An account is proposed of the nature of indeterminacy in visual experience. Along the way, alternative proposals by Block, Morrison, Munton, Prettyman, Stazicker and Nanay are considered.

According to phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, perceptual experiences can give us immediate justification for beliefs about the external world in virtue of having a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely phenomenal force. I present three cases to show that phenomenal force is neither pervasive among nor exclusive to perceptual experiences. The plausibility of such cases calls out for explanation. I argue that contrary to a long-held assumption, phenomenal force is a separate, non-perceptual state generated by some metacognitive mechanisms that monitor one’s (...) first-order mental processes and states. This new account advances our understanding of the nature of phenomenal force. (shrink)

Perceptual Confidence is the view that our conscious perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. In previous papers, I motived it using first-personal evidence (Morrison 2016) and Jessie Munton motivated it using normative evidence (Munton 2016). In this paper, I will consider the extent to which it is motivated by third-personal evidence. I will argue that the current evidence is supportive but not decisive. I will also describe experiments that might provide more decisive evidence.

We defend three controversial claims about preference, credence, and choice. First, all agents (not just rational ones) have complete preferences. Second, all agents (again, not just rational ones) have real-valued credences in every proposition in which they are confident to any degree. Third, there is almost always some unique thing we ought to do, want, or believe.