Both through his own work and that of his students, Franz Clemens Brentano had an often underappreciated influence on the course of 20 th - and 21 st -century philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ offers full coverage of Brentano’s philosophy and his influence. It contains 38 brand-new essays from an international team of experts that offer a comprehensive view of Brentano’s central research areas—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and value theory—as well as of the principal (...) figures shaped by Brentano’s school of thought. A General Introduction serves as an overview of Brentano and the contents of the volume and three separate bibliographies point students and researchers on to further avenues of inquiry. Systematic and detailed, _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ provides readers with a valuable reference to Brentano’s work, and to his lasting importance in the history of philosophy and in contemporary debates. (shrink)

In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: (i) the intentional inexistence of an object, (ii) the relation to a content, and (iii) the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian (...) classification of mental phenomena: in Brentano’s psychology one can distinguish two concepts of mental phenomena − the mental phenomenon in a broad sense and the mental phenomenon in a narrow sense; the former concept allows the separation of the mental from the physical, while the narrow concept allows the distinguishing of the main classes of mental phenomena. The third part of the paper shows that, with respect to sensation, the absence of a direction toward an object is compatible with both Brentano’s early taxonomies of philosophical sciences, and his early program for the establishment of a new, empirical and non-speculative philosophy. For this reason, I hold that intentionality is important for the foundation of both psychology, and empirical philosophy. (shrink)

In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: the intentional inexistence of an object, the relation to a content, and the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian classification of mental (...) phenomena: in Brentano’s psychology one can distinguish two concepts of mental phenomena—the mental phenomenon in a broad sense and the mental phenomenon in a narrow sense; the former concept allows the separation of the mental from the physical, while the narrow concept allows the distinguishing of the main classes of mental phenomena. The third part of the paper shows that, with respect to sensation, the absence of a direction toward an object is compatible with both Brentano’s early taxonomies of philosophical sciences, and his early program for the establishment of a new, empirical and non-speculative philosophy. For this reason, I hold that intentionality is important for the foundation of both psychology, and empirical philosophy. (shrink)

Between 1937 and 1951 Wittgenstein had numerous philosophical conversations with his student and close friend, Rush Rhees. This article is composed of Rhees’s notes of twenty such conversations — namely, all those which have not yet been published — as well as some supplements from Rhees’s correspondence and miscellaneous notes. The principal value of the notes collected here is that they fill some interesting and important gaps in Wittgenstein ’s corpus. Thus, firstly, the notes touch on a wide range of (...) subjects, a number of which are only briefly addressed by Wittgenstein elsewhere, if at all. The subjects discussed include: explanation, ethics, anarchism, contradiction, psychoanalysis, colour, religion, concepts, classification, seeing-as, evolution, the relation between science and philosophy, and free will, amongst others. Secondly, the notes contain references to, and brief remarks about, philosophers of whom Wittgenstein otherwise says very little, if anything — such as Brentano, Heidegger, Aquinas, and Marx, amongst others. And thirdly, the notes provide us with valuable examples of Wittgenstein ’s use of some key ‘Wittgensteinian’ terms of art which are surprisingly rare in his written works, such as ‘surface-’ and ‘depth-grammar’, and ‘centres of variation’. (shrink)

This paper develops a phenomenological approach to the concept of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the sociohistorical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and sociohistorical sciences; the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; the phenomenological account offered here identifies three fundamental levels that (...) make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a prereflective experience, as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; and such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and sociohistorical sciences. Arguably, the natural and sociohistorical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sciences address pain as an object of cognitive reflection, sociohistorical sciences first and foremost deal with pain as a prereflective experience and as an object of affective reflection. (shrink)

The proper sensible criterion of sensory individuation holds that senses are individuated by the special kind of sensibles on which they exclusively bear about (colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc.). H. P. Grice objected to the proper sensibles criterion that it cannot account for the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing shapes or other common sensibles. That paper advances a novel answer to Grice's objection. Admittedly, the upholder of the proper sensible criterion must bind the proper sensibles –i.e. colors– (...) to the common sensibles –i.e. shapes– so as to account for the visual phenomenal character of shapes. But, as Grice rightly objected, neither association, nor ontological dependence will do –I spend some time isolating why dependence is a bad answer here, basically because the dependence of shape on colors is generic, and that genericity is arguably not part of the phenomenal content of perception. -/- Grice is wrong, however, to think that once association and dependence have been rebutted, there is no other way to attach color to extension. The right way to connect proper and common sensibles is rather trivial, although it seems to have been widely neglected: proper sensibles FILL common ones. To see a shape, by contrast to feeling it, is to perceived as filled by some color. To feel a shape, is to perceive it as, say, filled by pressure. Filling in is the phenomenal connection between proper and common sensibles. -/- One important corollary of that proposal is that proper sensibles –color, pressure, noise, taste...– have to belong to the category of stuffs, in the sense of uncountable entities. Against the widespread view that colors are properties, which have countable instances, the last part of the paper argues that colors are phenomenal stuffs, which fill some visual area. One commits a category mistake in asking: "How many tropes/instances of this determinate redness is there on that ladybird". One should rather ask "How much of this determinate redness is there on that ladybird". (shrink)

