¿Cómo se nos presenta, fenomenológicamente la realidad humana? Es la que vemos diariamente en nuestra vida personal y social. Estamos hechos de materia, formamos parte del universo evolutivo. Además, está formada en nosotros una vida psíquica: la sensación, un sistema de percepciones, una conciencia integrada, una condición de sujeto psicológico; producimos conocimiento, emociones, motivaciones; pero, sobre todo, tenemos una mente que discurre racionalmente y nos instala en un mundo de emociones humanas; esta razón emocional está en la base de la (...) búsqueda de la verdad del universo, del sentido de la vida y de la responsabilidad moral, en la vida personal y social. Nuestra realidad humana es, pues, una realidad personal. Somos personas. Ahora bien, ¿cómo explica hoy la ciencia, la neurología, el hecho de que nuestra realidad humana posea estas propiedades que nos hacen personas? Esto debería poder explicarse desde el mundo físico-biológico. Ahora bien, en concreto, ¿cómo la ciencia hace posible explicar que la evolución nos haya producido a nosotros en nuestra condición de personas? Es decir, ¿cuál es el soporte físico que hace inteligible la ontología psico-bio-física que produce evolutivamente nuestra experiencia personal fenomenológica? Esta es, en último término, todavía hoy la cuestión fundamental de las ciencias humanas. Lo que la ciencia, a saber, la neurología, debe explicar es obvio: el hecho de que haya emergido la sensibilidad-conciencia, nuestra condición de sujetos psíquicos, el conocimiento y la razón emocional; de tal manera que, una vez emergida la razón emocional, lleve por sí misma a constituir la actividad racional y las emociones propias de la persona humana encaminada a construir el sentido de su vida. Estas son las cuestiones que abordamos en este artículo. (shrink)

This article presents and discusses an innovative pedagogical device designed for training pre-service teachers on the nature of science. We endorse an approach according to which aspects of the nature of science should be explicitly discussed in order to be understood by learners. We identified quantum physics, and more precisely the principles of uncertainty and complementarity, as a rich topic suitable for such a discussion. Our training device consists in preparing and staging a new type of theater, the “scientific experimental (...) theater,” based both on the characteristics of Brecht’s theater and Kelly’ cyclic theory of learning. This device was implemented with a group of eight pre-service teachers. According to our observations, the approach favors their involvement and provides them with a frame for expressing their doubts and confronting their points of view. By analyzing their discussion, we identified several aspects of the nature of science that the pre-service teachers raised spontaneously: subjectivity, the social and cultural embeddedness of science, the construction and status of models, and the role of questioning in the development of science. The implemented device therefore appears as an interesting means for stimulating a rich discussion on the nature of science. This study opens new avenues for teachers’ and students’ training devices aimed at developing a critical and reflective stance on science. (shrink)

Ladyman and Ross argue that quantum objects are not individuals and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory, according to which particles do have denite trajectories at all times. However, LR interpret the research by Brown et al. as implying that "raw stuff" or haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, (...) and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we note that Brown et al.'s research does not imply that haecceities are needed. Thus BT remains as a genuine option for those who seek to understand quantum particles as individuals. However, we go on to discuss some problems with BT which led Bohm and Hiley to modify it. This modified version underlines that, due to features such as context-dependence and non-locality, Bohmian particles have a very limited autonomy in situations where quantum effects are non-negligible. So while BT restores the possibility of quantum individuals, it also underlines the primacy of the whole over the autonomy of the parts. The later sections of the paper also examine the Bohm theory in the general mathematical context of symplectic geometry. This provides yet another way of understanding the subtle, holistic and dynamic nature of Bohmian individuals. We finally briefly consider Bohm's other main line of research, the "implicate order", which is in some ways similar to LR's structural realism. (shrink)

