The aim of this work is to revisit the proposal made by Dag Westerståhl a decade ago when he provided a modern reading of the traditional square of opposition and of related structures. We propose a formalization of this modern view and contrast it with the classical one. We discuss what may be a modern hexagon of opposition and a modern cube, and show their interest in particular for relating quantitative expressions.

Following a previous article (cf. Costa-Leite, A. (2018). Oppositions in a line segment, South American Journal of Logic, 4(1), pp.185-193) in which logical oppositions are defined in a line segment, this article goes one step further and proposes a method defining them using a zero-dimensional object: a point.

De modo geral, este texto é uma incursão em lógica filosófica e filosofia da lógica. Ele contém reflexões originais acerca dos conceitos de paraconsistência, modalidades e cognoscibilidade e suas possíveis relações. De modo específico, o texto avança em quatro direções principais: inicialmente, uma definição genérica de lógicas não clássicas utilizando a ideia de lógica abstrata é sugerida. Em seguida, é mostrado como técnicas manuais de paraconsistentização de lógicas são usadas para gerar sistemas particulares de lógicas paraconsistentes. Depois, uma definição de (...) possibilidade lógica é proposta por meio da ideia de limites de sequências de fórmulas. Por fim, muitas abordagens distintas ao paradoxo de Fitch e, consequentemente, aos limites do conhecimento são apresentadas considerando as reflexões anteriores. (shrink)

In logic, Aristotelian diagrams are almost always assumed to be closed under negation, and are thus highly symmetric in nature. In linguistics, by contrast, these diagrams are used to study lexicalization, which is notoriously not closed under negation, thus yielding more asymmetric diagrams. This paper studies the interplay between logical symmetry and linguistic asymmetry in Aristotelian diagrams. I discuss two major symmetric Aristotelian diagrams, viz. the square and the hexagon of opposition, and show how linguistic considerations yield various asymmetric versions (...) of these diagrams. I then discuss a pentagon of opposition, which occupies an uneasy position between the square and the hexagon. Although this pentagon belongs neither to the symmetric realm of logic nor to the asymmetric realm of linguistics, it occurs several times in the literature. The oldest known occurrence can be found in the cosmological work of the 14th-century author Nicole Oresme. (shrink)

Throughout this paper, we are trying to show how and why our Mathematical frame-work seems inappropriate to solve problems in Theory of Computation. More exactly, the concept of turning back in time in paradoxes causes inconsistency in modeling of the concept of Time in some semantic situations. As we see in the first chapter, by introducing a version of “Unexpected Hanging Paradox”,first we attempt to open a new explanation for some paradoxes. In the second step, by applying this paradox, it (...) is demonstrated that any formalized system for the Theory of Computation based on Classical Logic and Turing Model of Computation leads us to a contradiction. We conclude that our mathematical frame work is inappropriate for Theory of Computation. Furthermore, the result provides us a reason that many problems in Complexity Theory resist to be solved.(This work is completed in 2017 -5- 2, it is in vixra in 2017-5-14, presented in Unilog 2018, Vichy). (shrink)

Aristotle’s philosophy is considered with respect to one central concept of his philosophy, viz. opposition. Far from being a mere side-effect of syllogistic, it is argued in the present paper that opposition helps to articulate ontology and logic through an account of what can be or cannot be in a systematic and structural way. The paper is divided into three main parts. In Section I, the notion of Being is scrutinized through Aristotle’s theory of categories. In Section II, the notion (...) of Non-Being is connected to Aristotle’s theory of oppositions. In Section III, the notion of essence is revisited in order to bring about a holist theory of meaning by individuating through opposite properties. In conclusion, the legacy of Aristotle is depicted as balanced between a powerful reflection around Being and a restrictive ontology of substance. (shrink)

Logical geometry systematically studies Aristotelian diagrams, such as the classical square of oppositions and its extensions. These investigations rely heavily on the use of bitstrings, which are compact combinatorial representations of formulas that allow us to quickly determine their Aristotelian relations. However, because of their general nature, bitstrings can be applied to a wide variety of topics in philosophical logic beyond those of logical geometry. Hence, the main aim of this paper is to present a systematic technique for assigning bitstrings (...) to arbitrary finite fragments of formulas in arbitrary logical systems, and to study the logical and combinatorial properties of this technique. It is based on the partition of logical space that is induced by a given fragment, and sheds new light on a number of interesting issues, such as the logic-dependence of the Aristotelian relations and the subtle interplay between the Aristotelian and Boolean structure of logical fragments. Finally, the bitstring technique also allows us to systematically analyze fragments from contemporary logical systems, such as public announcement logic, which could not be done before. (shrink)

