Since the publication of his seminal monograph "The scientific image", Bas van Fraassen is a key figure in philosophy of science. In this book, other philosophers with various outlooks critically discuss his work on theories, empiricism and philosophical stances. The book starts with a new article by van Fraassen on his preferred account of theories, the so-called semantic view. This account is now 50 years old, and van Fraassen takes this anniversary as an opportunity to review the account, its history (...) and the philosophical discussion about it. In the main part of the book, Nancy Cartwright, Finnur Dellsén, Matthias Egg, Steven French, Michael Friedman, Milena Ivanova and Michela Massimi discuss van Fraassen's contributions to philosophy. Three chapters focus on his engagement with realism (French, Friedman, Ivanova). Others study his voluntarism (Cartwright) and his view on representation (Massimi). Finally, there are contributions about his elaboration of empiricism (Dellsén) and his proposal to consider philosophical positions as stances (Egg). The volume includes a laudatio written by Steven French and finishes with a reply by van Fraassen to his critics. (shrink)

In this talk I present the main results from Anta (2021), namely, that the theoretical division between Boltzmannian and Gibbsian statistical mechanics should be understood as a separation in the epistemic capabilities of this physical discipline. In particular, while from the Boltzmannian framework one can generate powerful explanations of thermal processes by appealing to their microdynamics, from the Gibbsian framework one can predict observable values in a computationally effective way. Finally, I argue that this statistical mechanical schism contradicts the Hempelian (...) (1958) thesis that the predictive power of a scientific theory is directly proportional to its explanatory potential, and vice versa. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a critique of taxonomic pluralism, namely the view that there are multiple correct ways to classify entities into natural kinds within a given scientific domain. I argue that taxonomic pluralism, as an anti-essentialist position, fails to provide a realist alternative to taxonomic monism, i.e., the view that there is only one correct way to classify entities into natural kinds within a given scientific domain. To establish my argument, I first explain why the naturalist approach to (...) natural kinds adopted by pluralists requires them to give up the mind-independence criterion of reality presupposed by monists. Next, I survey two types of pluralist account. I argue that, while the modest pluralist account is not pluralistic enough, the radical pluralist account fails to come up with an alternative criterion of reality that is robust enough to differentiate its position from anti-realism about natural kinds. I conclude by drawing out the implications of my critique for the essentialism/anti-essentialism debate about natural kinds. (shrink)

According to contemporary ‘process ontology’, organisms are best conceptualised as spatio-temporally extended entities whose mereological composition is fundamentally contingent and whose essence consists in changeability. In contrast to the Aristotelian precepts of classical ‘substance ontology’, from the four-dimensional perspective of this framework, the identity of an organism is grounded not in certain collections of privileged properties, or features which it could not fail to possess, but in the succession of diachronic relations by which it persists, or ‘perdures’ as one entity (...) over time. In this paper, I offer a novel defence of substance ontology by arguing that the coherency and plausibility of the radical reconceptualisation of organisms proffered by process ontology ultimately depends upon its making use of the ‘substantial’ principles it purports to replace. (shrink)

A large part of our exploration of the world consists in categorizing or classifying the objects and processes we encounter, both in scientific and everyday contexts. There are various, perhaps innumerable, ways to sort objects into different kinds or categories, but it is commonly assumed that, among the countless possible types of classifications, one group is privileged. Philosophy refers to such categories as natural kinds. Standard examples of such kinds include fundamental physical particles, chemical elements, and biological species. The term (...) natural does not imply that natural kinds ought to categorize only naturally occurring stuff or objects. Candidates for natural kinds can include man-made substances, such as synthetic elements, that can be created in a laboratory. The naturalness in question is not the naturalness of the entities being classified, but that of the groupings themselves. Groupings that are artificial or arbitrary are not natural; they are invented or imposed on nature. Natural kinds, on the other hand, are not invented, and many assume that scientific investigations should discover them. (shrink)

In this paper I elicit a prediction from structural realism and compare it, not to a historical case, but to a contemporary scientific theory. If structural realism is correct, then we should expect physics to develop theories that fail to provide an ontology of the sort sought by traditional realists. If structure alone is responsible for instrumental success, we should expect surplus ontology to be eliminated. Quantum field theory (QFT) provides the framework for some of the best confirmed theories in (...) science, but debates over its ontology are vexed. Rather than taking a stand on these matters, the structural realist can embrace QFT as an example of just the kind of theory SR should lead us to expect. Yet, it is not clear that QFT meets the structuralist's positive expectation by providing a structure for the world. In particular, the problem of unitarily inequivalent representations threatens to undermine the possibility of QFT providing a unique structure for the world. In response to this problem, I suggest that the structuralist should endorse pluralism about structure. (shrink)

