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Ramsey and the measurement of belief

In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism (2001)

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  1. Frank Ramsey.Fraser MacBride, Mathieu Marion, Maria Jose Frapolli, Dorothy Edgington, Edward J. R. Elliott, Sebastian Lutz & Jeffrey Paris - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–30) made seminal contributions to philosophy, mathematics and economics. Whilst he was acknowledged as a genius by his contemporaries, some of his most important ideas were not appreciated until decades later; now better appreciated, they continue to bear an influence upon contemporary philosophy. His historic significance was to usher in a new phase of analytic philosophy, which initially built upon the logical atomist doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, raising their ideas to a new level of (...)
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  • Ramsey’s Representation Theorem.Richard Bradley - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):483–497.
    This paper reconstructs and evaluates the representation theorem presented by Ramsey in his essay 'Truth and Probability', showing how its proof depends on a novel application of Hölder's theory of measurement. I argue that it must be understood as a solution to the problem of measuring partial belief, a solution that in many ways remains unsurpassed. Finally I show that the method it employs may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid a well known objection to it due (...)
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  • Ramsey’s Representation Theorem.Richard Bradley - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):483-497.
    This paper reconstructs and evaluates the representation theorem presented by Ramsey in his essay ‘Truth and Probability’, showing how its proof depends on a novel application of Hölder's theory of measurement. I argue that it must be understood as a solution to the problem of measuring partial belief, a solution that in many ways remains unsurpassed. Finally I show that the method it employs may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid a well known objection to it due (...)
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  • A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...)
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  • Comparing Evaluations.Richard Bradley - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):85-100.
    This paper explores the problem of comparing the strengths of different individual's attitudes, and especially their evaluative attitudes, by looking at how measures of these quantities are obtained. I argue that comparisons of both strengths of belief and relative strengths of preference and desire are justified by the causal role they play in the production of action.
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  • The Curious Case of Frank Ramsey’s Proof of the Multiplication Rule of Probability.Colin Howson - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):431-439.
    Frank Ramsey in his paper ‘Truth and Probability’ was the first to develop a theory of utility based on a representation theorem, and a theory of partial belief based on utility-valued odds. But his proof of the multiplication theorem, on which in his system the law of addition depends, contains a step for which there seems to be no justification, and Ramsey provided no clue as to how to supply one. I conjecture that the missing justification appeals naturally to a (...)
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  • V-Comparing Evaluations.Richard Bradley - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):85-100.
    This paper explores the problem of comparing the strengths of different individual's attitudes, and especially their evaluative attitudes, by looking at how measures of these quantities are obtained. I argue that comparisons of both strengths of belief and relative strengths of preference and desire are justified by the causal role they play in the production of action.
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  • A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.
    This paper provides new foundations for Bayesian Decision Theory based on a representation theorem for preferences defined on a set of prospects containing both factual and conditional possibilities. This use of a rich set of prospects not only provides a framework within which the main theoretical claims of Savage, Ramsey, Jeffrey and others can be stated and compared, but also allows for the postulation of an extended Bayesian model of rational belief and desire from which they can be derived as (...)
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