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  1. Relativism, Faultlessness, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Micah Dugas - 2018 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (2):137-150.
    Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in relativism. Proponents have defended various accounts that seek to model the truth-conditions of certain propositions along the lines of standard possible world semantics. The central challenge for such views has been to explain what advantage they have over contextualist theories with regard to the possibility of disagreement. I will press this worry against Max Kölbel’s account of faultless disagreement. My case will proceed along two distinct but connected lines. First, I (...)
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  • Desacuerdo sin falta y retractación Una defensa del relativismo sobre juicios de gusto.David Bordonaba - 2019 - Ideas Y Valores 68 (170):205-228.
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  • Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-Conformists.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):239-247.
    In recent work, J. Adam Carter argues that truth-relativism should be compatible with the so-called conformist response to peer disagreement about taste to the effect that subjects should revise their opinions. However, Carter claims that truth-relativism cannot make sense of this response since it cannot make sense of the idea that when two subjects are recognised as epistemic peers, they should acknowledge that they are equally likely to be right about the targeted issue. The main aim of this paper is (...)
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  • Disagreement and Dispute.Delia Belleri - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):289-307.
    In this paper, I will trace a distinction between two different ways of thinking about doxastic conflicts. The first way emphasises what is going on at the level of semantics, when two subjects disagree by uttering certain sentences or accepting certain contents. The second way emphasises some aspects that are epistemic in kind, which concern what subjects are rationally required to do whenever they disagree with someone. The semantics-oriented and epistemically-oriented notions will serve for the purpose of assessing some aspects (...)
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