This paper provides a historical overview of cognitive psychology and computational theories in cognitive science. Critiques of the computational model are discussed. The perspective of the evolution of mind and brain provides an alternative model such as that presented by Merlin Donald in terms of the “Hybrid Mind.” This “naturalist” model is also consistent with what we know of cognitive development in childhood. It provides a better understanding of cognition in situated context than the computational alternatives and is a better (...) fit as a model of mind for the social sciences, including for economic decision making. (shrink)

Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals: any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice-versa. This property of metaphors is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g. 'in my lawyer is like a shark', (...) the term 'shark' refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, 'my lawyer is a shark', 'shark' refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed. (shrink)

What would it be like to have never learned English, but instead only to know Hopi, Mandarin Chinese, or American Sign Language? Would that change the way you think? Imagine entirely losing your language, as the result of stroke or trauma. You are aphasic, unable to speak or listen, read or write. What would your thoughts now be like? As the most extreme case, imagine having been raised without any language at all, as a wild child. What—if anything—would it be (...) like to be such a person? Could you be smart; could you reminisce about the past, plan the future? (shrink)

This paper examines therelationship between industry and academia withregard to pharmaceutical research. Thecontinuous technological flux in researchpresents challenges to industry in obtainingadequately prepared scientists withoutinterfering in or disrupting a youngscientists' academic preparation. We presentour recommendations concerning the kinds ofskills required by changing technology andobserve the increasingly collaborativerelationship between academia and industry. Wesuggest the need for broader education forPh.D. and post-graduate students, inducing inthem transferable and productive skills for arapidly changing market. These skills,typically acquired in the liberal arts, wouldprovide young scientists (...) with an awareness oftheir position in the process of scientificdiscovery process. Such scientists will bebetter prepared for making discoveries inscience, as discovery is less the result of anindividual's effort and more the result ofconcerted team efforts. (shrink)

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...) acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The out- side world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the gov- erning laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Sev- eral lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception. (shrink)

We present statistical analyses of the large‐scale structure of 3 types of semantic networks: word associations, WordNet, and Roget's Thesaurus. We show that they have a small‐world structure, characterized by sparse connectivity, short average path lengths between words, and strong local clustering. In addition, the distributions of the number of connections follow power laws that indicate a scale‐free pattern of connectivity, with most nodes having relatively few connections joined together through a small number of hubs with many connections. These regularities (...) have also been found in certain other complex natural networks, such as the World Wide Web, but they are not consistent with many conventional models of semantic organization, based on inheritance hierarchies, arbitrarily structured networks, or high‐dimensional vector spaces. We propose that these structures reflect the mechanisms by which semantic networks grow. We describe a simple model for semantic growth, in which each new word or concept is connected to an existing network by differentiating the connectivity pattern of an existing node. This model generates appropriate small‐world statistics and power‐law connectivity distributions, and it also suggests one possible mechanistic basis for the effects of learning history variables (age of acquisition, usage frequency) on behavioral performance in semantic processing tasks. (shrink)

This research attempts to understand howchildren learn to use language. Instead ofusing syntax-based grammar rules to model thedifferences between children''s language andadult language, as has been done in the past, anew model is proposed. In the new researchmodel, children acquire language by listeningto the examples of speech that they hear intheir environment and subsequently use thespeech examples that have been previously heardin similar contextual situations. A computermodel is generated to simulate this new modelof language acquisition. The MALL computerprogram will listen (...) to examples of humanspeech, as would occur around a child, and thentry to use these examples in new situationsthat are similar to the contextual situationsin which the language examples were heard. This will provide a better understanding of howchildren learn to use language and howeducators can assist or improve the languagelearning process by providing required examplesof speech or by helping children to develop abetter understanding of similarities betweenvarious contexts. (shrink)

One of the core tenets of cognitive metaphor theory is the claim that metaphors ground abstract knowledge in concrete, first-hand experience. In this paper, I argue that this grounding hypothesis contains some problematic conceptual ambiguities and, under many reasonable interpretations, empirical difficulties. I present evidence that there are foundational obstacles to defining a coherent and cognitively valid concept of “metaphor” and “concrete meaning,” and some general problems with singling out certain domains of experience as more immediate than others. I conclude (...) from these considerations that whatever the facts are about the comprehension of individual metaphors, the available evidence is incompatible with the notion of an underlying conceptual structure organized according to the immediacy of experience. (shrink)

Since Aristotle, many writers have treated metaphors and similes as equals: any metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile, and vice‐versa. This property of metaphors is the basis for psycholinguistic comparison theories of metaphor comprehension. However, if metaphors cannot always be paraphrased as similes, then comparison theories must be abandoned. The different forms of a metaphor—the comparison and categorical forms—have different referents. In comparison form, the metaphor vehicle refers to the literal concept, e.g. ‘in my lawyer is like a shark’, (...) the term ‘shark’ refers to the literal fish. In categorical form, ‘my lawyer is a shark’, ‘shark’ refers to an abstract (metaphorical) category of predatory creatures. This difference in reference makes it possible for a metaphor and its corresponding simile to differ (a) in interpretability and (b) in meaning. Because a metaphor cannot always be understood in terms of its corresponding simile, we conclude that comparison theories of metaphor are fundamentally flawed. (shrink)

Throughout its history the Game was closely allied with music, and usually proceeded according to musical or mathematical rules. One theme, two themes, or three themes were stated, elaborated, varied, and underwent a development quite similar to that of the theme in a Bach fugue or a concerto movement.… Experts and Masters of the Game freely wove the initial theme into unlimited combinations [p. 30].

Psycholinguistics re-emerged in an almost explosive fashion during the 1950s and 1960s. It then underwent an equally abrupt decline as an independent sub-discipline. This paper charts this fall and identifies five general factors which, it is argued, were responsible for its demise. These are: (a) an uncompromisingly strong version of nativism; (b) a growing isolation of psycholinguistics from the body psychology; (c) a preference for formal theory over empirical data; (d) several abrupt modifications in the Standard Theory in linguistics; and (...) (e) a failure to appreciate the strong commitment to functionalism that characterizes experimental psychology. In short, what looked like a revolution two decades ago turned out to be merely a local reformation that occurred along side of and largely independent from the real revolution in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

A central concern of the cognitive science of language since its origins has been the concept of the linguistic system. Recent approaches to the system concept in language point to the exceedingly complex relations that hold between many kinds of interdependent systems, but it can be difficult to know how to proceed when “everything is connected.” This paper offers a framework for tackling that challenge by identifying *scale* as a conceptual mooring for the interdisciplinary study of language systems. The paper (...) begins by defining the scale concept—simply, the possibility for a measure to be larger or smaller in different instances of a system, such as a phonemic inventory, a word's frequency value in a corpus, or a speaker population. We review sites of scale difference in and across linguistic subsystems, drawing on findings from linguistic typology, grammatical description, morphosyntactic theory, psycholinguistics, computational corpus work, and social network demography. We consider possible explanations for scaling differences and constraints in language. We then turn to the question of *dependencies between* sites of scale difference in language, reviewing four sample domains of scale dependency: in phonological systems, across levels of grammatical structure (Menzerath's Law), in corpora (Zipf's Law and related issues), and in speaker population size. Finally, we consider the implications of the review, including the utility of a scale framework for generating new questions and inspiring methodological innovations and interdisciplinary collaborations in cognitive-scientific research on language. (shrink)