In this paper I present and critically discuss the main strategies that Bohr used and could have used to fend off the charge that his interpretation does not provide a clear-cut distinction between the classical and the quantum domain. In particular, in the first part of the paper I reassess the main arguments used by Bohr to advocate the indispensability of a classical framework to refer to quantum phenomena. In this respect, by using a distinction coming from an apparently unrelated (...) philosophical corner, we could say that Bohr is not a revisionist philosopher of physics but rather a descriptivist one in the sense of Strawson. I will then go on discussing the nature of the holistic link between classical measurement apparatuses and observed system that he also advocated. The oft-repeated conclusion that Bohr’s interpretation of the quantum formalism is untenable can only be established by giving his arguments as much force as possible, which is what I will try to do in the following by remaining as faithful as possible to his published work. (shrink)

I show how quantum mechanics, like the theory of relativity, can be understood as a 'principle theory' in Einstein's sense, and I use this notion to explore the approach to the problem of interpretation developed in my book Interpreting the Quantum World.

There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism, which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist, because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist (...) on the level of models. Such a realist position is what I call phenomenological realism. In this paper, and by taking Bohr’s debate with Einstein as a paradigm, I try to prove that Bohr was such a realist. (shrink)

Whenever an adequate theory is found in science, we will still be left with two questions: why this theory rather than some other theory, and how should this theory be interpreted? I argue that these questions can be answered by a theory of system relations. The basic idea is that fundamental characteristics of systems, viz. those arising from the general systemic nature of those systems, cannot be comprehended with the aid of discipline-specific methods. The systems theory required should commence with (...) an analysis of the qualitatively different relations possible between systems, because it is precisely the nature of those relations that determines the basic structures of systems. That the theory of the fundamental system relations and their ontological and epistemological implications is indeed able to provide the answers sought is demonstrated in theoretical physics and Plessner's analysis of the basic structures of plant, animal and human being. (shrink)

In the pursuit of researches and in the reporting of their results, the individual scientist as well as the community of fellow professionals rely implicitly on the researcher embracing the habit of truthfulness, a main pillar of the ethos of science. Failure to adhere to the twin imperatives of candor and integrity will be adjudged intolerable and, by virtue of science’s self-policing mechanisms, rendered the exception to the rule. Yet both as philosophical concepts and in practice, candor and integrity are (...) complex, difficult to define clearly, and difficult to convey easily to those entering on scientific careers. Therefore it is useful to present operational examples of two major scientists who exemplified devotion to candor and integrity in scientific research. (shrink)

I argue that quantum optical experiments that purport to refute Bohr’s principle of complementarity fail in their aim. Some of these experiments try to refute complementarity by refuting the so called particle–wave duality relations, which evolved from the Wootters–Zurek reformulation of BPC. I therefore consider it important for my forgoing arguments to first recall the essential tenets of BPC, and to clearly separate BPC from WZPC, which I will argue is a direct contradiction of BPC. This leads to a need (...) to consider the meaning of particle–wave duality relations and to question their fundamental status. I further argue that particle and wave complementary concepts are on a different footing than other pairs of complementary concepts. (shrink)

Self-fulfillment of theories is argued to be a threat to social science in at least two ways. First, a realist might worry that self-fulfillment constitutes a threat to the idea that social science is a proper science consistent with a realist approach that develops true and successful statements about the world. Second, one might argue that the potential self-fulfilling nature of social science theories potentially undermines the ethical integrity of social scientists. We argue that if one accepts that social science (...) theories are not based on laws akin to those that govern natural reality or acknowledges that if one can predict self-fulfillment via a meta-theory that explains the underlying regularities of the self-fulfilling change, the threat to realism is dismantled. Furthermore, on the basis of these arguments, we show that if one is unable to predict the consequences of a theory, it is difficult to ascribe moral responsibility at the individual level. It is, therefore, not the potential self-fulfillment of theories per se that poses an ethical challenge, in contrast to claims in the literature. (shrink)