Current controversies about knowledge integration reflect conflicting ideas of what it means to “take Indigenous knowledge seriously”. While there is increased interest in integrating Indigenous and Western scientific knowledge in various disciplines such as anthropology and ethnobiology, integration projects are often accused of recognizing Indigenous knowledge only insofar as it is useful for Western scientists. The aim of this article is to use tools from philosophy of science to develop a model of both successful integration and integration failures. On the (...) one hand, I argue that cross-cultural recognition of property clusters leads to an ontological overlap that makes knowledge integration often epistemically productive and socially useful. On the other hand, I argue that knowledge integration is limited by ontological divergence. Adequate models of Indigenous knowledge will therefore have to take integration failures seriously and I argue that integration efforts need to be complemented by a political notion of ontological self-determination. (shrink)

I consider the idea of a structure of fundamental physical particles being causal. Causation is traditionally thought of as involving relations between entities—objects or events—that cause and are affected. On structuralist interpretations, however, it is unclear whether or how precisely fundamental particles can be causally efficacious. On some interpretations, only relations exist; on others, particles are ontologically dependent on their relations in ways that problematize the traditional picture. I argue that thinking about causal efficacy in this context generates an inevitable (...) pattern of reasoning. To assess the cogency of a given structuralist proposal one must take a stand with respect to a significant metaphysical challenge. Two options then emerge: skepticism about the form of structuralism at issue; or a dissolution of the challenge by means of a contentious ontological primitive. I contend that the choice between these options cannot be forced on scientific or philosophical grounds alone. (shrink)

Chemical kinds (e.g. gold) are generally treated as having timelessly fixed identities. Biological kinds (e.g. goldfinches) are generally treated as evolved and/or evolving entities. So what kind of kind is a biochemical kind? This paper defends the thesis that biochemical molecules are clustered chemical kinds, some of which–namely, evolutionarily conserved units–are also biological kinds.On this thesis, a number of difficulties that have recently occupied philosophers concerned with proteins and kinds are shown to be resolved or dissolved.

Attempting to compare scientific theories requires a philosophical model of meaning. Yet different scientific theories have at times—particularly in early chemistry—pre-supposed disparate theories of meaning. When two theories of meaning are incommensurable, we must say that the scientific theories that rely upon them are meta-incommensurable. Meta- incommensurability is a more profound sceptical threat to science since, unlike first-order incommensurability, it implies complete incomparability.

RÉSUMÉDans Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology, je soutiens que les convictions ontologiques associées à la recherche scientifique sont imprégnées de convictions philosophiques. Les interprétations de l'ontologie scientifique impliquent ce que j'appelle des inférences métaphysiques et, qui plus est, il existe différentes façons de faire ces inférences sur la base de positions épistémiques différentes, mais néanmoins rationnelles. Si cette analyse est juste, elle problématise toute distinction nette entre la métaphysique naturalisée et les autres types de métaphysique, et dissout (...) toute présomption qu'il existe une seule bonne réponse aux questions ontologiques liées aux sciences. Dans cet article, je considère quelques-uns des importants défis qu'Amanda Bryant, Stathis Psillos et Matthew Slater posent à l'endroit de ces affirmations. (shrink)

In this paper, we reconsider the context of Barbara Carper'salternative ways of knowing,a prominent discourse in modern nursing theory in North America. We explore this relative to the concepts ofrealism, non‐realismandnominalism, and investigate the philosophical divisions behind the original typology, particularly in relationship to modern scientific enquiry. We examine forms of knowledge relative to realist and nominalist positions and make an argument ad absurdum against relativistic interpretations of knowledge using the example of Borge's Chinese Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge. We propose (...) a contentious postpositivist practical classification for nursing knowledge that demonstrates and supports the idea that knowledge has both individual and subjective components. This classification supports the practical application of nursing knowledge within the paradigm of realist postpositivist science. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend's metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science. Feyerabend's late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and provide a systematic alternative to traditional scientific realism, a package of views he sometimes referred to as “scientific materialism.” Scientific materialism is objectionable not only on metaphysical grounds, nor because it provides a poor ground for understanding science, but because it implies problematic (...) claims about the epistemic and cultural authority of science, claims incompatible with situating science properly in democratic societies. I show how Feyerabend's metaphysical view, which I call “the abundant world” or “abundant realism,” constitute a sophisticated and challenging form of ontological pluralism that makes interesting connections with contemporary philosophy of science and issues of the political and policy role of science in a democratic society. (shrink)

