and Memory. It intends to show how this concept is developing throughout the three types of perception that can be found in Bergson: the ordinary or utilitarian perception, pure perception and artistic perception . According to the modes of participation to these types of perception, the image can be regarded as representational image, movement-image and figuration-image . The article stresses the importance of artistic (...) vision, insufficiently treated by Bergson: it is regarded as a fundamental link between the two other types of perception and makes the appearance of material things possible for us, in our conscious perception. (shrink)

The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...) a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context. (shrink)

Conventional approaches to consciousness assume that our current science tells us within tolerable limits what physical nature is. Because nature so understood cannot explain consciousness as we seem to experience it ourselves, explaining consciousness becomes a problem. One solution is to rethink what consciousness is so that it becomes the sort of thing our current natural science could in principle explain. Whitehead takes the opposite approach, using the existence of consciousness as a clue to what nature must be if it (...) can generate something like consciousness. The justification for this approach can be found in Whitehead’s implicit indictment of descriptive phenomenology. According to Whitehead, the seemingly insoluble problem of explaining consciousness naturalistically is an artifact created by the assumption that consciousness faithfully samples the world, when in fact it obscures the very aspects of nature that are indispensable to understanding how anything, including consciousness itself, could emerge through a physical process. (shrink)

A specific mapping mechanism is defined as the basic unit of “Biological Memory”. This mechanism must account for the characteristic frequency patterns in the organic world, where future probability is a function of past experience. The conditions for the function of biological memory are analysed. It is found that asymmetry, and irreversibility as a consequence of complexity, are the basic principles of memory function. The essential asymmetries in genetic memory are pointed out, and the problem of bilateral symmetry in a (...) basically asymmetrical organization is briefly outlined.Complexity is defined in terms of symmetry. The thermodynamic arrow of time and the biological arrow of time are discussed in relation to elementarity and complexity with their specific types of repeatabilities: non-accumulative in the first case and accumulative as a result of “copy-reproduction” by memory in the second case. The application of terminology from Information Theory and Thermodynamics to Memory Mechanics is critically considered.The immediate and inevitable consequences of memory function are shown to be irreversible expansion and irreversible, unpredictable diversification, leading to growing complexity and size on all but the sub-molecular levels of biological structure. (shrink)

The use of teleological language in biology is burdened with many difficulties. Speakers in everyday and scientific discourse confuse functions with purposes and misunderstand functionality, finality, and intentionality. The paper is structured into three sections. In the first part the difference between Platonic supranatural and Aristotelian quasi-natural account of teleology will be explained, with examples from the history of philosophy of biology. The second part will present the Darwinian approach to etiology that constitutes a more sound alternative to the teleological (...) explanation. In the last section I will briefly introduce the teleological bias that is studied by developmental and cognitive psychologists. I believe that this psychological inclination is the real source of intuitive worldviews that are incompatible with contemporary science. (shrink)

Both biosemiotics and evolutionary epistemology are concerned with how knowledge evolves. (Applied) Evolutionary Epistemology thereby focuses on identifying the units, levels, and mechanisms or processes that underlie the evolutionary development of knowing and knowledge, while biosemiotics places emphasis on the study of how signs underlie the development of meaning. We compare the two schools of thought and analyze how in delineating their research program, biosemiotics runs into several problems that are overcome by evolutionary epistemologists. For one, by emphasizing signs, biosemiotics (...) needs to delineate a semiotic threshold, which is a problem not encountered by evolutionary epistemologists. Instead, the latter recognizes that all organisms are knowers that evolve knowledge, which they recognize to extend toward phenomena produced by organisms such as behavior, cognition, language, culture, science, and technology. Secondly, biosemiotics attempts at continuing adaptationist notions on how organisms relate to their environment, while especially Applied Evolutionary Epistemology comes to redefine the nature of the organism–environment relationship in such a way that it recognizes the spatiotemporal boundedness of existence, which in turn makes adaptationist accounts obsolete. (shrink)

« Esprit de corps » is a now globally uttered phrase, which designates the strong inner cohesion of — and attachment to — a human organized group. Since the Encyclopaedists up until Bourdieu, the term is usually critical and pejorative in French thought, used to fustigate the groupthink of privileged social casts. But in their famous chapter on war machines, Deleuze and Guattari proposed a much less well-known yet promising U-turn in the way esprit de corps was theorized. Far from (...) the now common paranoid idea of discipline, often defended by Foucauldian exegetes, this overseen aspect of nomadology, inspired by Bergson’s ideas on esprit de corps, but also by medieval guilds and oriental martial art communities, reopens the path to what could be called a politics of hieropoiesis, a communal and secular production of the sacred. (shrink)

Can we really perceive absences, i.e., missing things? Sartre tells us that when he arrived late for his appointment at the café, he saw the absence of his friend Pierre. Is that really what he saw? Where was it, exactly? Why didn’t Sartre see the absence of other people who were not there? Why did other people who were there not see the absence of Pierre? The perception of absences gives rise to a host of conundrums and is constantly on (...) the verge of conceptual confusion. Here I focus on the need to be clear about four sorts of distinctions: (i) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving something that is absent; (ii) the difference between perceiving an absence and an absence of perceiving; (iii) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving something as an absence; and (iv) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving that something is absent. (shrink)

In this paper is examined the evolution of the idea of consciousness in Bergson’s works –Essai sur les donnés immédiates de la conscience (1889), Matière et mémoire (1896), L’évolution créatrice (1907)–, firstly exploring the significance of this idea in Bergson’s contemporary philosophic thought and then analysing the variations and enrichments, explicit and underlying, of it in his own thinking, coming to the conclusion that Bergson’s idea of consciousness changes from being mainly cognitive to coincide with the idea of human life.

El objetivo de este artículo es examinar la definición de "vida" en el pensamiento de Helmut Plessner y de Hans Jonas, para, con base en las evidencias biológicas y las reflexiones de estos autores, plantear la pregunta por las categorías fundamentales que diferencian lo vital de lo inerte, que son, a nuestro juicio, tres: la célula como unidad estructural y funcional, la transmisión de información genética, y la evolución por selección natural. The objective of the article is to explore the (...) definition of "life" in the thought of Helmut Plessner and Hans Jonas. On the basis of biological evidence and the authors' reflections, the paper inquires into the three fundamental categories that differentiate living and non-living things: the cell as a structural and functional unit, the transmission of genetic information, and evolution due to natural selection. (shrink)