In recent years, English-language scholars have begun to approach the daunting field of Kant's politics by way of its technical core: the deduction of private right. In this interpretive project, t...

This article examines Kant’s theory of property through a comparative analysis of Gottfried Achenwall’s justification of ownership rights. I argue that at the core of Achenwall’s and Kant’s understanding of ownership rights lies the idea that rights are to be acquired through a juridical act (factum iuridicum, rechtlichen Act) of the will. However, while Achenwall thinks of this act as emerging from a private will, Kant holds that rights and obligations can only be brought about by an act of the (...) general will. By contrasting these two views, I aim to illuminate one of the main features of Kant’s theory of property, namely, that ownership rights are only possible in a rightfully constituted state. I conclude with a suggestion regarding Kant’s view of the notion of ‘provisional’ possession in the state of nature. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 106 - 128 This paper is interested in the critical potential of the idea of original common possession of the Earth. On the basis of a comparative analysis of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, it shows how different the meaning of this idea can be within a theory of property or territory. The first part is devoted to Grotius’s account of why and how the institution of property was progressively introduced. It highlights the (...) importance this account attaches to the intention of the first distributors for a good understanding of property laws, and in particular, for an understanding of their non-application in situations of extreme necessity. The second part takes the opposite path and shows that although Kant rejects the very existence of a right of necessity, the idea that one might be liberated from a law is not completely absent from, and even plays a crucial role in, his account of property. Clarification of this role ultimately leads us back to the idea of original possession in common of the Earth. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the current readings of permissive law fall into hermeneutical difficulties and do not completely explain Kant’s complex use of the concept. I argue that the shortcomings of these interpretations can only be overcome by relating permissive law to practical teleology. That teleological thinking has a role in Kant’s moral thought by way of history is not new. Here, however, I argue that the system of rights itself is in some manner teleologically situated. This interpretation (...) allows us to understand that Kant’s Doctrine of Right plays the role of a realist utopia. (shrink)

Neste artigo fazem-se algumas considerações sobre a justificação da propriedade privada na filosofia do direito de Kant. A partir da análise do conceito de lei permissiva da razão, defende-se que na filosofia do direito opera uma perspectiva teleológico- reflexionante de caráter prático, a qual permite compreender, por um lado, que a propriedade no estado de natureza seja legítima ao mesmo tempo em que é problemática, enquanto, por outro lado, o estado civil envolve a exigência de que a propriedade seja adequada (...) segundo as condições de um sistema de justiça distributiva. (shrink)

I criticize two ways of interpreting Kant's claim that property rights are merely ‘provisional’ in the state of nature.Weak provisionalityholds that in the state of nature agents can make rightful claims to property. What is lacking is the institutional context necessary to render their claims secure. By contrast,strong provisionalityholds that making property claims in the state of nature wrongs others. I argue for a third view,anticipatory provisionality, according to which state of nature property claims do not wrong others, but anticipate (...) a condition in which the authority to make such claims can no longer be unilaterally determined. (shrink)

This paper argues against the common justification for the necessity of the state through the particular difficulty of private property right. Instead, I argue that the necessity of the state is internal to the concept of right in general. In order to show this, I point out how Kants adoption of hylomorphic language for the concept of right, where there is a formal and material aspect of right, allows us to understand the Rechtslehre as progressing through a syllogistic deduction from (...) innate right (major), private right (minor) to public right (conclusion). Material right is made necessary through its subsumption under formal right in the civil condition. (shrink)

No direito real, Kant investiga a propriedade privada de uma substância (o solo e os objetos localizados nele). No estado de natureza, somente ocorre a posse física ou empírica de um objeto externo, a partir do postulado jurídico da razão prática como uma lei permissiva, pois, do contrário, as coisas utilizáveis seriam em-si ou res nullius, mas a posse jurídica ou inteligível depende da posse comum originária do solo (que não se confunde com o comunismo primitivo), para evitar que a (...) propriedade seja uma relação entre pessoas e coisas, como acontece na teoria do trabalho, porque todo direito exige um dever correspondente. Todavia, coisas não podem ter deveres com relação a pessoas, condição seguida da vontade unilateral do primeiro ocupante de querer o objeto e do advento de uma vontade unificada a priori do provo, que só se torna efetiva no estado civil, a única capaz de gerar uma obrigação recíproca entre todos; por isso, a posse inteligível somente é possível no estado civil, embora a posse empírica do estado de natureza tenha a presunção de tornar-se jurídica, quando ocorrer a entrada no estado jurídico e vale por comparação na espera e preparação daquele estado. (shrink)