In this book an introduction to the grammatical view of the scalar implicature phenomenon is presented. A detailed overview is offered concerning the embeddability of the exhaustivity operator, and the contextual dependance of the alternatives generation process. The theoretical implications of the grammatical view with respect to the abductive character of the scalar implicature are also discussed. A pragmatic account of the assertive content is proposed in correlation with a blindness-based account of the semantic content carried by scalar sentences, in (...) order to ensure that the information globally conveyed by the latter is sometimes different from the semantic content automatically generated. -/- . (shrink)

After recalling the distinction between logic as reasoning and logic as theory of reasoning, we first examine the question of relativity of logic arguing that the theory of reasoning as any other science is relative. In a second part we discuss the emergence of universal logic as a general theory of logical systems, making comparison with universal algebra and the project of mathesis universalis. In a third part we critically present three lines of research connected to universal logic: logical pluralism, (...) non-classical logics and cognitive science. (shrink)

A formal theory of oppositions and opposites is proposed on the basis of a non- Fregean semantics, where opposites are negation-forming operators that shed some new light on the connection between opposition and negation. The paper proceeds as follows. After recalling the historical background, oppositions and opposites are compared from a mathematical perspective: the first occurs as a relation, the second as a function. Then the main point of the paper appears with a calculus of oppositions, by means of a (...) non-Fregean semantics that redefines the logical values of various sorts of sentences. A num- ber of topics are then addressed in the light of this algebraic semantics, namely: how to construct value-functional operators for any logical opposition, beyond the classical case of contradiction; Blanché's "closure problem", i.e., how to find a complete structure connecting the sixteen binary sentences with one another. All of this is meant to devise an abstract theory of opposition: it encompasses the relation of consequence as subalternation, while relying upon the use of a primary "proto- negation" that turns any relatum into an opposite. This results in sentential negations that proceed as intensional operators, while negation is broadly viewed as a difference-forming operator without special constraints on it. (shrink)

A general theory of logical oppositions is proposed by abstracting these from the Aristotelian background of quantified sentences. Opposition is a relation that goes beyond incompatibility (not being true together), and a question-answer semantics is devised to investigate the features of oppositions and opposites within a functional calculus. Finally, several theoretical problems about its applicability are considered.

The paper first introduces a cube of opposition that associates the traditional square of opposition with the dual square obtained by Piaget’s reciprocation. It is then pointed out that Blanché’s extension of the square-of-opposition structure into an conceptual hexagonal structure always relies on an abstract tripartition. Considering quadripartitions leads to organize the 16 binary connectives into a regular tetrahedron. Lastly, the cube of opposition, once interpreted in modal terms, is shown to account for a recent generalization of formal concept analysis, (...) where noticeable hexagons are also laid bare. This generalization of formal concept analysis is motivated by a parallel with bipolar possibility theory. The latter, albeit graded, is indeed based on four graded set functions that can be organized in a similar structure. (shrink)

We revisit a typological puzzle due to Horn (Doctoral Dissertation, UCLA, 1972) regarding the lexicalization of logical operators: in instantiations of the traditional square of opposition across categories and languages, the O corner, corresponding to ‘nand’ (= not and), ‘nevery’ (= not every), etc., is never lexicalized. We discuss Horn’s proposal, which involves the interaction of two economy conditions, one that relies on scalar implicatures and one that relies on markedness. We observe that in order to express markedness and to (...) account for a bigger typological puzzle, namely the absence of lexicalizations of ‘XOR’ (= exclusive or), ‘all-or-none’, and many other imaginable logical operators, one must restrict the basic lexicalizable elements to a small set of primitives. We suggest that an ordering based perspective, following Keenan and Faltz (Boolean semantics for natural language, 1985), makes the stipulated primitives that we arrive at more natural. We also propose a modification to Horn’s proposal, based on recent work on implicatures, in which only the implicature condition is operative and in which markedness is part of the definition of the alternatives for scalar implicatures rather than an independent condition. (shrink)

