Can humans acquire knowledge of ultimate reality, even significant or comprehensive knowledge? I argue that for all we know we can, and that is so whether ultimate reality is divine or non-divine. My strategy involves arguing that we are ignorant, in the sense of lacking public or shared knowledge, about which possibilities, if any, obtain for humans to acquire knowledge of ultimate reality. This follows from a deep feature of our epistemic situation—that our current psychology strongly constrains what we can (...) conceive about the extent to which human intellectual and other psychological capacities might develop in the future. This mean that many possibilities for such development remain open to us epistemically, including the possibility that we might come to understand vastly more about ultimate reality than we currently do, even if ultimate reality is divine. I also argue that there is room to rationally hope that that is so. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, transhumanism is a movement seeking to advance the cause of post-humanity. It advocates using science and technology for a reconstruction of the human condition sufficiently radical to call into question the appropriateness of calling it “human” anymore. While there is not universal agreement among transhumanists as to the best path to this goal, the general outline is clear enough. Advances in genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, robotics and nanotechnology will make possible the achievement of the Baconian vision of “the (...) relief of man’s estate,” as they allow us to conquer disease, eliminate unhappiness, end scarcity and postpone, perhaps indefinitely, death itself. But fulfilling such long-standing dreams is only the beginning of what our new powers will make possible. Left to itself, the present trajectory of technological development necessarily aims at a future incomprehensible to beings such as we are – at no distant date an evolutionary leap in the way intelligence is embodied, and what it can accomplish. Transhumanism seeks to make sure no atavistic scruple obstructs this momentum, and to maximize its benefits and minimize its admitted risks. While there is no lack of illuminating print works advocating transhumanism, that its public face should be on the World Wide Web is as much a matter of course as once would have been the use by similar movements of the printed broadside or the public lecture. On the websites of the World Transhumanist Association (www. transhumanism.org) and the Extropy Institute (www.extropy. org) – premier among transhumanism’s many organizations – one finds authoritative statements explaining and justifying the transhumanist project. If transhumanism were primarily an academic school or a professional association, it would not be entirely fair to turn to these admittedly popular presentations for a critical look at the transhumanist vision. But as these are the documents by which transhumanism presents itself to the public as a movement, and through which it hopes to gain adherents, it is legitimate to make.... (shrink)

The article deals with the philosophical and ethical implications of transhumanism and human enhancement techniques. It considers how enhancement and therapy are two different types of biomedical intervention. It then looks at the implementation of these ideas in the military sector. It analyses various standpoints and views on transhumanism, the benefits and risks of using newly acquired scientific knowledge to improve and alter naturally deficient human nature. The need for ethical reflection and argumentation is emphasized; new scientific discoveries can dramatically (...) change our experience of the world around us and may present a huge risk to mankind if left unchecked and not critically discussed. The article reflects on the dangers and risks of human enhancement and its possible consequences on the battlefield as well as the broader contexts and implications. The article also considers which criteria would be suitable to ensure beneficial and less controversial enhancements are carefully selected and to enable these to be distinguished from more dangerous practices that change the human body and/or mind. The aim is to consider and evaluate the possible benefits and risks of using enhancements for military purposes and to identify possible criteria for their justification and/or rejection. (shrink)

Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (whose ranks include such diverse writers as Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin, and Bill McKibben) are generally (...) opposed to the use of technology to modify human nature. A central idea in bioconservativism is that human enhancement technologies will undermine our human dignity. To forestall a slide down the slippery slope towards an ultimately debased ‘posthuman’ state, bioconservatives often argue for broad bans on otherwise promising human enhancements. This paper distinguishes two common fears about the posthuman and argues for the importance of a concept of dignity that is inclusive enough to also apply to many possible posthuman beings. Recognizing the possibility of posthuman dignity undercuts an important objection against human enhancement and removes a distortive double standard from our field of moral vision. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades. [1] It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology and artificial intelligence.