The quantum theory of decoherence plays an important role in a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. It governs the descriptive content of claims about values of physical magnitudes and offers advice on when to use quantum probabilities as a guide to their truth. The content of a claim is to be understood in terms of its role in inferences. This promises a better treatment of meaning than that of Bohr. Quantum theory models physical systems with no mention of measurement: it (...) is decoherence, not measurement, that licenses application of Born's probability rule. So quantum theory also offers advice on its own application. I show how this works in a simple model of decoherence, and then in applications to both laboratory experiments and natural systems. Applications to quantum field theory and the measurement problem will be discussed elsewhere. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics studies physical phenomena on a microscopic scale. These phenomena are far beyond the reach of our observation, and the connection between QM's mathematical formalism and the experimental results is very indirect. Furthermore, quantum indeterminism defies common sense. Microphysical experiments have shown that, according to the empirical context, electrons and quanta of light behave as waves and other times as particles, even though it is impossible to design an experiment that manifests both behaviors at the same time. Unlike Newtonian (...) physics, the properties of quantum systems are not all well-defined simultaneously. Moreover, quantum systems are not characterized by their properties, but by a wave function. Although one of the principles of the theory is the uncertainty principle, the trajectory of the wave function is controlled by the deterministic Schrödinger equations. But what is the wave function? Like other theories of the physical sciences, quantum theory assigns states to systems. The wave function is a particular mathematical representation of the quantum state of a physical system, which contains information about the possible states of the system and the respective probabilities of each state. (shrink)

Este artigo destina-se a introduzir a conferência de Heisenberg "A doutrina goethiana e newtoniana das cores à luz da física moderna", proferida em 1941, cuja tradução é aqui publicada. Analisa-se primeiramente o projeto filosófico de uma ordenação da realidade, desenvolvido pelo físico no início da década de 1940, o qual subjaz à discussão sobre as doutrinas das cores em Goethe e Newton. No segundo momento, faz-se uma exposição de algumas das implicações filosóficas da teoria quântica, com ênfase na interpretação da (...) assim denominada escola de Copenhague. Por fim, procura-se mostrar como a querela entre Goethe e Newton é utilizada para defender as abstrações da física teórica dos ataques da assim denominada "física ariana" e, ao mesmo tempo, preservar o valor das considerações intuitivas de Goethe. This paper aims at exposing the Heisenberg's conference "The teachings of Goethe and Newton on colors in the light of modern physics", presented in 1941, whose translation is presented here. In the first place the paper analyzes the philosophical project of an ordination of the reality, developed by the physicist in the early 1940s and which is the basis for the discussion of the "Teachings of Goethe and Newton on colors". Secondly it exposes some philosophical implications of the quantum theory by emphasizing the point of view of the Copenhagen school. Finally, it shows how the dispute between Goethe and Newton is exploited to defend the abstractions of the theoretical physics against the attacks of the so called "German physicists" and, at the same time, to preserve the worth of the Goethe's intuitive analysis. (shrink)

Theory and Reality is about the connection between true theories and the world. A mathematical framefork for such connections is given, and it is shown how that framework can be used to infer facts about the structure of reality from facts about the structure of true theories, The book starts with an overview of various approaches to metaphysics. Beginning with Quine's programmatic "On what there is", the first chapter then discusses the perils involved in going from language to metaphysics. It (...) criticises contemporary intuition-driven metaphysics, comments on naturalistic approaches, and then presents the main proposition put forward in the thesis: we should base metaphysics on model theory. In chapters 2 to 5, mathematical treatments are given of concepts that we need: theories, metaphysics, necessitation and semantics. These are used in chapters 6 and 7 to prove that, seen from a certain informative view point, any true theory will give rise to an isomorphism between that theory and the world. This conclusion is similar to Wittgenstein's in the Tractatus, but differs in that it places the structural relationship on the level of whole theories, rather than single propositions. (shrink)

El principio de correspondencia y el punto de vista de la complementariedad constituyen los sucesivos ejes alrededor de los cuales gira la interpretación de Bohr de la teoría cuántica. En este trabajo sostenemos que el concepto kantiano de analogía resulta un hilo conductor que permite comprender satisfactoriamente tal desarrollo histórico del pensamiento de Bohr. Mostraremos que el principio de correspondencia guía la búsqueda de analogías en la experiencia, mientras que desde el punto de vista de la complementariedad Bohr establece analogías (...) simbólicas. The principle of correspondence and, later, the viewpoint of complementarity are the axes around which Bohr´s interpretation of quantum theory rotates. In this paper we claim that the Kantian notion of analogy enables a satisfactory understanding of such historical development of Bohr's thought. We shall show that the principle of correspondence guides the search for analogies in experience, while from the viewpoint of complementarity Bohr establishes symbolic analogies. (shrink)

