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Conditionalization and Belief De Se

Darren Bradley

Dialectica 64 (2):247-250 (2010)

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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. In this paper I show that their result only applies to a restricted range of cases. I then show that the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in general is one in which, upon learning P, we conditionalize, not on P, but on the proposition that we learned P. After proving this result, I provide further generalizations and show that much of the accuracy-first epistemology program is committed to KK-like iteration principles (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 55 citations
Conditionalization and not Knowing that One Knows.Aaron Bronfman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):871-892.details Bayesian Conditionalization is a widely used proposal for how to update one’s beliefs upon the receipt of new evidence. This is in part because of its attention to the totality of one’s evidence, which often includes facts about what one’s new evidence is and how one has come to have it. However, an increasingly popular position in epistemology holds that one may gain new evidence, construed as knowledge, without being in a position to know that one has gained this evidence. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 22 citations
Self-location is no problem for conditionalization.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):393-411.details How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 33 citations
Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.details Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 20 citations
Reply to Kim’s “Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty”.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1237-1243.details I begin by discussing a conundrum that arises when Bayesian models attempt to assess the relevance of one claim to another. I then explain how my formal modeling framework manages this conundrum. Finally, I apply my modeling methodology to respond to Namjoong Kim’s objection to my framework. Download Export citation Bookmark

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