Recent research has highlighted the character and importance of the study of agreement. This paper, paralleling work on the more familiar concept of deep disagreement, will provide a first articulation of the character and implications of deep agreements, that is, agreements so deep that disagreement cannot overcome them. To do so, I start by outlining the main features of deep disagreement. I then provide a brief characterization of agreement in general to ground the discussion of the unique characteristics of deep (...) agreements and compare them to deep disagreements. After distinguishing the concept from other more familiar ones, I then point to a few of the major social and theoretical issues the existence of deep agreements poses before concluding with some remarks pointing to valuable areas for future research. (shrink)

Adversariality in argumentation is typically theorized as inhering in, and applying to, the interactional roles of proponent and opponent that arguers occupy. This paper considers the kinds of adversariality located in the conversational roles arguers perform while arguing—specifically listening. It begins by contending that the maximally adversarial arguer is an arguer who refuses to listen to reason by refusing to listen to another’s reasons. It proceeds to consider a list of lousy listeners in order to illustrate the variety of ways (...) that the conversational role of listener can be performed adversarially. Because conversational roles, while not adversarial by nature, can be enacted adversarially, arguers are properly subject to praise and blame for their performances of these roles. Thus, the paper concludes, argumentation theory stands in need of an articulated normative vocabulary and theory to codify, apply, explain, and justify the norms of listening governing, guiding, and appraising arguers’ performances of listening in argumentation. (shrink)

A broad assumption in argumentation theory is that argumentation primarily regards resolving, confronting, or managing disagreement. This assumption is so fundamental that even when there does not appear to be any real disagreement, the disagreement is suggested to be present at some other level. Some have questioned this assumption (most prominently, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Doury), but most are reluctant to give up on the key idea that persuasion, the core of argumentation theory, can only regard disagreements. We argue here (...) that this assumption is false. Argument may be as much about strengthening or maintaining agreement as it is about disagreement. Once we see how argument is possible and manifestly enacted under conditions of agreement, then we have tools to explain otherwise curious fallacies and argumentative phenomena. (shrink)

This essay has two connected theses. First, that given the contrastivity of reasons, a form of dialectical adversariality of argument follows. This dialectical adversariality accounts for a broad variety of both argumentative virtues and vices. Second, in light of this contrastivist view of reasons, the primary objection to argumentative adversarialism, the winners-and-losers problem, can be answered.

Disputational models of argumentation have been criticized as introducing adversariality into argumentation by mistakenly conceiving of it as minimally adversarial, and, in doing so, structurally incentivizing ancillary adversariality. As an alternative, non-adversarial models of argumentation like inquiry have been recommended. In this article I defend disputational, minimally adversarial models of disagreement-based argumentation. First, I argue that the normative kernel of minimal adversariality is properly located in the normative fabric of disagreement, not our practices of disputation. Thus, argumentation’s minimal adversariality is (...) a hereditary, rather than an acquired, trait. Second, I show how attempts to model disagreement-based argumentation non-adversarially, as co-inquiry, misrepresent the normative commitments of disagreers. Indeed, such attempts backfire in their efforts to make argumentation less adversarial, by removing the normative, discursive mechanisms by which we may hold each other to rational account for our commitments. Finally, I show how regulative models of disputation, like the Pragma-Dialectical critical discussion, are designed to minimize ancillary adversariality thereby preventing its escalation. (shrink)

In dem vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich an aktuelle argumentationsdidaktische Überlegungen anknüpfen und einen spezifischen Aspekt genauer untersuchen, der von der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung bisher ein Stück weit vernachlässigt worden ist. Dieser Aspekt betrifft die Vermittlung sogenannter argumentativer Metakompetenzen, worunter ich grob gesprochen Fähigkeiten des angemessenen Gebrauchs bzw. der verantwortungsvollen Regulation von argumentativen Kompetenzen verstehe. Die grundlegende Idee ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Ausbildung basaler argumentativer Fähigkeiten zwar grundsätzlich durchaus wichtig und wünschenswert ist, dass aber gleichzeitig ein Einsatz dieser Fähigkeiten in (...) unterschiedlichen Situationen ganz unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllt. Dementsprechend müssen Lernende nicht nur mit argumentativen Kompetenzen ausgestattet, sondern darüber hinaus auch zu einem reflektierten und situativ angemessenen Gebrauch dieser Kompetenzen befähigt werden. (shrink)

Der Sammelband umfasst Aufsätze zu den Grundfragen, Anwendungen und Grenzen des Unterrichts des Argumentierens, in allen Fächern und mit Fokus auf die Fächer Philosophie und Ethik. Dabei werden Fragen wie diese behandelt: Welchen Zielen dient das Argumentieren und welche verfolgt der Unterricht des Argumentierens? In welchem Verhältnis stehen diese zu anderen Zielen des Unterrichts? Welche Kenntnisse, Fähigkeiten und Tugenden des Argumentierens sollen eingeübt werden und wie? Die vorgeschlagenen Antworten sind nicht nur für Personen aus der Fachdidaktik, sondern auch aus der (...) Philosophie und der Schullehrpraxis aller Fächer interessant. Der Band trägt damit auch zur stärkeren Etablierung des Felds der Argumentationsdidaktik bei. (shrink)