In the following reflection Claudio Corradetti and Allen Wood engage in a controversy concerning the possibilities and the limits of textual interpretation. Should an interpreter still be authorized to call an author’s interpretation the logical stretch of text beyond its black printed letters? The authors offer two different standpoints on what can still be defined as textual interpretation. Whereas for Allen Wood a clear-cut separation must be kept between what a text shows and what an interpreter argues starting from the (...) text, for Claudio Corradetti such distinction remains internal to textual exegesis in so far as the interpreter’s conclusions follow a logical pattern of jus tification starting from evidential hints. (shrink)

This study interprets the later texts of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) with the approach of conceptual history. The selected works include a number of texts that are not generally regarded as politically interesting or relevant. This study also highlights Kant’s role as a significant classic figure in political thinking who still benefits modern research. The selected texts are approached as political discourses in a contemporary dialogue, and no principal explanation is sought for these from Kant’s famous “major” critiques. The texts are (...) read as part of Publicum, the public debate atmosphere during Prussia’s Late Enlightenment, in which the opinions of other debaters were criticised or further developed. The interpretation focuses on political problems in Kant’s production, many of which still confound researchers. Frequently asked critical questions include: Why does the Enlightenment philosopher name ownership and gender requirements for citizenship? Would not education or studies be suitable criteria? How is it possible that republicanism, an ideal raised as a guarantee of eternal peace, can exist in a monarchy, while a democracy is the most undesirable way to rule? Why should a tyranny or a bad ruler not be opposed, while the French Revolution is an admirable example? In this study, Kant’s way of thinking is interpreted by opening up the context of the era. Known as a reformer in many themes, Kant has a strong background in German theoretical history. For example, the value of the natural history theory cannot be ignored. This study presents a view of how Kant explains the social contract and the development that takes place through it from the natural state to a regulated social state. Furthermore, the definition of all the different aspects of citizenships owes to the heritage of natural law. This study demonstrates that Kant understood the Enlightenment as a political project, which was associated not only with the demand for a freedom of publication, but also with the debate over questions in the political sphere. In my interpretation, Kant’s Enlightenment theme also includes the demand to tear down universities’ horizontal division into faculties and to elevate the position of the philosophical faculty, free of external ties, to the level of other faculties, or even higher, to evaluate their scientific and philosophical grounds. (shrink)

The rediscovery of Kant’s Doctrine of Right resulted in many attempts to apply Kant’s position to current affairs. This research often faces the problem of defining clear borders of what in Kant’s texts needs to be considered as rational core of his theory and what is merely a theoretically less significant consequence of particular political situation of 18th century. My claim is that in order to be able to adequately apply Kant’s ideas and concepts to the 21st century problems, the (...) process of application of his rational principles to the world of experience must be reconstructed. This will not only bring about the core structure of right but may also determine which elements of Kant’s legal theory are contingent to changing empirical data. I recognise two levels of Kant’s application of the rational principles to human condition, which consecutively determine the rational core of right and secondary structural divisions that emerge from contingent data about political history of mankind. The aim of the article is to investigate the fundamental steps of Kant’s application on the first level, in order to reconstruct the rational core of his legal theory. In the first step I analyse the universal principle of right in order to clarify Kant’s concept of a right. Further, I investigate the axiom of external freedom, which, in conjunction with human condition generates the necessity of using external objects of choice and therefore grounds the emergence of acquired rights. Nevertheless, these rights, as particular legal titles that limit the freedom of others, cannot be reconciled with universal freedom in the state of nature. Therefore, from the establishment of innate and acquired right, there arises the necessity of public right and entering the civil condition. (shrink)

La filosofía jurídico-política kantiana es —desde hace varios años— protagonista de primer nivel en los debates sobre la justicia, la propiedad y la pobreza. El renacimiento vino de la mano del trabajo de varios filósofos y juristas que, afortunadamente, se apartan de los incómodos y desacertados apodos que recibió Kant en la segunda mitad del siglo pasado: “Kant el político moralista”, “Kant liberal”, “Kant, el defensor de la propiedad privada exclusiva y excluyente”. Ha vuelto ahora con renovado y creciente interés, (...) el “Kant republicano”, luego de casi dos siglos de olvidos. No pretendo realizar una reseña de la abundante bibliografía de uno y otro período interpretativo —el del Kant liberal y el del Kant republicano—; el objetivo principal de este trabajo es recuperar algunas piezas del Kant republicano de la mano de la tradición republicana histórica que se inicia con Aristóteles y reaparece, con fuerza renovada, en algunos representantes modernos del derecho natural, siendo Kant uno de ellos. Comenzaré con una reseña acerca de lo que juzgo como la interpretación contemporánea más influyente sobre la justicia en Kant, la de John Rawls; para luego apuntar algunas tesis sobre el valor de la concepción kantiana de la justicia pública, entendida como el imprescindible correlato institucional del derecho a la libertad innata, el único derecho natural inalienable. (shrink)