We re-examine the problem of existential import by using classical predicate logic. Our problem is: How to distribute the existential import among the quantified propositions in order for all the relations of the logical square to be valid? After defining existential import and scrutinizing the available solutions, we distinguish between three possible cases: explicit import, implicit non-import, explicit negative import and formalize the propositions accordingly. Then, we examine the 16 combinations between the 8 propositions having the first two kinds of (...) import, the third one being trivial and rule out the squares where at least one relation does not hold. This leads to the following results: (1) three squares are valid when the domain is non-empty; (2) one of them is valid even in the empty domain: the square can thus be saved in arbitrary domains and (3) the aforementioned eight propositions give rise to a cube, which contains two more (non-classical) valid squares and several hexagons. A classical solution to the problem of existential import is thus possible, without resorting to deviant systems and merely relying upon the symbolism of First-order Logic (FOL). Aristotle’s system appears then as a fragment of a broader system which can be developed by using FOL. (shrink)

Aristotelian diagrams, such as the square of opposition and other, more complex diagrams, have a long history in philosophical logic. Alpha-structures and ladders are two specific kinds of Aristotelian diagrams, which are often studied together because of their close interactions. The present paper builds upon this research line, by reformulating and investigating alpha-structures and ladders in the contemporary setting of logical geometry, a mathematically sophisticated framework for studying Aristotelian diagrams. In particular, this framework allows us to formulate well-defined functions that (...) construct alpha-structures and ladders out of each other. In order to achieve this, we point out the crucial importance of imposing an ordering on the elements in the diagrams involved, and thus formulate all our results in terms of ordered versions of alpha-structures and ladders. These results shed interesting new light on the prospects of developing a systematic classification of Aristotelian diagrams, which is one of the main ongoing research efforts within logical geometry today. (shrink)

This discussion explores the possibility of distinguishing a tighter notion of contrariety evident in the Square of Opposition, especially in its modal incarnations, than as that binary relation holding statements that cannot both be true, with or without the added rider ‘though can both be false’. More than one theorist has voiced the intuition that the paradigmatic contraries of the traditional Square are related in some such tighter way—involving the specific role played by negation in contrasting them—that distinguishes them from (...) other pairs of incompatible statements constructed from the same conceptual materials. Prominent among examples, these other nonstandard pairs are the ‘new contraries’ presented by Robert Blanché’s hexagon(s) of opposition. With special, though not exclusive, attention to these cases, we investigate whether contrariety in the distinguished sense can be captured by adding to the incompatibility condition the further demand that the pair of statements concerned can be represented as the results of applying some sentence operator to the content in its scope, for one of the pair, and, for the other, the application of that same operator to the negation of that content. For one of the two cases, a Blanché case, of nonstandard contrariety singled out for attention, the question of whether such a representation is available is settled at the end of Section 4, and then in a more satisfying way in Section 5, though for the other case, noticed by Peter Simons, the question remains open, after some tentative discussion in one subsection, 6.2, of an Appendix (Section 6). (shrink)

This paper studies John Buridan's octagons of opposition for the de re modal propositions and the propositions of unusual construction. Both Buridan himself and the secondary literature have emphasized the strong similarities between these two octagons (as well as a third one, for propositions with oblique terms). In this paper, I argue that the interconnection between both octagons is more subtle than has previously been thought: if we move beyond the Aristotelian relations, and also take Boolean considerations into account, then (...) the strong analogy between Buridan's octagons starts to break down. These differences in Boolean structure can already be discerned within the octagons themselves; on a more abstract level, they lead to these two octagons having different degrees of Boolean complexity (i.e. Boolean closures of different sizes). These results are obtained by means of bitstring analysis, which is one of the key tools from contemporary logical geometry. Finally, I argue that this historical investigation is directly relevant for the theoretical framework of logical geometry, and discuss how it helps us to address certain open questions in this framework. (shrink)

In 1995 Slater argued both against Priest’s paraconsistent system LP (1979) and against paraconsistency in general, invoking the fundamental opposition relations ruling the classical logical square. Around 2002 Béziau constructed a double defence of paraconsistency (logical and philosophical), relying, in its philosophical part, on Sesmat’s (1951) and Blanche’s (1953) “logical hexagon”, a geometrical, conservative extension of the logical square, and proposing a new (tridimensional) “solid of opposition”, meant to shed new light on the point raised by Slater. By using n-opposition (...) theory (NOT) we analyse Beziau’s anti-Slater move and show both its right intuitions and its technical limits. Moreover, we suggest that Slater’s criticism is much akin to a well-known one by Suszko (1975) against the conceivability of many-valued logics. This last criticism has been addressed by Malinowski (1990) and Shramko and Wansing (2005), who developed a family of tenable logical counter-examples to it: trans-Suszkian systems are radically many-valued. This family of new logics has some strange logical features, essentially: each system has more than one consequence operator. We show that a new, deeper part of the aforementioned geometry of logical oppositions (NOT), the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”, generates new logical-geometrical structures, essentially many-valued, which could be a very natural (and intuitive) geometrical counterpart to the “strange”, new, non-Suszkian logics of Malinowski, Shramko and Wansing. By a similar move, the geometry of opposition therefore sheds light both on the foundations of paraconsistent logics and on those of many-valued logics. (shrink)

