The axiomatic presentation of modal systems and the standard formulations of natural deduction and sequent calculus for modal logic are reviewed, together with the difficulties that emerge with these approaches. Generalizations of standard proof systems are then presented. These include, among others, display calculi, hypersequents, and labelled systems, with the latter surveyed from a closer perspective.

This paper formulates a bilateral account of harmony that is an alternative to one proposed by Francez. It builds on an account of harmony for unilateral logic proposed by Kürbis and the observation that reading the rules for the connectives of bilateral logic bottom up gives the grounds and consequences of formulas with the opposite speech act. I formulate a process I call 'inversion' which allows the determination of assertive elimination rules from assertive introduction rules, and rejective elimination rules from (...) rejective introduction rules, and conversely. It corresponds to Francez's notion of vertical harmony. I also formulate a process I call 'conversion', which allows the determination of rejective introduction rules from assertive elimination rules and conversely, and the determination of assertive introduction rules from rejective elimination rules and conversely. It corresponds to Francez's notion of horizontal harmony. The account has a number of features that distinguish it from Francez's. (shrink)

There appears to be few, if any, limits on what sorts of logical connectives can be added to a given logic. One source of potential limitations is the motivating ideology associated with a logic. While extraneous to the logic, the motivating ideology is often important for the development of formal and philosophical work on that logic, as is the case with intuitionistic logic. One family of logics for which the philosophical ideology is important is the family of relevant logics. In (...) this paper, I explore the limits of what a relevant connective is, showing how some basic criteria motivated by the ideology of relevant logicians provide robust limits on potential connectives. These criteria provide some plausible necessary conditions on being a relevant connective. (shrink)

Intuitionistic modal logics are extensions of intuitionistic propositional logic with modal axioms. We treat with two modal languages ${\mathscr{L}}_\Diamond $ and $\mathscr{L}_{\Diamond,\Box }$ which extend the intuitionistic propositional language with $\Diamond $ and $\Diamond,\Box $, respectively. Gentzen sequent calculi are established for several intuitionistic modal logics. In particular, we introduce a Gentzen sequent calculus for the well-known intuitionistic modal logic $\textsf{MIPC}$. These sequent calculi admit cut elimination and subformula property. They are decidable.

The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties task have exactly the same underlying logical structure. (...) We also consider the Sally-Anne task, having a more complicated logical structure, presupposing a “principle of inertia” saying that a belief is preserved over time, unless there is belief to the contrary. (shrink)

A cut-free Gentzen sequent calculus for Ewald’s intuitionistic tense logic \ is established. By the proof-theoretic method, we prove that, for every set of strictly positive implications S, the classical tense logic \ is embedded into its intuitionistic analogue \ via Kolmogorov, Gödel–Genzten and Kuroda translations respectively. A sufficient and necessary condition for Glivenko type theorem in tense logics is established.

The article presents a full proof‐theoretic semantics for natural deduction based on an extended inversion principle: the elimination rule for an operator q may invert the introduction rule for q, but also vice versa, the introduction rule for a connective q may invert the elimination rule for q. Such an inversion—extending Prawitz' concept of inversion—gives the following theorem: Inversion for two rules of operator q (intro rule, elim rule) exists iff a reduction of a maximum formula for q exists. The (...) inversion theorem is specified to two logics, Lambek calculus (LC) and intuitionistic linear logic (ILL), with four propositional connectives: two multiplicatives (implication and conjunction) and two additives (conjunction and disjunction), with two quantifiers and two modals. LC is defined by using elimination rules by composition. ILL is defined by using usual general elimination rules. Elimination rules by composition are an exciting alternative to general elimination rules; in some cases, they do not need permutations. (shrink)

We develop multi-conclusion nested sequent calculi for the fifteen logics of the intuitionistic modal cube between IK and IS5. The proof of cut-free completeness for all logics is provided both syntactically via a Maehara-style translation and semantically by constructing an infinite birelational countermodel from a failed proof search. Interestingly, the Maehara-style translation for proving soundness syntactically fails due to the hierarchical structure of nested sequents. Consequently, we only provide the semantic proof of soundness. The countermodel construction used to prove completeness (...) required a completely novel approach to deal with two independent sources of non-termination in the proof search present in the case of transitive and Euclidean logics. (shrink)

In this paper we study natural deduction for the intuitionistic and classical (normal) modal logics obtained from the combinations of the axioms T, B, 4 and 5. In this context we introduce a new multi-contextual structure, called T-sequent, that allows to design simple labelfree natural deduction systems for these logics. After proving that they are sound and complete we show that they satisfy the normalization property and consequently the subformula property in the intuitionistic case.

We introduce an extension of natural deduction that is suitable for dealing with modal operators and induction. We provide a proof reduction system and we prove a strong normalization theorem for an intuitionistic calculus. As a consequence we obtain a purely syntactic proof of consistency. We also present a classical calculus and we relate provability in the two calculi by means of an adequate formula translation.

This article addresses and resolves some issues of relational, Kripke-style, semantics for the logics of bounded lattice expansions with operators of well-defined distribution types, focusing on the case where the underlying lattice is not assumed to be distributive. It therefore falls within the scope of the theory of Generalized Galois Logics, introduced by Dunn, and it contributes to its extension. We introduce order-dual relational semantics and present a semantic analysis and completeness theorems for non-distributive lattice logic with n -ary additive (...) or multiplicative operators, with negation operators modally interpreted as impossibility and unnecessity, as well as with implication connectives. Order-dual relational semantics shares with the generalized Kripke frames, or the bi-approximation semantics approach, the use of both a satisfaction and a co-satisfaction relation, but it also responds to the recently voiced concerns of Craig, Haviar and Conradie about the relative non-intuitiveness of the 2-sorted semantics of the aforementioned approaches. In this article, we provide a standard interpretation of modalities and natural interpretations of both negation and implication, despite the absence of distribution. Thereby, our results contribute in creating the necessary background for research in non-distributive logics with modalities variously interpreted as dynamic, temporal etc, by analogy to the classical case. (shrink)