This paper addresses the seemingly insurmountable challenges the problem of personal identity raises for the prospect of radical human enhancement and synthetic consciousness. It argues that conceptions of personal identity rooted in psychological continuity akin to those proposed by Parfit and the Buddha may not provide the sort of grounding that many transhumanists chasing the dream of life extension think that they do if they rest upon ontologies that assume an incompatibility between identity and change. It also suggests that process (...) ontologies that take change to be primary, such as those that align with contemporary systems biology, offer a better way out of the personal identity dilemma. But the solution in this case, which regards biological organisms as processes rather than things, may constrain the possibility of biologically inspired superintelligent aliens (BISAs), which Schneider (following Bostrom 2014) posits as possibly the most common form of (extraterrestrial) superintelligence in the universe. (shrink)

What are and where are the ethical limits of neuroeducation? The article reflects on a necessary question for the evolution of cognitive processes through critical deliberation, the delimitation of boundaries and the estimation of progress. On the one hand, it argues that the experimental turn could call into question the ethical and humanistic goal of education; on the other hand, it argues that a systematic renunciation of neuroscientific advances would also mean abandoning the quest for human flourishing. The humanities alone (...) do not provide the biopsychosocial approach from which we must understand our self-realisation. Thus, the first of the limits that is the origin of all the others arises from a scientific-humanist dilemma. The new boundaries to be delimited are the neuroscientific implications in themselves and how these are translated into educational, if they were to be valid in this field. Here neuromyths play an important role. It is precisely neuroethics as an applied ethics or branch of bioethics that takes up these aspects through neuroeducational ethics and educational neuroethics. In its fundamental branch, this discipline opens up the debate on moral neuroeducation. But the possibility of reducing morality and all that we are to our neural bases leads to new limits. To overcome them, he highlights the potential of a sociocultural and biological symbiosis with the notions of 'neuroculture' and 'proactive epigenesis'. Finally, the essay deliberates on the more speculative boundaries between what we are and our possibilities for understanding it on the basis of transhumanism. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________________________¿Cuále s son y dónde están los límites éticos de la neuroeducación? El artículo reflexiona sobre una cuestión necesaria para el devenir de los procesos cognitivos mediante la deliberación crítica, la delimitación de fronteras y la estimación del progreso. Su hilo argumental proyecta, por un lado, que el giro experimental podría poner en entredicho el objetivo ético y humanista de la educación; por otro lado, que una renuncia sistemática a los avances de las neurociencias supondría, igualmente, abandonar la búsqueda del florecimiento humano. Las humanidades solo no brindan el enfoque biopsicosocial desde el que hemos de entender nuestra autorrealización. Por ende, el primero de los límites que es origen de todos los demás surge dada una disyuntiva científico-humanista. Los nuevos confines a delimitar subyacen de las implicaciones neurocientíficas en sí mismas y de cómo estas se trasladan a la praxis escolar, si es que tuviesen validez en este campo. Aquí los neuromitos juegan un papel importante. Precisamente, la neuroética como ética aplicada o rama de la bioética recoge estos aspectos mediante la ética neuroeducativa y la neuroética educativa. En su rama fundamental, dicha disciplina abre el debate sobre la neuroeducación moral. Pero la posibilidad de reducir lo moral y todo lo que somos a nuestras bases neurales deriva en nuevos límites. Para superarlos, destaca el potencial de una simbiosis sociocultural y biológica con las nociones de ‘neurocultura’ y de ‘epigénesis proactiva’. Finalmente, el ensayo delibera sobre los límites más especulativos entre lo que somos y nuestras posibilidades para entenderlo en base al transhumanismo._____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______HOW TO CITE / CÓMO CITAR: Castillo, P. (2023). Los límites éticos de la neuroeducación. Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria, 35(2), 191-208. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone, en primer lugar, analizar algunos de los cambios producidos en el concepto de naturaleza humana a lo largo de la historia y, en segundo lugar, realizar una reflexión bioética acerca de las intervenciones planteadas por el transhumanismo y el enhancement o mejoramiento humano. Después de repasar la génesis y principales cambios transcendentales del concepto de physis aplicado al hombre, concluiremos que hoy en día el concepto de naturaleza humana, tal y como lo entiende el transhumanismo, podría (...) alinearse por analogía con la modernidad líquida. Entenderíamos, así, la naturaleza humana como una “naturaleza líquida”, permanentemente en cambio. Esto plantea numerosos problemas, no solo de índole ética o biomédica, sino sobre todo de carácter antropológico y metafísico, en el modo de entender al hombre, y condiciona toda valoración bioética acerca de las intervenciones que supuestamente mejoran la humanidad. (shrink)