The hexagon of opposition is an improvement of the square of opposition due to Robert Blanché. After a short presentation of the square and its various interpretations, we discuss two important problems related with the square: the problem of the I-corner and the problem of the O-corner. The meaning of the notion described by the I-corner does not correspond to the name used for it. In the case of the O-corner, the problem is not a wrong-name problem but a no-name (...) problem and it is not clear what is the intuitive notion corresponding to it. We explain then that the triangle of contrariety proposed by different people such as Vasiliev and Jespersen solves these problems, but that we don’t need to reject the square. It can be reconstructed from this triangle of contrariety, by considering a dual triangle of subcontrariety. This is the main idea of Blanché’s hexagon. We then give different examples of hexagons to show how this framework can be useful to conceptual analysis in many different fields such as economy, music, semiotics, identity theory, philosophy, metalogic and the metatheory of the hexagon itself. We finish by discussing the abstract structure of the hexagon and by showing how we can swing from sense to non-sense thinking with the hexagon. (shrink)

The Aristotelian square of oppositions is a well-known diagram in logic and linguistics. In recent years, several extensions of the square have been discovered. However, these extensions have failed to become as widely known as the square. In this paper we argue that there is indeed a fundamental difference between the square and its extensions, viz., a difference in informativity. To do this, we distinguish between concrete Aristotelian diagrams and, on a more abstract level, the Aristotelian geometry. We then introduce (...) two new logical geometries, and develop a formal, well-motivated account of their informativity. This enables us to show that the square is strictly more informative than many of the more complex diagrams. (shrink)

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a (...) “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “ n -opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m ” ( m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid). (shrink)

Some Carrollian posthumous manuscripts reveal, in addition to his famous ‘logical diagrams’, two mysterious ‘logical charts’. The first chart, a strange network making out of fourteen logical sentences a large 2D ‘triangle’ containing three smaller ones, has been shown equivalent—modulo the rediscovery of a fourth smaller triangle implicit in Carroll's global picture—to a 3D tetrahedron, the four triangular faces of which are the 3+1 Carrollian complex triangles. As it happens, such an until now very mysterious 3D logical shape—slightly deformed—has been (...) rediscovered, independently from Carroll and much later, by a logician , a mathematician and a linguist studying the geometry of the ‘opposition relations’, that is, the mathematical generalisations of the ‘logical square’. We show that inside what is called equivalently ‘n-opposition theory’, ‘oppositional geometry’ or ‘logical geometry’, Carroll's first chart corresponds exactly, duly reshap.. (shrink)

The logical hexagon (or hexagon of opposition) is a strange, yet beautiful, highly symmetrical mathematical figure, mysteriously intertwining fundamental logical and geometrical features. It was discovered more or less at the same time (i.e. around 1950), independently, by a few scholars. It is the successor of an equally strange (but mathematically less impressive) structure, the “logical square” (or “square of opposition”), of which it is a much more general and powerful “relative”. The discovery of the former did not raise interest, (...) neither among logicians, nor among philosophers of logic, whereas the latter played a very important theoretical role (both for logic and philosophy) for nearly two thousand years, before falling in disgrace in the first half of the twentieth century: it was, so to say, “sentenced to death” by the so-called analytical philosophers and logicians. Contrary to this, since 2004 a new, unexpected promising branch of mathematics (dealing with “oppositions”) has appeared, “oppositional geometry” (also called “n-opposition theory”, “NOT”), inside which the logical hexagon (as well as its predecessor, the logical square) is only one term of an infinite series of “logical bi-simplexes of dimension m”, itself just one term of the more general infinite series (of series) of the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”. In this paper we recall the main historical and the main theoretical elements of these neglected recent discoveries. After proposing some new results, among which the notion of “hybrid logical hexagon”, we show which strong reasons, inside oppositional geometry, make understand that the logical hexagon is in fact a very important and profound mathematical structure, destined to many future fruitful developments and probably bearer of a major epistemological paradigm change. (shrink)

