An education for cultural coherence tends to the child’s well-being through identity construction and maintenance. Critics charge that this sort of education will not bode well for the future autonomy of children. I will argue that culturally coherent education, provided there is no coercion, can lend itself to eventual autonomy and may assist minority children in countering the negative stereotypes and discrimination they face in the larger society. Further, I will argue that few individuals actually possess an entirely coherent identity; (...) rather, most of us possess hybrid identities that lend themselves to multiple, not necessarily conflicting allegiances. (shrink)

The ideological interface between Muslims and liberal educators undoubtedly is strained in the realm of sex education, and perhaps on no topic more so than homosexuality. Some argue that schools should not try to ‘undermine the faith’ of Muslims, who object to teaching homosexuality as an ‘acceptable alternative lifestyle’. In this article, I will argue against this monolithic presentation of Islam. Furthermore, I will argue that a narrow view of Islam is neglectful of gay and lesbian Muslims who are particularly (...) vulnerable to the unrepentant hostilities of their own communities. (shrink)

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

For many, it is far from clear where the prerogatives of parents to educate as they deem appropriate end and the interests of their children, immediate or future, begin. In this article I consider the educational interests of children and argue that children have an interest in their own well-being. Following this, I will examine the interests of parents and consider where the limits of paternalism lie. Finally, I will consider the state's interest in the education of children and discuss (...) a familiar view that argues that we have a central obligation to cultivate good citizens. The article will focus on the tensions which inevitably arise from the sometimes conflicting interests between them. (shrink)

Several philosophers of education argue that schooling should facilitate students’ development of autonomy. Such arguments fall into two main categories: Student-centered arguments support autonomy education to help enable students to lead good lives; Public-goods-centered arguments support autonomy education to develop students into good citizens. Critics challenge the legitimacy of autonomy education—of the state imposing a schooling curriculum aimed at making children autonomous. In this paper, I offer a unified solution to the challenges of legitimacy that both arguments for autonomy education (...) face. I first defend a particular construal of liberal legitimacy, and then consider each legitimacy challenge in light of that construal. I argue that the legitimacy challenges confronting both types of argument can be overcome. Further, I explain why we should pursue both arguments, rather than resting the entire case for autonomy education on one or the other. I conclude that each argument—if it can justify autonomy education at all—can justify autonomy education consistent with the requirements of liberal democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

In response to the feminist concern that various religions undermine the ability of young women to realize themselves as free and equal citizens, Rawls has suggested that mandatory civic education could balance out non-egalitarian faiths. However, mandated civic education, if substantive enough to meet the demands of feminists, would likely disrupt the ability of religious conservatives and their children to develop and freely exercise the two moral powers. The result of this dilemma is twofold: the first is that a Rawlsian (...) society which includes both feminists and religious conservatives may never be able achieve a stable overlapping consensus in the right way unless substantial accommodations are made for religious conservative families with regard to education. The second result is a broader one, namely, that using the public education system to condition students’ thinking beyond what political liberalism requires may undermine legitimacy and produce instability and polarization. Therefore, the public education system ought to be depoliticized as much as possible. (shrink)