The Argumentative Adversariality debate is over the question of whether argument must be adversarial. A particular locus of this debate is on skeptical challenges in critical dialogue. The Default Skeptical Stance in argument is a practical manifestation of argumentative adversariality. Views about the on-the-ground value of the DSS vary. On one hand, in “The Social & Political Limitations of Philosophy”, Phyllis Rooney argues that the DSS leads to epistemic injustice. On the other, Allan Hazlett in his recent piece “Critical Injustice” (...) argues for the virtues of the skeptical stance in terms of epistemic justice. Both Rooney and Hazlett are concerned with the role skeptical engagement plays in argument, but they assign opposite values to it. In this essay, I review Rooney and Hazlett’s examples and show that the epistemic dysfunction in the two scholar’s going cases is one and the same, and argue that the cause of both is a lack of proper skeptical engagement. Skeptical engagement is a requirement for epistemic justice. Together and constitute an initial defense of the Adversarialist position against objections regarding the social epistemic risk of the skeptical stance. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the debate about the strawman fallacy. It is the received view that strawmen are employed to fool not the arguer whose argument they distort, but instead a third party, an audience. I argue that strawmen that fool their victims exist and are an important variation of the strawman fallacy because of their special perniciousness. I show that those who are subject to hermeneutical lacunae or who have since forgotten parts of justifications they have provided earlier (...) are especially vulnerable to falling for strawmen aimed at their own positions or arguments. Adversarial argumentation provides especially fertile ground for strawmen that fool their own victims, but cooperative argumentation is no fail-safe protection from them either. (shrink)

Arguments involve, at minimum, attempts at presenting something that an audience will take to be a reason. Reasons, once understood, affect an addressee’s beliefs in ways that are in some significant sense outside of their direct voluntary control. Since such changes may impact the well-being, life projects, or sense of self of the addressee, they risk infringing upon their autonomy. We call this the “autonomy worry” of argumentation. In light of this worry, this paper asks whether one ought to seek (...) an addressee’s consent before arguing with them. We first consider the view that arguing of any sort and on any topic requires consent. However, such a view is extreme, and we reject the general requirement of consent because argument contains its own internal permission structure. We find, however, that this permission structure is not always operative, and that consent may nonetheless be morally required in certain kinds of cases. (shrink)

Minimal adversariality consists in the opposition of contradictory conclusions in argumentation, and its usual metaphorical expression as a game between combating arguers has seen it be criticized from a number of perspectives: the language used, whether cooperation best attains the argumentative telos of epistemic betterment, and the ideal nature of the metaphor itself. This paper explores primarily the idealization of deductive argumentation, which is problematic due to its attenuated applicability to a dialectic involving premises and justificatory biases that are left (...) hidden and unelucidated. To clarify the issue and offer up a solution, we consider minimal adversariality as an involuntary state of affairs before relating this interpretation to a link between rational persuasion and the attainment of epistemic betterment. Through this we see how the idealizing tendencies of minimal adversariality can be reduced even in argumentation involving premises whose justifications for any arguer are inaccessible to any other arguer. (shrink)

Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines (...) whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them. (shrink)

When people argue, they are vulnerable to unwanted and costly changes in their beliefs. This vulnerability motivates the position that belief involuntarism makes argument inherently adversarial, as well as the development of alternatives to adversarial argumentation such as “invitational rhetoric”. The emphasis on involuntary belief change in such accounts, in our perspective, neglects three dimensions of arguing: the diversity of arguer intentions, audience agency, and the benefits of belief change. The complex impact of arguments on both audiences and arguers involves (...) vulnerabilities related to various forces of argument, not just the intellectual force of premise-conclusion complexes. Shifting emphasis from adversariality to vulnerability, we propose a more holistic understanding of argument, in which vulnerability reveals various sources of strength and opportunity in addition to risk. (shrink)

Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are (...) adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions. (shrink)

Can arguments change minds? Philosophers like to think that they can. However, a wealth of empirical evidence suggests that arguments are not very efficient tools to change minds. What to make of the different assessments of the mind-changing potential of arguments? To address this issue, we must take into account the broader contexts in which arguments occur, in particular the propagation of messages across networks of attention, and the choices that epistemic agents must make between alternative potential sources of content (...) and information, which are very much influenced by perceptions of reliability and trustworthiness. Arguments can change minds, but only under conducive, favourable socio-epistemic conditions. (shrink)