- A Non-Ideal Theory of Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2024 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 98 (1):93-112.details
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Explaining Go: Challenges in Achieving Explainability in AI Go Programs.Zack Garrett - 2023 - Journal of Go Studies 17 (2):29-60.details
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Is Knowledge a Social Phenomenon?Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Metaethics for Neo-Pragmatists: A Pragmatic Account of Linguistic Meaning for Moral Vocabulary.Thomas Wilk - 2019 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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(1 other version)Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131-152.details
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Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction.Jeff Kochan - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.details
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Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?Julien Dutant & Erik J. Olsson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1347-1365.details
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An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Alexander S. Harper - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (3):235-256.details
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Virtue epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):229 – 243.details
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Resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.details
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(1 other version)Contrastive knowledge.Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89.details
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(1 other version)Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.details
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Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance.Guy Axtell - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.details
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A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 178–199.details
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Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.details
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Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.details
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The content and acquisition of lexical concepts.Richard Horsey - 2006details
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(1 other version)Vector reliability: A new approach to epistemic justification.Mark E. Wunderlich - 2003 - Synthese 136 (2):237 - 262.details
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(1 other version)Vector Reliability: A new Approach to Epistemic Justification.Mark E. Wunderlich - 2003 - Synthese 136 (2):237-262.details
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Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.details
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Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Closure.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - Theoria 68 (2):129-161.details
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(1 other version)Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief.Carlo Penco - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.details
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(1 other version)Farewell to Objectivity: A Critique of Brandom.Sven Rosenkranz - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):232-237.details
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Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.details
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Internalism and Externalism in Meliorative Epistemology.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):59-72.details
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Moral and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.details
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McKinsey paradoxes, radical skepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - Synthese 130 (2):279-302.details
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Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):531-549.details
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The Limits of Internalism: A Case Study.Karyn L. Freedman - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (1):73-89.details
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Brandom on Thought and Reality: Showing Receptivity the Way out of the Bottleneck.Manuel de Pinedo & Hilan Bensusan - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):21-36.details
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The Problem of Induction Dissolved; But are we better off?Ruth Weintraub - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):69-84.details
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Realism, perspectivism, and disagreement in science.Michela Massimi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6115-6141.details
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On the Rational Resolvability of Deep Disagreement Through Meta-argumentation: A Resource Audit.David Godden - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):725-750.details
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Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):173-178.details
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Neurath’s protocol statements revisited: sketch of a theory of scientific testimony.Thomas Uebel - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):4-13.details
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The Generality Problem Naturalized.Erik J. Olsson - unknowndetails
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Realism, perspectivism, and disagreement in science.Michela Massimi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6115-6141.details
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Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction.Jeff Kochan - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19:35-43.details
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.details
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Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-19.details
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