Concerned with interreligious conflict in Indonesia, this study seeks to describe and evaluate the current citizenship education that has been designed and implemented for a democratic multireligious Indonesia. The context for the study, outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, is contemporary Indonesian society. Three features of this society are highlighted as especially significant. First, it is characterized by a wide diversity of religious groups. Second, it is governed by the state which acknowledges religious diversity with an official stance of interreligious (...) tolerance. Third, since 1998 it has adopted a democratic political system. The study begins by outlining how the state and national education has tried to meet demands of national unity and those of religious acknowledgment. The remainder of the study combines philosophical and qualitative empirical methods. In Chapter 3, I critically examine three contemporary liberal theories of citizenship education models. I suggest that these theories contain important insights relevant to a forward looking assessment of Indonesian citizenship educational policy and practice even though Indonesia is not a secular liberal democracy in the 'Western' mould. Specifically, I argue that what is critical to cultivate in multireligious Indonesia is the core idea of political liberalism – that is, the capacity for "public reasonableness" which involves the attitude and capacity to think, to judge and to behave in a way reasonable to pluralist societies. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on two case studies of public senior high schools in Jakarta and provide examples of citizenship education taking place in the education system. Overall, I found that although educational policy and the public schools I studied did indeed focus on civic knowledge transmission, the specific practices indicated mixed results for achieving the desired aims of citizenship education for a multireligious Indonesia. On the positive side, school settings were relatively diverse and facilitated a good deal of social interaction and created the potential for shared civic knowledge across religious differences. In some cases, friendships and cooperative relationships among religiously diverse students seemed to occur. On the negative side, there were cases of interreligious discrimination, misunderstanding, tension and conflict and these seemed to originate from a lack of open communication, and interreligious misunderstanding and ignorance. Furthermore, when it came to the official curriculum and classroom practice, both schools emphasized confessional religious education, ignored the internal diversity of religion, lacked exposure to religious diversity, deemphasized democratic deliberation and opposed interreligious dialogue. As such, I argue that the schools are missing a crucial element of citizenship education for "public reasonableness" as proposed by the political liberalism model studied in Chapter 3. I conclude that in order to meet the demands of creating a citizenry prepared to address the challenges of religious diversity, disagreement, and respectful interaction, Indonesian citizenship education should seek to encourage the following characteristics: 1) maintain and increase, where possible, religiously diverse school settings, 2) ensure fairness in accommodation of diversity, 3) intensify social interaction and practice of democracy and dialogue, 4) focus on the development of deep shared civic knowledge, and 5) develop interreligious conversation and knowledge of religious diversity. It is important to start talking about these issues or otherwise as Indonesians we will continue to combat one another, with all Indonesian citizens being the losers in the end. (shrink)

This paper addresses whether universal, general education programs are enough to satisfy basic criteria of human rights, or whether comprehensive family planning programs, in conjunction with universal education programs, might also be morally required. Even before the Reagan administration instituted the ‘global gag rule’ at the 1984 conference in Mexico City, prohibiting funding to nongovernmental organizations that included providing information about abortion as a possible method of family planning, the moral acceptability of family planning programs has been called into question. (...) This paper makes a moral argument for family planning by appealing to both data and to theory: data about the efficacy of universal and comprehensive family planning education programs at reducing fertility and infant mortality, and theory about what is required for the establishment of autonomy. It reasons that universal educational programs are insufficient for the promotion of autonomy, and therefore argues on substantive autonomy grounds for comprehensive family planning programs in addition to universal education programs. (shrink)

Philosophical conceptions of educational justice are centered at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of education. They justify moral‐political rights to education and sometimes also determine who is responsible for their realization through which kinds of pedagogical practices or systemic educational reform. This article concentrates on contemporary conceptions of educational justice in primary and secondary education and highlights central practical implications that the various conceptions of educational justice have under non‐ideal circumstances. Section 2 explains the conceptions of fair and (...) luck‐egalitarian equal educational opportunity, Section 3 the conception of educational priority for the least‐advantaged students, and Section 4 the conception of democratically adequate education. Finally, Section 5 presents a philosophical conception of global justice in school education. Section 6 concludes. (shrink)

This article examines whether autonomy as an educational aim should be defended at the global scale. It begins by identifying the normative issues at stake in global autonomy education by distinguishing them from the problems of autonomy education in multicultural nation-states. The article then explains why a planet-wide expansion of the ideal of autonomy is conceivable on the condition that the concept of autonomy is widened in a way that renders its precise meaning flexibly adjustable to a variety of distinct (...) social and cultural contexts. A context-transcendent, core meaning of autonomy remains in place, however, according to which a person is only autonomous if she relates to the values and goals that direct her life in a way so that she sees them as her own and is able to identify and critically assess her principal reasons for action. Finally, the article addresses two challenges to the global expansion of autonomy education: the objection that autonomy is presently not the most important educational aim and the objection that global autonomy education is a form of cultural imperialism. It finds both objections wanting. (shrink)