- Taking type-b materialism seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.details
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Analysis, schmanalysis.Steve Petersen - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):pp. 289-299.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Type-q materialism.Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - In Chase B. Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.details
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(1 other version)Iterating definiteness.Cian Dorr - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Conceptual and linguistic analysis: A two-step program.Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):267–291.details
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A priori entailment and conceptual analysis: Making room for type-c physicalism.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111.details
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Analytic truths—still harmless after all these years?Christian Nimtz - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):91-118.details
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(1 other version)A non-eliminative understanding of austere nominalism.Philip Goff - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54.details
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Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub‐types.Michael Esfeld & Christian Sachse - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1 – 17.details
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The limits of conceptual analysis.Laura Schroeter - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):425-453.details
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Scott Soames' two-dimensionalism.David J. Chalmers - 2006details
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Considering empty worlds as actual.Laura Schroeter - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):331-347.details
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(1 other version)Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness constrained: Commentary on Metzinger.Josh Weisberg - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.details
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The evidential status of philosophical intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.details
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(2 other versions)Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.details
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Against A Priori reductions.Laura Schroeter - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586.details
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The Role of Consciousness in Electoral Behavior: Philosophical Analysis.Ірина Анатоліївна ФАРАФОНОВА - 2024 - Epistemological studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences 7 (1):122-127.details
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The Possibility Bias is not Justified.Samuel Kimpton-Nye - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.details
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The a Priori Truth of Modal Rationalism.Harry Cleeveley - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):816-836.details
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A Kripkean argument for descriptivism.Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):654-669.details
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¿Qué hace físicamente posible a un mundo posible?Manuel Jesús Herrera Aros & Cristián Ariel López - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (1):65-88.details
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Law-Determination as Grounding: A Common Grounding Framework for Jurisprudence.Samuele Chilovi & George Pavlakos - 2019 - Legal Theory 25 (1):53-76.details
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Possible worlds and ideology.Constant Thomas - 2017 - Dissertation, Cardiff Universitydetails
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Can self-representationalism explain away the apparent irreducibility of consciousness?Tom McClelland - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1-22.details
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The Zombie Attack, Perry’s Parry, and a Riposte: A Slight Softening of the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness.J. Brendan Ritchie - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):55-65.details
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Necessity and Apriority.Gordon Prescott Barnes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495-523.details
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New Life for Carnap’s Aufbau?Hannes Leitgeb - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):265-299.details
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Explanation and the Explanatory Gap.Elanor Taylor - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):77-88.details
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Files, Indexicals and Descriptivism.Krista Lawlor - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):147-158.details
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A defense of the knowledge argument.John Martin DePoe - unknowndetails
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How to Explain the Explanatory Gap.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):117-135.details
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Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics.Tim Henning - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):717-748.details
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The zombie's cogito: Meditations on type-Q materialism.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585-605.details
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Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.details
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Two-dimensional semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Are sensations still brain processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.details
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Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption.Ragnar Francén - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Identity theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.details
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A third way in metaethics.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):1-30.details
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Names.Sam Cumming - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Conceivability, higher order patterns, and physicalism.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz & Amir Horowitz - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):349-366.details
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Turning the zombie on its head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.details
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Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience.Thomas W. Polger - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92.details
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The rationalist foundations of Chalmers's 2-d semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):227-255.details
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Reduction and emergence in the physical sciences: Reply to Rueger.Max Kistler - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):347 - 354.details
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(1 other version)Closing the gap on pain: Mechanism, theory, and fit.Thomas W. Polger & Kenneth J. Sufka - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.details
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On ensuring that physicalism is not a dual attribute theory in sheep's clothing.Frank Jackson - 2006 - Philsophical Studies 131 (1):227-249.details
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