Today’s technological-scientific prospect of posthumanity simultaneously evokes and defies historical understanding. On the one hand, it implies a historical claim of an epochal transformation concerning posthumanity as a new era. On the other, by postulating the birth of a novel, better-than-human subject for this new era, it eliminates the human subject of modern Western historical understanding. In this article, I attempt to understand posthumanity as measured against the story of humanity as the story of history itself. I examine the fate (...) of humanity as the central subject of history in three consecutive steps: first, by exploring how classical philosophies of history achieved the integrity of the greatest historical narrative of history itself through the very invention of humanity as its subject; second, by recounting how this central subject came under heavy criticism by postcolonial and gender studies in the last half-century, targeting the universalism of the story of humanity as the greatest historical narrative of history; and third, by conceptualizing the challenge of posthumanity against both the story of humanity and its criticism. Whereas criticism fragmented history but retained the possibility of smaller-scale narratives, posthumanity does not doubt the feasibility of the story of humanity. Instead, it necessarily invokes humanity, if only in order to be able to claim its supersession by a better-than-human subject. In that, it represents a fundamental challenge to the modern Western historical condition and the very possibility of historical narratives – small-scale or large-scale, fragmented or universal. (shrink)

Because of accelerating technological progress, humankind may be rapidly approaching a critical phase in its career. In addition to well-known threats such as nuclear holocaust, the propects of radically transforming technologies like nanotech systems and machine intelligence present us with unprecedented opportunities and risks. Our future, and whether we will have a future at all, may well be determined by how we deal with these challenges. In the case of radically transforming technologies, a better understanding of the transition dynamics from (...) a human to a "posthuman" society is needed. Of particular importance is to know where the pitfalls are: the ways in which things could go terminally wrong. While we have had long exposure to various personal, local, and endurable global hazards, this paper analyzes a recently emerging category: that of existential risks. These are threats that could case our extinction or destroy the potential of Earth - originating intelligent life. Some of these threats are relatively well known while others, including some of the gravest, have gone almost unrecognized. Existential risks have a cluster of features that make ordinary risk management ineffective. A final section of this paper discusses several ethical and policy implications. A clearer understanding of the threat picture will enable us to formulate better strategies. (shrink)

There are at least three dimensions to rights. We may have and lack freedom to 1) be, 2) do, and 3) have. These dimensions reformulate Locke’s categories, and are further complicated by placing them within the context of domains such as natural or civil rights. Here the question of the origins of rights is not addressed, but issues concerning how we may contextualize them are discussed. Within the framework developed, this paper makes use of Actor-Network Theory and Enlightenment values to (...) examine the multidimensionality and appropriateness of animal rights and human rights for posthumans. The core position here is that rights may be universal and constant, but they can only be accessed within a matrix of relative cultural dimensions. This will be true for posthumans, and their rights will be relative to human rights and dependent on human and posthuman responsibilities. (shrink)

advocating the use of biotechnology to abolish suffering throughout the living world. At that time, Nick was a philosophy postgrad in London. He read the manifesto and fired off several incisive questions. Later we met up. I harangued Nick into getting a website. Nick then sounded me out about setting up a kind of umbrella organization for transhumanists - and overcame my doubts about whether overcoming suffering is really at the heart of a transhumanist agenda.