On nous a habitué, dans les études husserliennes, à traiter de la ques tion du rapport de la phénoménologie des Recherches logiques à Brentano dans la perspective de la critique que Husserl adresse à la théorie immanen tiste de l’intentionnalité dans cet ouvrage*. Mais cette perspective laisse dans l’ombre un enjeu fondamental de la question qui sous-tend les discussions de Husserl dans la § 15 de la cinquième Recherche et dans l’Appendice au deuxième volume de l’ouvrage, à savoir ce que (...) j’appellerai par commodité la thèse du caractère coextensif de la conscience, de l’inten tionnalité et de la pensée. Je voudrais montrer que la critique que Husserl adresse à cette thèse s’appuie sur la distinction introduite dans ses premiers travaux à Halle entre les actes et les contenus sensibles ou contenus pri maires, plus précisément entre deux classes au sein de l’expérience sensible, la première correspondant aux phénomènes psychiques de Brentano, l’autre, qui n’est pas intention nelle, correspond à ce qu’il est maintenant convenu d’appeler la conscience ou l’expérience phénoménale. Pour ce faire, j’exami nerai la critique de la théorie de la perception de Brentano (uniquement celle de sa Psychologie de 1874) dans la première édition des Recherches logiques ainsi que dans un traité sur la perception publié récemment sous le titre de « Abhandlung über Wahrnehmung von 1898 » qui était vraisemblablement destiné à la deuxième série des Re cherches logiques. (shrink)

The following investigation aims to determine the historical origins of the phenomenology of pain. According to my central thesis, these origins can be traced back to an enthralling discussion between Husserl and two of his most important teachers, Brentano and Stumpf. According to my reconstruction of this discussion, while Brentano defended the view that all feelings, including pain, are intentional experiences, and while Stumpf argued that pain is a non-intentional feeling-sensation, Husserl of the Logical Investigations provides compelling resources to resolve (...) the polemic between his teachers by showing how pain can be conceived as a pre-intentional experience. According to my argument, this largely forgotten discussion is of significance not only because it enriches our understanding of pain, but also because it modifies the phenomenological conception of consciousness. Thus in the concluding section, I show why the Husserlian resolution of the controversy between Brentano and Stumpf is of importance for our understanding of the central phenomenological theme—intentionality. (shrink)

Nowadays cognitive science often views sensorial presentations and mental presentations as mutually exclusive, and they are also given separate treatment by neurophysiologists and by cognitive scientists, and some phenomena (like anomalous surfaces or various types of imagery) are reduced to either the former or the latter. Since no adequate methods for its investigation have been developed, the level of perceptual experiences analysed by Gestaltists and magnificently illustrated by Metzger in his Laws of Seeing remains unexplored. Starting from Metzger’s analyses the (...) paper deals with the question of the theoretical value of experimental phenomenology to the theory of knowledge and ontology. (shrink)

The considerable agreement across languages in the way they categorize the color domain, despite independent historical development, demands an explanation. One option is to postulate a universal innate representation of the color categories, 'hardwired' into each observer's brain. An alternative is that observers internalize their color categories through a process of cultural transmission, constrained by some kind of 'optimality hypothesis' to account for the cross-language agreement. A number of optimality hypotheses are reviewed. It is tempting to believe that the vivid (...) experiential quality of the categories can only be explained if they are determined by innate representations rather than by linguistic imprinting. However, linguistic transmission of color categories – perturbed from their optimal boundaries by special circumstances – fits best with the experience of dichromats. Even for the 'primary hue' categories, where the case for innate representations should be strongest, the evidence is far from convincing. (shrink)

Space—an essential dimension of our life—is analyzable from different viewpoints, which often gives rise to contrasting conceptualizations. Perceptual analyses shed light on the intrinsic anisotropy and deformations of perceived space, raising the issue of which geometry may be able to represent perceptual space. Pictorial drawings and painting have been relevant sources of information about the nature of living and perceived space. Although the geometry of perceptual space is still in its infancy, contributions are beginning to appear. This special issue contributes (...) to the development of the geometry of perceptual space. (shrink)