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  1. A Deflationary Theory of Reference.Arvid Båve - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):51 - 73.
    The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S (...)
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  • Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism.David Löwenstein - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):23-44.
    Whether or not deflationism is compatible with truth-conditional theories of meaning has often been discussed in very broad terms. This paper only focuses on Davidsonian semantics and Brandom's anaphoric deflationism and defends the claim that these are perfectly compatible. Critics of this view have voiced several objections, the most prominent of which claims that it involves an unacceptable form of circularity. The paper discusses how this general objection applies to the case of anaphoric deflationism and Davidsonian semantics and evaluates different (...)
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  • Pietro Salis, "Pratiche Discorsive Razionali. Studi Sull'inferenzialismo di Robert Brandom", Milano-Udine, Mimesis Edizioni, 2016, Pp. 332. [REVIEW]Giacomo Turbanti - 2018 - Aphex 17.
    Che cosa vuol dire per le espressioni del nostro linguaggio avere un significato? Secondo un approccio oggi sostanzialmente standard in semantica, avere significato vuol dire prima di tutto avere un contenuto rappresentazionale, cioè poter rappresentare qualcosa. Secondo un inferenzialista come Robert Brandom, invece, le espressioni del nostro linguaggio hanno contenuto perché sono inserite in una rete di relazioni inferenziali, rispetto alla quale possono essere utilizzate per dare e richiedere ragioni. Il libro di Pietro Salis, Pratiche discorsive razionali, presenta e discute (...)
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  • Truth-Predicates Still Not Like Pronouns: A Reply to Salis.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-9.
    I here argue that my original critique of the Prosentential theory of truth (PT) withstands Pietro Salis's recent objections, particularly, my objection that (PT) makes an idle analogy between "true" and proforms, and that the analogy breaks down in several ways.
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  • Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism.James Connelly - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):559 - 585.
    Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein?s apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of ?p? is true and p in ?136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the (...)
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  • The Generality of Anaphoric Deflationism.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):505-522.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a kind of prosententialist account of the use of “true.” It holds that “true” is an expressive operator and not a predicate. In particular, “is true” is explained as a “prosentence.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: As pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their semantic content from previously introduced sentences. So, if Jim says, “The candidate is going to win the election,” and Bill replies (...)
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  • Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):117-134.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” (...)
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