- Asynchronous Introspection Theory: The Underpinnings of Phenomenal Consciousness in Temporal Illusion.Shuo Chen, Changle Zhou, Jing Li & Hua Peng - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (2):315-330.details
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The illusion of conscious will.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):197 - 213.details
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Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.details
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Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Everyday Confabulation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):227-249.details
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Does reflection lead to wise choices?Lisa Bortolotti - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):297-313.details
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Global Workspace Theory and Animal Consciousness.Jonathan Birch - 2020 - Philosophical Topics 48 (1):21-37.details
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Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals.Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):795-815.details
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Unconscious perceptual justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):569-589.details
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How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists.Jacob Berger - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):503-526.details
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A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation.Sven Bernecker - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Conscious states and conscious creatures: Explanation in the scientific study of consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.details
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Nonconscious Pain, Suffering, and Moral Status.Bernardo Aguilera - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (3):337-345.details
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Introspective acquaintance: An integration account.Anna Giustina - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):380-397.details
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What is it like to be a chimpanzee?Michael Tomasello - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Enkinaesthesia: Proto-moral value in action-enquiry and interaction.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):411-431.details
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Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal.Henry Shevlin - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):297-314.details
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Mnemonic Confabulation.Sarah Robins - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):121-132.details
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Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
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Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals.Stephen Puryear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):250-269.details
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Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories.Vincent Picciuto - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):555-575.details
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Indirect representation and the self-representational theory of consciousness.Ben Phillips - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):273-290.details
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A puzzle about desire.Jared Peterson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3655-3676.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4637-4666.details
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Are Infants Conscious?Claudia Passos-Ferreira - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):308-329.details
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What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Michelle Montague - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380.details
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Privileges of First-Person Reference and of Third-Person Reference.Guido Melchior - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):37-52.details
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The New LeDoux: Survival Circuits and the Surplus Meaning of ‘Fear’.Raamy Majeed - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):809-829.details
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The dorsal stream and the visual horizon.Michael Madary - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):423-438.details
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Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.details
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Phenomenal properties are luminous properties.Geoffrey Hall - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11001-11022.details
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Confining ‘Disenhanced’ Animals.John Hadley - 2012 - NanoEthics 6 (1):41-46.details
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The Collapse Argument.Joseph Gottlieb - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):1-20.details
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Los cinco sexos, o cómo establecemos fronteras categoriales moralmente relevantes en un mundo difuso y continuo.Antoni Gomila - 2013 - Arbor 189 (762):a050.details
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What Is It Like To …?D. Goldstick - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (1):27-30.details
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An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.details
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The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.details
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Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2020 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7.details
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Anesthesia and Consciousess.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 5 (1):49-69.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Against the Necessity of Functional Roles for Conscious Experience: Reviving and Revising a Neglected Argument.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):33-53.details
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Consciousness.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind. Quebec: Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48.details
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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Animal Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Springer: Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.details
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Why should our mind-reading abilities be involved in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness?Diana I. Pérez - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):35-84.details
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