The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of category theory in the foundations of mathematics. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding this issue. A standard philosophical strategy in the face of a situation of this kind is to draw various distinctions and in this way show that the confusion rests on divergent conceptions of what the foundations of mathematics ought to be. This is the strategy adopted in the present paper. It is divided into 5 (...) sections. We first show that already in the set theoretical framework, there are different dimensions to the expression foundations of. We then explore these dimensions more thoroughly. After a very short discussion of the links between these dimensions, we move to some of the arguments presented for and against category theory in the foundational landscape. We end up on a more speculative note by examining the relationships between category theory and set theory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to put into context the historical, foundational and philosophical significance of category theory. We use our historical investigation to inform the various category-theoretic foundational debates and to point to some common elements found among those who advocate adopting a foundational stance. We then use these elements to argue for the philosophical position that category theory provides a framework for an algebraic in re interpretation of mathematical structuralism. In each context, what we aim to show (...) is that, whatever the significance of category theory, it need not rely upon any set-theoretic underpinning. (shrink)

Structuralism has recently moved center stage in philosophy of mathematics. One of the issues discussed is the underlying logic of mathematical structuralism. In this paper, I want to look at the dual question, namely the underlying structures of logic. Indeed, from a mathematical structuralist standpoint, it makes perfect sense to try to identify the abstract structures underlying logic. We claim that one answer to this question is provided by categorical logic. In fact, we claim that the latter can be seen—and (...) probably should be seen—as being a structuralist approach to logic and it is from this angle that categorical logic is best understood. (shrink)

Fefermans argument is indeed convincing in a certain context, it can be dissolved entirely by modifying the context appropriately.

5.5. Every topos is linguistic: the equivalence theorem.

The purpose of this paper is to justify the claim that Topos theory and Logic (the latter interpreted in a wide enough sense to include Model theory and Set theory) may interact to the advantage of both fields. Once the necessity of utilizing toposes (other than the topos of Sets) becomes apparent, workers in Topos theory try to make this task as easy as possible by employing a variety of methods which, in the last instance, find their justification in metatheorems (...) from Logic. Some concrete instances of this assertion will be given in the form of simple proofs that certain theorems of Algebra hold in any (Grothendieck) topos, in order to illustrate the various techniques that are used. In the other direction, Topos theory can also be a useful tool in Logic. Examples of this are independence proofs in (classical as well as intuitionistic) Set theory, as well as transfer methods in the presence of a sheaf representation theorem, the latter applied, in particular, to model theoretic properties of certain theories. (shrink)

Paul Cohen’s method of forcing, together with Saul Kripke’s related semantics for modal and intuitionistic logic, has had profound effects on a number of branches of mathematical logic, from set theory and model theory to constructive and categorical logic. Here, I argue that forcing also has a place in traditional Hilbert-style proof theory, where the goal is to formalize portions of ordinary mathematics in restricted axiomatic theories, and study those theories in constructive or syntactic terms. I will discuss the aspects (...) of forcing that are useful in this respect, and some sample applications. The latter include ways of obtaining conservation results for classical and intuitionistic theories, interpreting classical theories in constructive ones, and constructivizing model-theoretic arguments. (shrink)

By a classifying topos for a first-order theory , we mean a topos such that, for any topos models of in correspond exactly to open geometric morphisms → . We show that not every first-order theory has a classifying topos in this sense, but we characterize those which do by an appropriate ‘smallness condition’, and we show that every Grothendieck topos arises as the classifying topos of such a theory. We also show that every first-order theory has a conservative extension (...) to one which possesses a classifying topos, and we obtain a Heyting-valued completeness theorem for infinitary first-order logic. (shrink)

Using recent results in topos theory, two systems of higher-order logic are shown to be complete with respect to sheaf models over topological spaces- so -called "topological semantics." The first is classical higher-order logic, with relational quantification of finitely high type; the second system is a predicative fragment thereof with quantification over functions between types, but not over arbitrary relations. The second theorem applies to intuitionistic as well as classical logic.

The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...) Most articles are contributions to current philosophical debates, but contributions also include some new mathematical results, important historical surveys, and a translation by Wilfrid Hodges of a key work of arabic logic. (shrink)

Volume 40, Issue 4, November 2019, Page 389-402.

In this paper we study the logic , which is first-order logic extended by quantification over functions (but not over relations). We give the syntax of the logic as well as the semantics in Heyting categories with exponentials. Embedding the generic model of a theory into a Grothendieck topos yields completeness of with respect to models in Grothendieck toposes, which can be sharpened to completeness with respect to Heyting-valued models. The logic is the strongest for which Heyting-valued completeness is known. (...) Finally, we relate the logic to locally connected geometric morphisms between toposes. (shrink)

In this paper we study the logic $\mathcal{L}^\lambda_{\omega\omega}$, which is first-order logic extended by quantification over functions . We give the syntax of the logic as well as the semantics in Heyting categories with exponentials. Embedding the generic model of a theory into a Grothendieck topos yields completeness of $\mathcal{L}^\lambda_{\omega\omega}$ with respect to models in Grothendieck toposes, which can be sharpened to completeness with respect to Heyting-valued models. The logic $\mathcal{L}^\lambda_{\omega\omega}$ is the strongest for which Heyting-valued completeness is known. Finally, (...) we relate the logic to locally connected geometric morphisms between toposes. (shrink)

We consider formal theories synonymous with various free categories . Their Lindenbaum algebras may be described as the lattices of subobjects of a terminator. These theories have intuitionistic logic. We show that the Lindenbaum algebras of second order and higher order arithmetic , and set theory are not isomorphic to the Lindenbaum algebras of first order theories such as arithmetic . We also show that there are only five kernels of representations of the free Heyting algebra on one generator in (...) these Lindenbaum algebras. (shrink)

We establish a course-of-values induction principle for K-finite sets in intuitionistic type theory. Using this principle, we prove a pigeonhole principle conjectured by Bénabou and Loiseau. We also comment on some variants of this pigeonhole principle.

We introduce the notion of Boolean measure algebra. It can be described shortly using some standard notations and terminology. If B is any Boolean algebra, let BN denote the algebra of sequences , xn B. Let us write pk BN the sequence such that pk = 1 if i K and Pk = 0 if k < i. If x B, denote by x* BN the constant sequence x* = . We define a Boolean measure algebra to be a Boolean (...) algebra B with an operation μ:BN → B such that μ = 0 and μ = x. Any Boolean measure algebra can be used to model non-principal ultrafilters in a suitable sense. Also, we can build effectively the initial Boolean measure algebra. This construction is related to the closed open Ramsey Theorem 193–198.). (shrink)

We define and investigate Heyting-valued interpretations for Constructive Zermelo–Frankel set theory . These interpretations provide models for CZF that are analogous to Boolean-valued models for ZF and to Heyting-valued models for IZF. Heyting-valued interpretations are defined here using set-generated frames and formal topologies. As applications of Heyting-valued interpretations, we present a relative consistency result and an independence proof.