The sciences occasionally generate discoveries that undermine their own assumptions. Two such discoveries are characterized here: the discovery of apophenia by cognitive psychology and the discovery that physical systems cannot be locally bounded within quantum theory. It is shown that such discoveries have a common structure and that this common structure is an instance of Priest’s well-known Inclosure Schema. This demonstrates that science itself is dialetheic: it generates limit paradoxes. How science proceeds despite this fact is briefly discussed, as is (...) the connection between our results and the realism-antirealism debate. We conclude by suggesting a position of epistemic modesty. (shrink)

We show that a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the notion of event is defined without reference to measurement or observers, allows to construct a quantum general ontology based on systems, states and events. Unlike the Copenhagen interpretation, it does not resort to elements of a classical ontology. The quantum ontology in turn allows us to recognize that a typical behavior of quantum systems exhibits strong emergence and ontological non-reducibility. Such phenomena are not exceptional but natural, and are (...) rooted in the basic mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Science has always engaged with the worldviews of societies and cultures. The theme is of particular importance at the present time as many national and provincial education authorities are requiring that students learn about the nature of science (NOS) as well as learning science content knowledge and process skills. NOS topics are being written into national and provincial curricula. Such NOS matters give rise to at least the following questions about science, science teaching and worldviews: -/- What is a worldview? (...) -/- Does science have a worldview? -/- Are there specific ontological, epistemological and ethical prerequisites for the conduct of science? -/- Does science lack a worldview but nevertheless have implications for worldviews? -/- How can scientific worldviews and practice be reconciled with seemingly discordant religious and cultural worldviews? -/- In which ways do the worldviews of students impact on their interest and learning of science? -/- Should science teachers engage with the worldviews of students? -/- In addition to the NOS curricular impetus for refining understanding of science and worldviews, there are also pressing cultural and social forces that give prominence to questions about science, worldviews and education. There is something of an avalanche of popular literature on the subject that teachers and students are variously engaged by. Additionally the modernisation and science-based industrialisation of huge non-Western populations whose traditional religions and beliefs are different from those that have been associated with orthodox science make very pressing the questions of whether, and how, science is committed to and hence promotes particular worldviews and contradicts others. Hopefully this chapter, and others in the section, will contribute to a more informed understanding of the relationship between science, worldviews and education and provide assistance to teachers who are routinely engaged with the subject. (shrink)

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

This book is a synthesis of more than three decades of research into the concept of time and its semiotic nature. If traditional philosophy – and philosophy of time should be no exception – in the shadow of advancing biology can be said to have reached an impasse, one important reason for this, in harmony with Wittgenstein’s vision, appears to have been its lack of appropriate tools for explicating language. The present theory of time proceeds, accordingly, from the exploration of (...) temporal expressions in language as an evolutionary fact. It derives in a hypothetical, coherent feedback process of hierarchically ordered distinctions the semantics of time from its biologically dictated perceptual and cognitive-pragmatic origins. The corresponding abductive-regulative model is anchored in the assumption of biological rhythmization as the very foundation of perception and mental/physical action. Understood to originate in space and spatial perspective, time reveals itself as an instrument for temporal perspective on motion (events and situations) in a process of analysis, i.e., discontinuation of chaos made divisible and continuous by the rhythmical screen. Whereas traditional philosophy of time paid attention almost exclusively to the temporal category of tense, the biopragmatic model sees strong evidence in the perspectival nature of time for ascribing the decisive, and probably universal, role in temporal analysis to the linguistic category of aspect. Aspect may, according to the present findings, be assumed to partake already of change-of-state and cause-effect analysis without which man’s adaptation to new situations – and precondition for survival – would be inconceivable. The proposed model of space/time cognition, inspired by Hegelian dialectics, Heidegger-Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle and Peircean logic, makes Kantian a priori superfluous and liberates time from its enigmatic appearance. For the first time in temporal studies it thus appears possible to derive hypothetically linguistic expressions of time all the way from pretemporal, homogeneous continuity effected by biological rhythmization, via pretemporal metonymic (Gestalt), chunk-wise partitioning – as a general precondition for the perception and, based on primary metaphorization, the cognition of things, space and motion – to temporal analysis/discontinuation proper, primarily by aspectual perspective, and the subsequent synthesized, heterogeneous continuity of temporally ordered events. The conception of time, so disastrous for modern temporal logic, i.e., as moving object assigned extension, divisible continuity (‛linearity’) and direction, can be shown to have emerged as a result of secondary metaphorization. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to (...) show, when such an approach is adopted, not only does a new, functionally-grounded answer emerge; we also gain insight into the adaptive significance of the process proposed to underwrite our belief in the memorial status of a mental state (i.e.,autonoetic awareness). (shrink)