According to Brouwer’s ‘theory of the exodus of consciousness’, our experience includes ‘egoicity’, a distinct kind of feeling. In this paper, we describe his phenomenology in order to explore and elaborate on the notion of egoic sensations. In the world of perception formed from sensations, some of them are, Brouwer claims, not completely separated or ‘estranged’ from the subject, which is to say they have a certain degree of egoicity. We claim this phenomenon can be explained in terms of the (...) primordial state of consciousness from where the ‘exodus’ starts. Having undertaken the analysis and interpretation of Brouwer’s descriptions and examples of egoic sensations, we provide a formal account of egoicity based on Brouwer’s definition of its relation to estrangement, desire and fear. We show that the four terms can be modeled by a classical and a graded logical hexagon, giving the corresponding axiomatizations. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Avicenna’s conception of the consequence relation. I will consider in particular his categorical and hypothetical logics. I will first analyse his definition of the implication and will show that this relation is not a consequence relation in his frame. Unlike the medieval logicians, he does not distinguish explicitly between material and formal consequences. The arguments discussed in al-Qiyās, where the conclusion is true only in some matters, and would seem close to a material consequence for (...) that reason, are rejected explicitly as not syllogistic. He also rejects the ‘enthymemes’ unless they are complemented by their missing premise and the superfluous premises which, according to him, should promptly be ruled out. It seems then that the consequence relation in his theory is formal. It can be characterized as being ‘productivity in all matters’ or ‘necessary truth preserving’. It is illustrated by some single premise arguments, and above all by all kinds of syllogisms which, in his theory, are more numerous and various than in Aristotle’s one. The syllogism may contain two or more premises, including disjunctive ones. When it is hypothetical, it may lead to several conclusions. The premises may be in conflict, but then, the conclusion is false. He thus rejects the principle according to which ‘anything follows from a contradiction’. But, unlike what some scholars say, he does not admit any connexive principle. In the compound syllogisms, the conclusion follows by steps, each step taking two premises at once. (shrink)

In the recent debate on future contingents and the nature of the future, authors such as G. A. Boyd, W. L. Craig, and E. Hess have made use of various logical notions, such as the Aristotelian relations of contradiction and contrariety, and the ‘open future square of opposition.’ My aim in this paper is not to enter into this philosophical debate itself, but rather to highlight, at a more abstract methodological level, the important role that Aristotelian diagrams can play in (...) organizing and clarifying the debate. After providing a brief survey of the specific ways in which Boyd and Hess make use of Aristotelian relations and diagrams in the debate on the nature of the future, I argue that the position of open theism is best represented by means of a hexagon of opposition. Next, I show that on the classical theist account, this hexagon of opposition ‘collapses’ into a single pair of contradictory statements. This collapse from a hexagon into a pair has several aspects, which can all be seen as different manifestations of a single underlying change. (shrink)

After explaining the interdisciplinary aspect of the series of events organized around the square of opposition since 2007, we discuss papers related to the 4th World Congress on the Square of Opposition which was organized in the Vatican at the Pontifical Lateran University in 2014. We distinguish three categories of work: those dealing with the evolution and development of the theory of opposition, those using the square as a metalogical tool to give a better understanding of various systems of logic (...) and those related with applications of the theory of opposition to conceptual analysis and pedagogy. (shrink)

It is argued that the theory of opposition is in position to contribute as a formal method of conceptual engineering, by means of an increasing dichotomy-making process that augments the number of elements into any structured lexical field. After recalling the roots of this theory and its logical tenets, it is shown how the processes of expansion and contraction of discourse can modify a lexical field and, with it, our collective representation of ideas. This theory can also bring some order (...) to the question of disagreement in philosophical discourse: what do philosophers disagree about; how can we clarify the distinction between verbal disagreement (focused on words) and substantive disagreement (focused on things)? The ensuing construction of conceptual systems will be exemplified through three case studies of philosophy: desire, truth judgment, and the left–right political divide. The construction rules of such systems resort to the theory of opposition, which intends to improve our understanding of what entails either agreement or disagreement about the meaning of concepts. Such a better understanding of philosophical discourse relies on its formalization in terms of closed lexical fields, thereby leading to a comparative analysis of concepts in light of logical relations between their definitions. (shrink)