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I (...) suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

This article reflects on whether today, there is a need for a ‘new’ educational ideal of rationality. To articulate that objective, a critical analysis is made of the pedagogical ideas underlying two conflicting trends: transhumanism and critical thinking. First, the distinctive identity of the transhumanist philosophical movement is examined in terms of its partial ascription to, and, given its attempts to overcome it, its renunciation of Humanism. In the face of the apparent promises and pitfalls that techno-science portends for pedagogical (...) discourse, a distrust of reason is imminent. Contrary to such an assumption, critical thinking, as the embodiment of rationality in Israel Scheffler’s conception, illuminates the inconsistencies of scientific imperialism that conceal the moral-rational aspects of teaching. In view of the above, the discussion focuses on the relationship between theory and practice, justification and commitment, fallibility and wisdom; in short, between the moral and the rational of any educational ideal to be proposed.___________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________ -/- Questo articolo riflette sulla necessità di un “nuovo” ideale educativo di razionalità. Per articolare tale obiettivo, viene effettuata un’analisi critica delle idee pedagogiche alla base di due tendenze in conflitto: il transumanesimo e il pensiero critico. In primo luogo, si esamina l’identità distintiva del movimento filosofico transumanista in termini di parziale ascrizione e, visti i suoi tentativi di superamento, di rinuncia all’Umanesimo. Di fronte alle apparenti promesse e insidie che la tecno-scienza comporta per il discorso pedagogico, si profila una sfiducia nella ragione. Contrariamente a tale ipotesi, il pensiero critico, in quanto incarnazione della razionalità nella concezione di Israel Scheffler, illumina le incongruenze dell’imperialismo scientifico che nascondono gli aspetti morali-razionali dell’insegnamento. Alla luce di quanto detto, la discussione si concentra sul rapporto tra teoria e pratica, giustificazione e impegno, fallibilità e saggezza; in breve, tra morale e razionale di qualsiasi ideale educativo da proporre.___________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________HOW TO CITE / CÓMO CITAR: Castillo, P. (2023). Does There Exist a Need for a ‘New’ Educational Ideal of Rationality? The Crossroads between Transhumanism and Israel Scheffler’s Conception of Critical Thinking. Encyclopaideia: Journal of Phenomenology and Education, 27(66), 49-61. (shrink)

The authors studied the problem of techno-humanitarian balance. A difference was found in approaches to the study of technological progress and its impact on the development of society. The ideas of transhumanism, existential risk, etc. suggested by Nick Bostrom, David Pearce, etc. provided a utilitarian attitude towards new technologies. The representatives of transhumanism proceeded from the idea that any technology is part of human nature and expanded its presence in life. Nazaretyan’s ideas were based on the opposite premise. Namely, man (...) and technology have a different nature of origin. Hence, the need arises to adapt to a non-native environment and create certain restraining mechanisms. The societies that failed to adapt to the exponential spread of information and communication technologies in time undermined the natural and/or geopolitical foundations of their existence. In turn, the societies that have adapted to new technologies have achieved sustainable development and prosperity. The authors used the comparative method of research, as well as methods of modelling, analysis, and synthesis. The study resulted in the testing of two models of the relationship between society and technology, built on the Nazaretyan hypothesis and the Bostrom concept. The test results proved the effectiveness of the model, built on the concept of Bostrom. The model presents the general dynamic nature of man and technology. (shrink)

Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims about (...) the physical limits of computation and yet lack good evidence for claims about our own physical constitution. I then show that two ways of modifying the argument so as to remove the need for this presupposition fail to preserve the original conclusion. Finally, I argue that, while there are unusual circumstances in which Bostrom’s selective scepticism might be reasonable, we do not currently find ourselves in such circumstances. There is no good reason to uphold the selective scepticism the Simulation Argument presupposes. There is thus no good reason to believe its conclusion. (shrink)

Der soziotechnische Wandel bringt neue Phänomene des Zufalls hervor, die sich den üblichen Strategien des Umgangs mit Risiken und Unsicherheit entziehen. Diese Akzidenzphänomene sind prinzipiell unvorhersehbar und in ihrer komplexen Effektgesamtheit jenseits von Kalkulation und Antizipation. Eine allgemeine Verzukünftigung unseres Weltbezuges mit spezifischen weitreichenden Problemen ist die Folge und lässt klassische Agenturen des Risikomanagements und der Unsicherheitsbewältigung an ihre Leistungsgrenzen stoßen. Bruno Gransche zeigt, dass Philosophie und Zukunftsforschung gemeinsam großes Potenzial aufweisen, hier zu helfen.