The ArgumentThe aim of this paper is to provide a critical perspective for Einstein's opposition to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, by analyzing the ingenious rhetoric of Bohr's principle of complementarity. I argue that what Bohr presents as arguments of “inevitability” are in fact merely arguments for the consistency of the quantum-mechanical scheme. Einstein's resistance to being persuaded by this potent technique of argumentation, and his rejection of Bohr's interpretation of quantum physics, appear consequently as an eminently reasonable position (...) and not as a conservative stand, as it is often presented by the adherents of the Copenhagen orthodoxy. (shrink)

The study of world politics in theoretical and empirical terms has recently witnessed an upsurge of interest in the question of complexity, drawing upon complexity theory; particularly, renewed interest in emergent properties and the aleatory nature of the political. This article seeks to demonstrate, primarily via an exploration of the work of Gilles Deleuze and Manuel DeLanda, the possibilities for a type of thinking about the ‘international’ that utilises the notion of social complexity as its primary mode of enframing the (...) major dimensions to world politics. As such it argues for a theoretical reconceptualisation of the system of states, markets and societies as individual and overlapping scale-entities, each possessing causal agency, with overlapping and enmeshed boundaries, situated in their historical and concrete manifestations. The reified concepts of polity, economy and society are re-cast in the language of assemblage theory as ordering, exchanging and cohering, thus highlighting process in world politics and providing a theoretical base better equipped to cope with complex social processes and practices. And this I conclude clears the way to re-situate international space theoretically as a complex adaptive system. (shrink)

It is argued that the validity of the predictions of quantum theory in certain spincorrelation experiments entails a violation of Einstein's locality idea that no causal influence can act outside the forward light cone. First, two preliminary arguments suggesting such a violation are reviewed. They both depend, in intermediate stages, on the idea that the results of certain unperformed experiments are physically determinate. The second argument is entangled also with the problem of the meaning of “physical reality.” A new argument (...) having neither of these characteristics is constructed. It is based strictly on the orthodox ideas of Bohr and Heisenberg, and has no realistic elements, or other ingredients, that are alien to orthodox quantum thinking. (shrink)

Stem cells have the capacity both to self‐renew and to give rise to differentiated progeny, and are vital to the organization of multicellular organisms. Stem cells raise a number of fundamental questions regarding lineage restriction and cellular differentiation, and they hold enormous promise for cell‐based therapies. Here I propose a theoretical framework for stem cell biology based on the concepts of autopoiesis (self‐production) and complementarity. I argue that stem cells are pivotal in the self‐production of the organism and that we (...) need complementary approaches to understand their probabilistic behavior. I discuss how this framework generates testable hypotheses regarding stem‐cell functions. BioEssays 26:1013‐1016, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The quantum theory of decoherence plays an important role in a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. It governs the descriptive content of claims about values of physical magnitudes and offers advice on when to use quantum probabilities as a guide to their truth. The content of a claim is to be understood in terms of its role in inferences. This promises a better treatment of meaning than that offered by Bohr. Quantum theory models physical systems with no mention of measurement: (...) it is decoherence, not measurement, that licenses application of Born’s probability rule. So quantum theory also offers advice on its own application. I show how this works in a simple model of decoherence, and then in applications to both laboratory experiments and natural systems. Applications to quantum field theory and the measurement problem will be discussed elsewhere. (shrink)

