Context: In most jurisdictions where medical-aid-in-dying is available, this option is reserved for individuals suffering from incurable physical conditions. Currently, in Canada, people who have a mental illness are legally excluded from accessing MAiD. Methods: We developed a questionnaire for mental health care providers to better understand their perspectives related to ethical issues in relation to MAiD in the context of severe and persistent suffering caused by mental illness. We used a mixed-methods survey approach, using a concurrent embedded model with (...) both closed and open-ended questions. Findings: 477 healthcare providers from the province of Québec completed the questionnaire. One third of the sample were nurses, one quarter psychologists and one quarter psycho-educators. Nearly half of the respondents considered that people with a severe mental illness should be granted the right to opt for MAiD as a way to end their suffering. Respondents were more likely to feel comfortable listening to the person and participating in discussions related to MAiD for a mental illness than offering care or the means for the person to access MAiD. Most reported that they had not received adequate/sufficient training, education or preparation in order to address ethical questions surrounding MAiD. Conclusions: The findings highlight how extending MAiD to people with a mental illness would affect daily practices for mental healthcare providers who work directly with people who may request MAiD. The survey results also reinforce the need for adequate training and professional education in this complex area of care. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 59-60.

In this paper, I address the question of whether it is ever permissible to grant a request for physician-aid-in-dying (PAD) from an individual suffering from treatment-resistant depression. I assume for the sake of argument that PAD is sometimes permissible. There are three requirements for PAD: suffering, prognosis, and competence. First, an individual must be suffering from an illness or injury which is sufficient to cause serious, ongoing hardship. Second, one must have exhausted effective treatment options, and one’s prospects for recovery (...) must be poor. Third, the individual must be judged competent to request PAD. I argue that many cases of treatment-resistant depression meet the first two requirements. Thus, the key question concerns the third. I consider four features of depression that might compromise a person’s decision-making capacity. Ultimately, I conclude that PAD requests from depressed patients can be permissibly granted in some circumstances. (shrink)

Treatment-resistant depression (TRD) holds centrality in many debates regarding psychiatric euthanasia. Among the strongest reasons cited by opponents of psychiatric euthanasia is the uncertainty behind the irremediability of psychiatric illnesses. According to this argument, conditions that cannot be considered irremediable imply that there are possible remedies that remain for the condition. If there are possible remedies that remain for the condition, then patients with that condition cannot be considered for access to euthanasia. I call this the irremediability requirement (IR). I (...) argue that patients with TRD can, indeed, meet the operationalisation of irremediability in the IR. This is because the irremediability it asks for is not some global or absolute irremediability, but rather a present irremediability based on the current state of medical science. I show this by considering irremediability relating to (1) possible future treatments and (2) not trying presently available alternative treatments. I extend Schuklenk nd van de Vathorst’s argument from parity to terminal malignancies, to show that (1) is an unreasonable expectation for all cases of euthanasia. Taking (2) as a more serious opponent to psychiatric euthanasia, I show how the IR, based on how it is presently operationalised, can be realistically applied to cases of TRD. I do this by further developing Tully’s argument on broad-sense treatment resistance with the robust empirical data from the STAR*D trials. If my argument from Tully’s is valid, then we have reasons to, again, seek parity between the operationalisations of irremediability in terminal malignancies and TRD. (shrink)

Some jurisdictions that have decriminalized assisted dying exclude psychiatric patients on the grounds that their condition cannot be determined to be irremediable, that they are vulnerable and in need of protection, or that they cannot be determined to be competent. We review each of these claims and find that none have been sufficiently well-supported to justify the differential treatment psychiatric patients experience with respect to assisted dying. We find bans on psychiatric patients’ access to this service amount to arbitrary discrimination. (...) Proponents of banning the practice ignore or overlook alternatives to their proposal, like an assisted dying regime with additional safeguards. Some authors have further criticized assisted dying for psychiatric patients by highlighting allegedly problematic practices in those countries which allow it. We address recent evidence from the Netherlands, showing that these problems are either misrepresented or have straightforward solutions. Even if one finds such evidence troubling despite our analysis, other jurisdictions need not adopt every feature of the Dutch system. (shrink)