Because of accelerating technological progress, humankind may be rapidly approaching a critical phase in its career. In addition to well-known threats such as nuclear holocaust, the prospects of radically transforming technologies like nanotech systems and machine intelligence present us with unprecedented opportunities and risks. Our future, and whether we will have a future at all, may well be determined by how we deal with these challenges. In the case of radically transforming technologies, a better understanding of the transition dynamics from (...) a human to a “posthuman” society is needed. Of particular importance is to know where the pitfalls are: the ways in which things could go terminally wrong. While we have had long exposure to various personal, local, and endurable global hazards, this paper analyzes a recently emerging category: that of existential risks. These are threats that could cause our extinction or destroy the potential of Earth-originating intelligent life. Some of these threats are relatively well known while others, including some of the gravest, have gone almost unrecognized. Existential risks have a cluster of features that make ordinary risk management ineffective. A final section of this paper discusses several ethical and policy implications. A clearer understanding of the threat picture will enable us to formulate better strategies. (shrink)

No artigo, abordo a ideia de melhoramento humano (MH), visando a contestar três frustrantes tendências dos seus críticos, a saber, as ideias de: (1) que a natureza humana será artificializada, sugerindo que estaremos diante de algo novo e incomparavelmente perigoso, bem como que ainda seja possível preservar uma separação radical entre natureza e técnica; (2) que é possível abordar e criticar o MH a partir de uma singularidade semântica; e, diretamente relacionada à anterior, (3) que há univocidade entre os defensores (...) do MH acerca de como os indivíduos devem lidar com os meios biotecnocientíficos disponibilizados, a saber, como uma ingênua e acrítica obrigação de melhorar. In this paper, I discuss the idea of human enhancement (HE). My goal is to refute three frustrating trends in the HE criticism, namely the ideas that: (1) human nature will become artificial, suggesting that we will be facing something new and uniquely dangerous, and that it is still possible to preserve a radical separation between nature and technique; (2) it is possible to address and criticize HE from a semantic uniqueness, which is directly related to the previous item; and (3) there is an univocity among the HE's defenders on how individuals should handle the available bio-techno-scientific tools made available, namely, as a naive and uncritical obligation to become enhanced. (shrink)

Discussion of the posthuman has emerged in a wide set of fields through a diverse set of thinkers including Donna Haraway, Ray Kurzweil, Nick Bostrom, N. Katherine Hayles, and Francis Fukuyama, just to name a few. Despite his extensive critique of technology, commentators have not explored the fruitfulness of Heidegger's work for deciphering the various strands of posthumanism recently formulated in response to contemporary technological developments. Here, I employ Heidegger's critique of technology to trace opposing visions of the posthuman, visions (...) that are both tied intimately to new information technologies. For those seeking to extend humanist ideals, information technologies are employed to extend the vision of an ultra-humanist view of a ‘scientific posthuman’ that dangerously understands the body to be a forfeitable nuisance, rather than an inherent aspect of being human. Along Heideggerian lines, thinkers such as N. Katherine Hayles and Thomas Carlson have developed an alternative trajectory related to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. This trajectory posits the self as constituted by a lack or abyss, enabling the formulation of a ‘mystical posthuman,’ celebrating, rather than forfeiting, humanity's embodied existence. (shrink)

Transhumanism is the school of thought that advocates the use of technology to enhance the human species, to the point where some supporters consider that a new species altogether could arise. Even some critics think this at least a technological possibility. Some supporters also believe the emergence of a new, improved, superhuman species raises no special ethical questions. Through an examination of the metaphysics of species, and an analysis of the essence of the human species, I argue that the existence (...) of an embodied, genuinely superhuman species is a metaphysical impossibility. Finally, I point out an interesting ethical consideration that this metaphysical truth raises. (shrink)