The paper discusses the recent literature on abstraction/idealization in connection with the “paradox of infinite idealization.” We use the case of taking thermodynamics limit in dealing with the phenomena of phase transition and critical phenomena to broach the subject. We then argue that the method of infinite idealization is widely used in the practice of science, and not all uses of the method are the same. We then confront the compatibility problem of infinite idealization with scientific realism. We propose and (...) defend a contextualist position for realism and argue that the cases for infinite idealization appear to be fully compatible with contextual realism. (shrink)

Recent discussions about the microstructure of materials generally focus on the ontological aspects of the molecular structure. However, there are many types of substances that cannot be studied by means of the concept of molecule, for example, salts. For the quantum treatment of these substances, a new particle, called phonon, is introduced. Phonons are generally conceived as a pseudo-particle, that is, a mathematical device necessary to perform calculations but which does not have a "real" existence. In this context, the aim (...) of this paper will be to analyze the ontological status of phonons. For such purposes we will critically analyze the arguments that would account for the presumed nonexistence of phonons. Finally, having already demonstrated that there are not enough reasons to consider phonons as non-existing entities, we will explore some possibilities that allow us to elucidate their ontological status. (shrink)

Worrall :99–124, 1989) famously claimed that structural realism is the best of both worlds; it enables one to endorse the best arguments for scientific realism and antirealism. In this paper, I argue that structural realism also enables one to combine two other seemingly inconsistent positions: realism and pluralism. Indeed, the very features which form the basis of the structural realist’s reply to the problem of theory change may be applied synchronically to allow for a pluralist structural realism. The resulting position (...) incorporates a robust variety of scientific pluralism unavailable to the traditional realist and thereby allows the structural realist to take seriously the pluralism apparent in scientific practice. (shrink)

The paper discusses the recent literature on abstraction/idealization in connection with the “paradox of infinite idealization.” We use the case of taking thermodynamics limit in dealing with the phenomena of phase transition and critical phenomena to broach the subject. We then argue that the method of infinite idealization is widely used in the practice of science, and not all uses of the method are the same. We then confront the compatibility problem of infinite idealization with scientific realism. We propose and (...) defend a contextualist position for realism and argue that the cases for infinite idealization appear to be fully compatible with contextual realism. (shrink)

One of the factors that adversely influenced the worldwide reception of Fleck was the rather narrow critical interest that his ideas had aroused in Poland. Apart from a few reviews of his book, only two polemics were published before WWII, and these likewise fell into oblivion. The philosophical views of one of those polemists, Tadeusz Bilikiewicz, shared the same fate. Since an acquaintance with Bilikiewicz’s background would seem to be a necessary condition for a understanding of his controversy with Fleck, (...) the aim of this paper is to sketch his views on the history and sociology of science, and to clarify certain errors regarding the facts of his life. (shrink)

Integrating local knowledge about environmental and socioeconomic circumstances is necessary in order for development efforts to be responsive to local realities and needs. However, knowledge-integ...

Chemical kinds are generally treated as having timelessly fixed identities. Biological kinds are generally treated as evolved and/or evolving entities. So what kind of kind is a biochemical kind? This article defends the thesis that biochemical molecules are clustered chemical kinds, some of which—namely, evolutionarily conserved units—are also biological kinds. On this thesis, a number of difficulties that have recently occupied philosophers concerned with proteins and kinds are shown to be either resolved or dissolved. 1 Introduction2 Conflicting Intuitions about Kinds (...) of Proteins3 Against Permissive Pluralism4 Against Nominalism, Toward a Duality of Kinds5 Biological Kinds, Chemical Kinds, and Their Relations6 Implications for Biological Individuals7 Implications for Monism and Scientific Practice. (shrink)

A los cristales se los describe como a una red de átomos que puede vibrar alrededor de su posición de equilibrio. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la energía de estas ondas esté cuantificada sugiere una analogía con el campo electromagnético. En analogía con el fotón se define al fonón. Generalmente se concibe al fonón como a una cuasi-partícula, es decir, como a un instrumento matemático útil en los cálculos pero sin una existencia propia. En este trabajo estudiamos el estatuto (...) ontológico del fonón y argumentaremos en favor de la idea de considerarlo como una partícula real. (shrink)