Canada and California each introduced legislation to permit medical assistance in dying in June, 2016. Each jurisdiction publishes annual reports on the number of deaths that occurred under their respective legislations in the previous years. The numbers are disturbingly different. In 2021, 486 individuals died under California’s End of Life Option. In the same year 10,064 Canadians died under that country’s Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) legislation. California has a slightly larger population than Canada, and while medically assisted deaths as (...) a percentage of total deaths remained virtually unchanged in California from 2020-2021, Canada saw a 30% increase from 2020 to 2021. This essay examines some of the factors propelling Canada down the slippery slope of medically assisted suicide, as well as those that may be keeping California and other US jurisdictions from taking the slide. At a time of increasing pressure in many jurisdictions (both nationally and internationally) to liberalize access to medical assistance in dying, some lessons from this comparative analysis are offered. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying, which includes voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, is legally permissible in a number of jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. Although medical assistance in dying is most commonly provided for suffering associated with terminal somatic illness, some jurisdictions have also offered it for severe and irremediable psychiatric illness. Meanwhile, recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry has led to a renewed understanding of psychiatric illness that emphasises the role of the relation between the person (...) and the external environment in the constitution of mental disorder. In this paper, I argue that this externalist approach to mental disorder highlights an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness. At the level of the clinical assessment, externalism draws attention to potential social and environmental interventions that might have otherwise been overlooked by the standard approach to mental disorder, which may confound the judgement that there is no further reasonable alternative that could alleviate the person’s suffering. At the level of the wider society, externalism underscores how social prejudices and structural barriers that contribute to psychiatric illness constrain the affordances available to people and result in them seeking medical assistance in dying when they otherwise might not have had under better social conditions. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 65-68.

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 3-7.

Melancholia is an attunement of despair and despondency that can involve radical disruptions to temporal experience. In this article, I extrapolate from the existing analyses of melancholic time to examine some of the important existential implications of these temporal disruptions. In particular, I focus on the way in which the desynchronization of melancholic time can complicate the melancholic’s relation to death and, consequently, to the meaning and significance of their life. Drawing on Heidegger’s distinction between death and demise, I argue (...) that melancholic time leaves the melancholic in an impossible state of existing, where they are both unable to live and unable to die. Turning to the role of the physician, I consider the significant role that clinical interventions might have in resynchronizing the melancholic with time and examine these ideas further through a case study on physician-assisted suicide. In so doing, I demonstrate that the desynchronization of melancholic time should indeed be understood as a matter of life and death. (shrink)

Advocates of physician-assisted suicide often argue that, although the provision of PAS is morally permissible for persons with terminal, somatic illnesses, it is impermissible for patients suffering from psychiatric conditions. This claim is justified on the basis that psychiatric illnesses have certain morally relevant characteristics and/or implications that distinguish them from their somatic counterparts. In this paper, I address three arguments of this sort. First, that psychiatric conditions compromise a person’s decision-making capacity. Second, that we cannot have sufficient certainty that (...) a person’s psychiatric condition is untreatable. Third, that the institutionalisation of PAS for mental illnesses presents morally unacceptable risks. I argue that, if we accept that PAS is permissible for patients with somatic conditions, then none of these three arguments are strong enough to demonstrate that the exclusion of psychiatric patients from access to PAS is justifiable. (shrink)