Les concepts scientifiques, même usés, même désuets, ne sont jamais définitivement périmés. Ils peuvent toujours faire retour dans les conjonctures théoriques ultérieures. Cela tient à la nature très particulière du concept, irréductible aux descriptions positivistes : issus de l’expérience et ayant vocation à en rendre raison, les concepts représentent autant d’arrachements à l’expérience et de survols explicatifs de l’expérience. Des épistémologues antipositivistes du xxe siècle ont été attentifs à de telles caractéristiques philosophiques. On expose ici leur modèle de la conceptualisation (...) scientifique et on le met au travail sur un cas, le concept de tendance, dont on montre il survit à la période de sa première formulation et il mérite de revenir dans les débats psychophysiologiques contemporains. (shrink)

This paper first investigates logical characterizations of different structures of opposition that extend the square of opposition in a way or in another. Blanché’s hexagon of opposition is based on three disjoint sets. There are at least two meaningful cubes of opposition, proposed respectively by two of the authors and by Moretti, and pioneered by philosophers such as J. N. Keynes, W. E. Johnson, for the former, and H. Reichenbach for the latter. These cubes exhibit four and six squares of (...) opposition respectively. We clarify the differences between these two cubes, and discuss their gradual extensions, as well as the one of the hexagon when vertices are no longer two-valued. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the use of these structures of opposition for discussing the comparison of two items. Comparing two items usually involves a set of relevant attributes whose values are compared, and may be expressed in terms of different modalities such as identity, similarity, difference, opposition, analogy. Recently, J.-Y. Béziau has proposed an “analogical hexagon” that organizes the relations linking these modalities. Elementary comparisons may be a matter of degree, attributes may not have the same importance. The paper studies in which ways the structure of the hexagon may be preserved in such gradual extensions. As another illustration of the graded hexagon, we start with the hexagon of equality and inequality due to R. Blanché and extend it with fuzzy equality and fuzzy inequality. Besides, the cube induced by a tetra-partition can account for the comparison of two items in terms of preference, reversed preference, indifference and non-comparability even if these notions are a matter of degree. The other cube, which organizes the relations between the different weighted qualitative aggregation modes, is more relevant for the attribute-based comparison of items in terms of similarity. (shrink)

The article expands the traditional system of concepts used in deontic logic, in order to allow the inclusion of supererogatory behaviour. This requires the development of a deontic decagon. In addition, it is shown how this decagon can be used to interpret deontic terms, e.g. in Islamic Law.

This article describes a specific pedagogical context for an advanced logic course and presents a strategy that might facilitate students’ transition from the object-theoretical to the metatheoretical perspective on logic. The pedagogical context consists of philosophy students who in general have had little training in logic, except for a thorough introduction to syllogistics. The teaching strategy tries to exploit this knowledge of syllogistics, by emphasizing the analogies between ideas from metalogic and ideas from syllogistics, such as existential import, the distinction (...) between contradictories and contraries, and the square of opposition. This strategy helps to improve students’ understanding of metalogic, because it allows the students to integrate these new ideas with their previously acquired knowledge of syllogistics. (shrink)

Burgess-Jackson has recently suggested that the debate between theism and atheism can be represented by means of a classical square of opposition. However, in light of the important role that the position of agnosticism plays in Burgess-Jackson’s analysis, it is quite surprising that this position is not represented in the proposed square of opposition. I therefore argue that the square of opposition should be extended to a slightly larger, more complex Aristotelian diagram, viz., a hexagon of opposition. Since this hexagon (...) does represent the position of agnosticism, it arguably yields a more helpful representation of the theism/atheism debate. It would be naïve to presume that Aristotelian diagrams can, by themselves, lead to a comprehensive solution of debates as intricate as that between theism and atheism. Nevertheless, this paper aims to show that these diagrams — especially if they are chosen carefully — have an important methodological role to play, by systematically organizing and clarifying the debate. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a grammatical account of scalar implicatures. In particular, I submit new evidence in favor of the contextual blindness principle, assumed in recent versions of the grammatical account. I argue that mismatching scalar implicatures can be generated even when the restrictor of the universal quantifier in a universal alternative is contextually known to be empty. The crucial evidence consists of a hitherto unnoticed oddness asymmetry between formally analogous existential sentences with reference failure NPs. I conclude that (...) the generation of mismatching scalar implicatures does not require contextual access. (shrink)