The ethical monitoring of brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) is discussed in connection with the potential impact of BMIs on distinguishing traits of persons, changes of personal identity, and threats to personal autonomy. It is pointed out that philosophical analyses of personhood are conducive to isolating an initial thematic framework for this ethical monitoring problem, but a contextual refinement of this initial framework depends on applied ethics analyses of current BMI models and empirical case-studies. The personal autonomy-monitoring problem is approached by identifying (...) various ways in which the inclusion of a robotic controller in the motor pathway of an output BMI may limit or jeopardize personal autonomy. (shrink)

This paper argues that even though massive technological unemployment will likely be one of the results of automation, we will not need to institute mass-scale redistribution of wealth to deal with its consequences. Instead, reasons are given for cautious optimism about the standards of living the newly unemployed workers may expect in the fully-automated future. It is not claimed that these predictions will certainly bear out. Rather, they are no less likely to come to fruition than the predictions of those (...) authors who predict that massive technological unemployment will lead to the suffering of the masses on such a scale that significant redistributive policies will have to be instituted to alleviate it. Additionally, the paper challenges the idea that the existence of a moral obligation to help the victims of massive unemployment justifies the coercive taking of anyone else’s property. (shrink)

El transhumanismo es una moda intelectual que propone la transformación de los seres humanos mediante diversas tecnologías. Expondremos brevemente los rasgos más conspicuos del TH, así como las principales críticas que se le han hecho. Pero la intención de este artículo no es entrar en esta polémica; aportaremos tan solo las claves imprescindibles para poder seguir adelante. Y una de las claves más intrigantes del TH es que, por debajo de su pátina tecno-futurista, remite a ciertas ideas filosóficas tan viejas (...) como, en apariencia, incompatibles entre sí. El TH remite al naturalismo radical, tanto como al nihilismo existencialista. La tesis que aquí se defiende es que tanto el naturalismo radical como el nihilismo existencialista son producto de las diversas oleadas del dualismo: del dualismo platónico antiguo, del dualismo cartesiano moderno. Una vez que separamos, a la manera dualista, la libertad por un lado y la naturaleza por el otro, podemos contar hasta dos, como hacen los dualistas, o quedarnos solo en uno, como hacen los existencialistas, que se paran en la libertad, y los naturalistas, que solo cuentan con la naturaleza. En cualquier caso, la imagen del ser humano, que es libertad y naturaleza, sale dañada. Asoma entonces el animal aporético y enfermizo al cual hay que salvar… de sí mismo. ¿Cómo? Siguiendo el método de Procusto, pero ahora con los prefijos bio e info en lugar de sierra y martillo. Hasta que el pobre ser humano encaje en el lecho de la utopía que algunos visionarios han urdido. ¿Y no hay otra vía, otra forma de mejorar la vida humana que sea más respetuosa para con la humana envergadura? Quizá sí, mas para trazar esa tercera vía, entre el naturalismo radical que mutila y el nihilismo existencialista que descoyunta y estira, habría que negar de antemano el dualismo que a los dos engendra, y atenerse a la sensatez común, en línea con la tradición aristotélica, antes que a las ensoñaciones utópicas. En nuestra opinión, el concepto aristotélico de naturaleza humana nos habilita para juzgar las antropotecnias mejor que la normatividad extraída de las visiones futuristas propias del TH. (shrink)

A debate has emerged in the bioethics literature about the use of biotechnology to modify human nature. A failure to define humanness has produced conceptual confusion in this debate. We draw upon recent social psychological work on folk concepts of humanness and dehumanization to analyse the understandings of humanness that underpin the rival positions. We argue that advocates and opponents of human nature modification employ distinct conceptions of humanness, and that their differing evaluations of modification make sense in light of (...) these conceptions. Advocates view modification as the enhancement of a non-essentialist sense of humanness that takes us further from animal nature. Opponents view it as the loss of an essentialist sense of humanness that takes us closer to a robotic state. Recognition that humanness has multiple senses implies that there is no mutually exclusive choice between seeing the outcome of modification as a quantitative gain in humanness or a fundamental, qualitative loss of it. (shrink)