Background Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) sparks debate in several countries, some of which allow or plan to allow MAiD where a mental disorder is the sole underlying medical condition (MAiD-MD). Since MAiD-MD is becoming permissible in a growing number of jurisdictions, there is a need to better understand the moral concerns related to this option. Gaining a better understanding of the moral concerns at stake is a first step towards identifying ways of addressing them so that MAiD-MD can be (...) successfully introduced and implemented, where legislations allow it. Methods Thus, this article aims (1) to better understand the moral concerns regarding MAiD-MD, and (2) to identify potential solutions to promote stakeholders’ well-being. A qualitative thematic review was undertaken, which used systematic keyword-driven search and thematic analysis of content. Seventy-four publications met the inclusion criteria. Results Various moral concerns and proposed solutions were identified and are related to how MAiD-MD is introduced in 5 contexts: (1) Societal context, (2) Healthcare system, (3) Continuum of care, (4) Discussions on the option of MAiD-MD, (5) MAiD-MD practices. We propose this classification of the identified moral concerns because it helps to better understand the various facets of discomfort experienced with MAiD-MD. In so doing, it also directs the various actions to be taken to alleviate these discomforts and promote the well-being of stakeholders. Conclusion The assessment of MAiD-MD applications, which is part of the context of MAiD-MD practices, emerges as the most widespread source of concern. Addressing the moral concerns arising in the five contexts identified could help ease concerns regarding the assessment of MAiD-MD. (shrink)

Although euthanasia and assisted suicide in people with psychiatric disorders is relatively rare, the increasing incidence of EAS requests has given rise to public and political debate. This study aimed to explore support of the public and physicians for euthanasia and assisted suicide in people with psychiatric disorders and examine factors associated with acceptance and conceivability of performing EAS in these patients. A survey was distributed amongst a random sample of Dutch 2641 citizens and 3000 physicians. Acceptance and conceivability of (...) performing EAS, demographics, health status and professional characteristics were measured. Multivariable logistic regression analyses were performed. Of the general public 53% were of the opinion that people with psychiatric disorders should be eligible for EAS, 15% was opposed to this, and 32% remained neutral. Higher educational level, Dutch ethnicity, and higher urbanization level were associated with higher acceptability of EAS whilst a religious life stance and good health were associated with lower acceptability. The percentage of physicians who considered performing EAS in people with psychiatric disorders conceivable ranged between 20% amongst medical specialists and 47% amongst general practitioners. Having received EAS requests from psychiatric patients before was associated with considering performing EAS conceivable. Being female, religious, medical specialist, or psychiatrist were associated with lower conceivability. The majority of the psychiatrists were of the opinion that it is possible to establish whether a psychiatric patient’s suffering is unbearable and without prospect and whether the request is well-considered. The general public shows more support than opposition as to whether patients suffering from a psychiatric disorder should be eligible for EAS, even though one third of the respondents remained neutral. Physicians’ support depends on their specialization; 39% of psychiatrists considered performing EAS in psychiatric patients conceivable. The relatively low conceivability is possibly explained by psychiatric patients often not meeting the eligibility criteria. (shrink)

In many Western jurisdictions, the law presumes that adult persons, and sometimes children that meet certain criteria, are capable of making their own health care decisions; for example, consenting to a particular medical treatment, or consenting to participate in a research trial. But what exactly does it mean to say that a subject has or lacks the requisite capacity to decide? This last question has to do with what is commonly called “decisional capacity,” a central concept in health care law (...) and ethics, and increasingly an independent topic of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Decision-Making Capacity First published Tue Jan 15, 2008; substantive revision Fri Aug 14, 2020 In many Western jurisdictions the law presumes that adult persons, and sometimes children that meet certain criteria, are capable of making their own medical decisions; for example, consenting to a particular medical treatment, or consenting to participate in a research trial. But what exactly does it mean to say that a subject has or lacks the requisite capacity to decide? This question has to do with what (...) is commonly called “decisional capacity”, a central concept in health care law and ethics, and increasingly an independent topic of philosophical inquiry. -/- Decisional capacity can be defined as the ability of subjects to make their own medical decisions. Somewhat similar questions of capacity arise in other contexts, such as capacity to stand trial in a court of law and the ability to make decisions that relate to personal care and finances. However, the history behind the more general legal notions of capacity to stand trial and capacity to manage one’s life is different and operates somewhat differently in law (Roth, Meisel, & Litz 1977; Zapf & Roesch 2005). For the purposes of this discussion the notion of decisional capacity will be limited to medical contexts only; most notably, those where decisions to consent or to refuse treatment or participation in clinical research are concerned. (shrink)