The idea of ensembles which are both pre- and post-selected was introduced by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz and developed by Aharonov and his school. To derive formulae for the probabilities of outcomes of a measurement performed on such an ensemble at a time intermediate between pre-selection and post-selection, the latter group introduces a two-vector formulation of quantum mechanics, one vector propagating in the forward direction in time and one in the backward direction. The formulae which they obtain by this radical (...) generalization are vindicated by a rigorous derivation using Bayes’s theorem together with standard quantum mechanical predictions regarding ensembles that are only pre-selected. Their own two-vector derivation, however, suffers from a serious lacuna. (shrink)

The standard interpretation of quantum physics (QP) and some recent generalizations of this theory rest on the adoption of a rerificationist theory of truth and meaning, while most proposals for modifying and interpreting QP in a “realistic” way attribute an ontological status to theoretical physical entities (ontological realism). Both terms of this dichotomy are criticizable, and many quantum paradoxes can be attributed to it. We discuss a new viewpoint in this paper (semantic realism, or briefly SR), which applies both to (...) classical physics (CP) and to QP. and is characterized by the attempt of giving up verificationism without adopting ontological realism. As a first step, we construct a formalized observative language L endowed with a correspondence truth theory. Then, we state a set of axioms by means of L which hold both in CP and in QP. and construct a further language Lv which can express bothtestable andtheoretical properties of a given physical system. The concepts ofmeaning andtestability do not collapse in L and Le hence we can distinguish between semantic and pragmatic compatibility of physical properties and define the concepts of testability and conjoint testability of statements of L and Le. In this context a new metatheoretical principle (MGP) is stated, which limits the validity of empirical physical laws. By applying SR (in particular. MGP) to QP, one can interpret quantum logic as a theory of testability in QP, show that QP is semantically incomplete, and invalidate the widespread claim that contextuality is unavoidable in QP. Furthermore. SR introduces some changes in the conventional interpretation of ideal measurements and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. (shrink)

A number of papers on wave-particle duality has appeared since the two-prism experiment was performed by Mizobuchi and Ohtake, based on a suggestion by Ghose, Home, and Agarwal. Against this backdrop, the present paper provides further clarification of the key issues involved in the analysis of the two-prism experiment. In the process, we present an overview of wave-particle duality vis-a vis Bohr's complementarity principle.

We examine, in the context of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedankenexperiment, problems associated with state reduction and with nonlocal influences according to different interpretations of quantum mechanics, when attempts are made to apply these interpretations in the relativistic domain. We begin by considering the significance of retrodiction within four different interpretations of quantum mechanics, and show that three of these interpretations, if applied in a relativistic context, can lead to ambiguities in their description of a process. We consider ways of dealing with (...) these ambiguities, in particular focussing on the “preferred frame” hypothesis. We then re-examine an argument involving nonlocal measurements which claimed that the preferred frame hypothesis is not tenable, and show that this argument does not in fact necessitate a rejection of the preferred frame. We then suggest that, to avoid confusion, the preferred frame could be extended to cover unitary interactions as well as state reductions. We conclude with a brief examination of a proposal that state reduction should take effect across the backward light cone of a measurement event. (shrink)

A rather recent interpretation of quantum mechanics, known under the various names of consistent histories, decohering histories, or logical interpretation, has brought interpretation into a standard deductive theory and is now investigated in many places. A key difference with the Copenhagen interpretation is the status of classical physics, now derived completely from quantum principles in both its dynamical and logical aspects. After describing briefly this new interpretation in its essentials, leaving aside technical details, it is shown how its consequences in (...) epistemology differ drastically from the familiar outcomes of the Copenhagen interpretation, leading in particular to a well-defined theory of knowledge. Some more speculative philosophical consequences associated with the unsolved problem of actuality are also mentioned. (shrink)

The perception of reality by biosystems is based on different, and in certain respects more effective, principles than those utilized by the more formal procedures of science. As a result, what appears as random pattern to the scientific method can be meaningful pattern to a living organism. The existence of this complementary perception of reality makes possible in principle effective use by organisms of the direct interconnections between spatially separated objects shown to exist in the work of J. S. Bell.

The argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen is reviewed with attention to logical structure and character of assumptions. Bohr's reply is discussed. Bell's contribution is formulated without use of hidden variables, and efforts to equate hidden variables to realism are critically examined. An alternative derivation of nonlocality that makes no use of hidden variables, microrealism, counterfactual definiteness, or any other assumption alien to orthodox quantum thinking is described in detail, with particular attention to the quartet or broken-square question.

Space and time are discussed in connection with the future of quantum theory.

Niels Bohr's arguments indicating the non-applicability of quantum methodology to the study of the ultimate details of life, given in his bookAtomic Physics and Human Knowledge, conflict with the commonly held opposite view. The bases for the usual beliefs are examined and shown to have little validity; significant differences do exist between the living organism and the type of system studied successfully in the physics laboratory. Dealing with living organisms in quantum-mechanical terms with the same degree of rigor as is (...) normal for non-living systems would seem not to be possible without considering also questions of the origins of life and of the universe. (shrink)

If the energy-absorbing radio-frequency spin-flipping device used in perfect crystal neutron interferometry is an intermediate measuring device, then the experimental results contradict the associated wave packet collapse and support the real existence of the de Broglie pilot waves in both arms while the neutron travels in only one.

We bring out the fact that the essential new quality implied by the quantum theory is nonlocality; i.e., that a system cannot be analyzed into parts whose basic properties do not depend on the state of the whole system. This is done in terms of the causal interpretation of the quantum theory, proposed by one of us (D.B.) in 2952, involving the introduction of the “quantum potential.” We show that this approach implies a new universal type of description, in which (...) the standard or canonical form is always supersystem-system-subsystem; and this leads to the radically new notion of unbroken wholeness of the entire universe. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of extending these notions to the relativity domain, and in so doing, we indicate a novel concept of time, in terms of which relativity and quantum theory may eventually be brought together. (shrink)

The working situation prevailing in theoretical and experimental physics today is held to be inseparable from the interpretation of quantum theory, and constitutes an embodiment of its implicit difficulties. Such an understanding of the present situation in fundamental physics provides a quite different basis for ideas than the formulation of alternative courses of action (experiments) or alternative forms of knowledge (theories), which proceeds from the belief in a full separation of theory from experiment in this field. It is argued that (...) this underlying belief is not well founded. One must therefore consider the technical details of the field together with its foundations, and thus especially the situation produced by fundamental physics, including, in particular, the growth of high-energy technology, which exerts a determining influence on the further course of the subject. (shrink)

A systematic effort is here made to express some of the general results of quantum mechanics in a conceptual form closer to ordinary language than is the case with most modern physics. Many of the implications of the theory appear much more clearly thereby, in particular the fact that the laws of quantum mechanics are only statistical propositions about classes, not referring to individual objects. Conversely, the microscopic structure of an object cannot be precisely defined in quantum mechanical terms. To (...) say that an object has a definite microscopic structure is an operationally meaningless statement; it is on the same level as saying in relativity that a selected coordinate system is “at rest.” This raises the need for a “theory of matching”: What is the best statement about the structure of an object, given that the tools of description are only statistical? A technique is known for this: the theory of inductive probabilities. There is no longer one true description but a manifold of statistical descriptions, some of which have a greater likelihood of being satisfactory than others. The main concrete application of this type of conceptual reasoning lies in its power to clean out the speculative underbrush which so far has prevented the transition from theoretical physics to theoretical biology. (shrink)

A reproducibility principle is formulated and adopted as the guiding criterion for the acceptance of an experimental procedure as a simultaneous measurement of several observables. It is pointed out that this criterion can be applied to classical as well as quantum physics, and that it incorporates compatible as well as incompatible observables. The concept of fuzzy probability measure is presented as a possible mathematical tool for the description of statistical processes involving measurements of incompatible observables.